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ABSTRACT 
On 2 August 1990 Iraq invaded and occupied the Emirate of Kuwait, 
setting in motion a chain of events that led to the largest military build 
up since the Second World War. These events, which have come to be 
known as the Persian Gulf Crisis and War of 1990/91 provide an 
important background for the analysis of New Zealand's 'decision' to 
provide military personnel to the multi-national force being assembled in 
the Gulf in December 1990. 
Unlike many of its traditional friends and allies New Zealand had not 
been invited to join the United States sponsored coalition and military 
force due to the strained relationship that had existed between New 
Zealand and the United States since the ANZUS dispute of the mid-
1980s. 
However, membership was not contingent upon an 'invitation' and New 
Zealand came under pressure from domestic and external sources to join 
the coalition, which it did so in December 1990. It is argued that this 
decision was possibly the catalyst for a significant improvement in the 
New Zealand-United States relationship and lead to a much more active 




The primary objective of this thesis is to examine the decision by New 
Zealand to contribute troops to the multi-national forces during the 
Persian Gulf War of 1990/91 within a foreign policy decision making 
framework utilising a levels of analysis approach. 
There are a number of factors that make this thesis both unusual and 
important. Firstly this case study has not been addressed previously, so 
it will fill a gap in the literature. Secondly the events of the case study 
occurred at a time of considerable change in both New Zealand and the 
wider world, following the end of the Cold War. The impact of this is 
reflected in the methodology of the thesis. For example in terms of 
personality. outlook, and intellect there were three different prime 
ministers within a period of just two months. At the national level there 
were two separate governments, the first of which had been beset by a 
recent history of internal differences and leadership changes and 
impending electoral devastation. The defence establishment was in the 
process of adjusting to radical reshaping and was forced to feel its way 
through a new and unfamiliar policy process while dealing with a largely 
hesitant and uncertain political leadership. In the immediate post-Cold 
War era the international system was in flux, and the United Nations and 
member states adjusted to new roles, norms and opportunities. 
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The literature suggests that a political crisis impacts upon a routine 
decision making process in the following ways: 
1. the number of individuals exercising authority is reduced; 
2. the number of alternative solutions is reduced: 
3. the rate of communication within and between domestic 
foreign policy agencies is increased; 
4. the rate of communication with the foreign policy agencies of 
international actors is increased; and 
5. the frequency with which decision makers are likely to take 
action increases1• 
There is also a reduction in the amount of time available for the 
completion of the decision making process. Often foreign policy decisions 
are debated. written, rewritten, and debated again in various stages and 
fora for months, sometimes years before any action is taken. However 
crisis decision making places a premium on urgency. The fact that it took 
four months, two governments and three prime ministers before a 
deciSion was made to commit non-combatant forces indicates that it was 
either (a) a complex and important issue that could not be dealt with 
quickly, and/or (b) one that was hampered by hesitancy and uncertainty 
on the part of the deCision makers. The logistics of the decision making 
process will form the basis for the substantive chapters in this thesis. 
I c.F. Hermann, "Threat, Time, and Surprise: a Simulation ofInternational Crisis" in C.F. Hermann. Ed., 
International Crises: Insights i;'om Behavioral Research, New York. 1972, pp. 195-207. 
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As well as the considerations of time and space, the decision making 
process in small states during a period of international crisis might be 
expected to be limited and constrained by the following factors: 
1. geo-political forces, 
2. limited flow of information, 
3. limited resources for unexpected actions, and 
4. ideological compatibility with the major political actors. 
In theory this implies that the outcome of the decision making process 
should remain consistent despite changes in leadership and government. 
However, during the Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 there was a degree 
of policy variation, evidenced by different responses of the Labour and 
National governments. The reasons for this I also propose to examine. 
International crises rarely develop overnight, and the case of Iraq and 
Kuwait is no different. Chapter Two examines the crisis that led to Iraq 
invading Kuwait on 2 August 1990, and the request of Kuwait for 
assistance in the immediate post-invasion period. The reaction of US 
President George H. Bush will be analysed because it was he, and not 
the United Nations that was instrumental in the formation of the multi-
national force (MNF) 2 . Finally the key actions and resolutions of the 
United Nations, as they relate to New Zealand's decision to join the 
multi-national force will be analysed. 
Chapter three outlines the theoretical approach to the decision making 
process utilising three levels of interactive analysis: individual, domestic, 
2 When Bush fonned and led the international coalition it was done without initial support from many 
within the American government. This resistance is highlighted by the voting pattern when, on 12 January 
1991, Bush sought and obtained Congressional support for committing US troops to battle. The resolution 
authorising such action was only passed by a margin of 52-47 in the Senate and 250-183 in the House of 
Representatives. 
3 
and international. This approach was chosen because it offers scope for 
interactive analysis. Many foreign policy decision making studies 
concentrate on only one particular aspect of the process, whether it be a 
cognitive study of the decision maker, or an analysis of international 
interactions. However. many important interactive aspects and factors of 
a case study may be overlooked simply because they do not fit the 
specified criteria. For example in early October 1990, Mike Moore, as 
Prime Minister decided to send a series of international cables regarding 
a possible New Zealand military contribution to the US sponsored 
international force operating in the Gulf. This action clearly fits into the 
individual level. However. because he made this decision after consulting 
with officials whom he also ordered to carryout the action it also impacts 
upon the domestic level. Accordingly because the cables were sent to 
several international actors including the United Nations. Britain, and 
the United States it also falls under the international level. There are 
some examples of sectional interaction, however, repetition is avoided as 
much as possible. 
Chapter four examines the decision making processes of the key 
individuals in the role of prime minister, who had different foreign policy 
experiences and approaches, including on the question of committing 
troops to the MNF, including their exposure to new ideas and 
information. This chapter has two distinct sections. The first examines 
comparatively the circumstances associated with leadership change 
during a period of international crisis3 . The second section deals more 
explicitly with the criSiS, focusing on their decision making process 
including personality traits that that influenced their decision making. 
3 This is important as the literature on small state makes very little comment on leadership change. 
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Chapter five examines some aspects of domestic politics in the context of 
the decision making process. Specific reference is given to the Ministry of 
External Relations and Trade (MERT), Ministry of Defence (MOD), and 
the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) who were most active in the 
decision making process at the domestic level. It also looks at the 
upheaval and reorganisation that occurred in the defence sector in the 
immediate years preceding the case study as this impacted markedly on 
the adviSOry element of the process. 
Chapter Six examines New Zealand's place in the international 
environment, its relationships with its traditional allies. and its 
international interactions during the crisis period, including the recent 
ANZUS dispute and its impact on New Zealand's international 
relationships during the formation of the MNF. Communication with and 
reaction from New Zealand's traditional allies over a potential military 
contribution is also discussed in this context as this was important in 
terms of both the actual decision to contribute, and the nature of that 
contribution. 
The final chapter of this thesis offers an explanation for the variability in 
New Zealand's policy towards the height of the crisis with some 
theoretical observations for further study. 
The Literature 
An analysis of foreign policy raises some interesting questions that 
reqUire addressing4, For example. this review highlights the following 
inadequacies in the literature: 
4 The biggest problem with doing a literature review on foreign policy decision making or the levels of 
analysis is that there is an abundance of literature in these areas. Any holes or deficiencies have long since 
been noted, explored and exploited. The likes of the Hermanns, Kaplan. Frankel, Rosenau, East, Et. Ai., 
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1. It tends to concentrate on either small European states. or 
developing states; 
2. It concentrates on general foreign policy behaviour, while 
crisis decision making receives less attention; 
3. Crisis behaviour is examined on the basis of involvement in, 
or in close proximity to, the conflict, 
4. It tends to concentrate on the relationship between the small 
state and larger actors, both states and Inter-Governmental 
Organisations (IGOs). 
A large preponderance of the literature tends to be either strictly 
theoretical or is written on smaller European states such as the 
Scandinavian countries and their relationships with primarily the larger 
European states5 • New Zealand, for example, barely features except as a 
part of tables relating to small states. One exception to this is the work of 
John Henderson (1991) who has examined New Zealand's foreign policy 
behaviour and cites six characteristics of small state behaviour6. 
Small state theorists such as Vital (1967, 1971) and East (1973, 1978) 
concentrate on general foreign policy behaviour and ignore crisis decision 
making. When small states are considered in crisis analysis they are 
have long since explored and examined the theoretical components of foreign policy decision making and 
produced many good insights. 
5 D. Vital, The Inequality of States: A Study of the Small Power in International Relations, Oxford, 1967. 
And D. Vital, The Survival of Small States: Studies in Small Power/Great Power Conflict, Oxford. 1971. 
And T. Mathisen, The Functions of Small States, Oslo, 1971. And M. Handel, Weak States in the 
International System, London. 1981. And W. Bauwens, A. Cleese. & O. Knudsen, Eds .. Small States and 
the Security Challenge in the New Europe, London, 1996. And R. Alapuro, Et Al., Small States in 
Comparative Perspective, Oslo, 1985. And M.A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two 
Models" in World Politics, Vol. 15, No.4., Princeton, 1973. 
6 J. Henderson, "New Zealand and the Foreign Policy of Small States" in R. Kennaway, & J. Henderson, 
Eds., Beyond New Zealand II, Auckland, 1991, p. 6. 
6 
generally small European states. In the context of a larger crisis such as 
Vital's use of pre-war Czechoslovakia. In addition those who study crisis 
behaviour such as Lebow (1981) and Hermann eLal., (1972) largely 
ignore small states. 
Because the literature almost exclusively concentrates on the foreign 
policy behaviour of small states in the context of larger states there are 
some important areas of foreign policy behaviour that have not been 
thoroughly examined. There are a very few studies that examine the 
crisis decision making behaviour of a small state. Because of these 
deficiencies this thesis will hopefully add to the literature as it examines 
the foreign policy behaviour of a small state indirectly involved in a 
mounting international crisis. 
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Chapter Two 
The Persian Gulf War 1990-1991 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a background to the case study of 
this thesis. This is necessary because it sets the context for New 
Zealand's decision by explaining the scope of the crisis and the 
international coalition assembled to deal with it. It will briefly cover the 
invasion that sparked the international crisis before giving more detail on 
the responses of the United States and the United Nations. 
THE IRAQ-KUWAIT CRISIS OF 1990 
From February through late July 1990 a state of crisis had effectively 
existed between Iraq and Kuwait. Iraq had issued various threats against 
Kuwait. often backing up these threats with military manoeuvres. 
President Saddam Hussein claimed that Kuwait was waging economic 
warfare against Baghdad because (a) Kuwait had refused to give in to 
Iraqi demands to cancel Baghdad's war debts, and (b) to loan it US$30 
billion for post-war economic reconstruction. At the Arab League summit 
meeting in Baghdad in May 1990, Saddam launched a stinging verbal 
assault on the Gulf States. Kuwait in particular. was singled out for 
inflating OPEC oil production quotas thus keeping oil prices down, 
refusing to forgive Iraq's debts from the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88), and for 
failing to extend post-war reconstruction credits to Iraq. 
The Kuwaitis attempted to ease the crisis and avert further trouble by 
making concessions at the negotiating table. These included 
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guaranteeing loans to the Iraqi government and sharing revenues from 
the al-Rumaylah oil field. The Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, and 
Saudi king, Fahd ibn Abdul Aziz, offered to help settle the deepening 
crisis. However at a meeting in Jidda, Saudi Arabia, on 1 August 1990, 
in what is now seen with hindsight as a clear statement of intentions, the 
Iraqi representative walked out, citing Kuwait's failure to discuss Iraqi 
territorial claims or to forgive Iraq's debts7. 
On 25 July 1990 US Ambassador to Iraq. April Glaspie, met with 
President Saddam Hussein. She told him that the US did not want to 
become involved in inter-Arab conflicts. How badly Glaspie misread the 
situation can be seen in her report to Washington where she wrote "his 
emphasis that he wants a peaceful settlement is surely sincere"8. Thus, 
as Baghdad prepared for a military assault on Kuwait. Sad dam 
successfully concealed his preparations by deceiving the United States 
and by agreeing to allow the Egyptians and Saudis to mediate an end to 
the quarrel9 . 
THE AUGUST 1990 INVASION 
Shortly before midnight of 1/2 August 1990, Iraqi scouts crossed the 
Kuwaiti border. At 2am the first Iraqi tanks and artillery of an invasion 
7 RG. Summers, Persian Gulf War Almanac, New York, 1995, p. 15. And B. W. W~ltson, Ed., Military 
Lessons of the Gulf War, London, 1993, pp. 17-18. 
x Cited in G.R. Hess, Presidential Decisions for War: Korea, Vietnam and the Persian Gulf War, 
Baltimore, 2001, p. 161. 
y Watson, 1993, pp. 17-18. 
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force that consisted of 140 000 troops and 1800 tanks crossed at the 
Abdaly customs post and the invasion was underwaylO. 
While the battles in the countryside lasted for three days or so, the 
invasion itself was already successful by about noon on the first day. The 
Iraqi forces captured Kuwait City quite quickly and easily. The only real 
resistance was at the Palace of the Emir itself where the King's younger 
brother Sheikh Fahd died while leading the defence of the palace. The 
Emir, Sheikh Jaber aI-Ahmed al-Sabah, and the rest of the royal family 
fled to Saudi Arabia where he established a government in exile ll . Within 
hours of the invasion the U.S. acceded to a Kuwaiti request and froze 
both Iraq's and Kuwait's considerable overseas assets 12• 
INITIAL UNITED STATES RESPONSE 
The United States and its main allies saw the invasion as intolerable on 
two counts. First. there was the undeniable fact that Kuwait had been 
recognised as independent by the world community since 1961, and a 
member of the United Nations since 196313 • Secondly its invasion and 
occupation by another state was a clear violation of international law. 
A no-less important consideration lay in the fact that Kuwait was a major 
oil producer. ApprOximately 65 percent of the world's known oil reserves 
at the time were located in the Middle East. Iraq controlled 9.9 percent of 
10 The Staff of US News and World Report, Triumph Without Victory: An Unreported History of The 
Persian Gulf War, New York, 1992, pp. 11-12. And Summers, 1995, pp. 12-18. And S.A. Yitev, The 
Persian Gulf Crisis, Westport, 1997, pp. 10-11. 
II Summers, 1995, p. 15. And Watson, 1993, p. 18. And Yitev, 1997. p. 11. And US News & World 
Report, 1992, p. 18. 
12 US News & World Report. 1992, pp. 36-39. 
13 1. Bickerton, & M. Pearson, 43 Davs: The Gulf War, Melbourne, 1991, p. 52. 
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the world's total, Kuwait, 9.3 percent, and Saudi Arabia 25.2 percent. 
Saddam's 9.9 percent was no mean figure, but if he were successful in 
annexing Kuwait, he would have controlled almost 20 percent of world oil 
production. If he took Saudi Arabia then he would have had an 
enormous 44 percent14. 
Throughout August and September 1990 New Zealand closely monitored 
the international oil market and liaised with the International Energy 
Agency (lEA) in order to gain early warning should an oil crisis develop. 
However, by 15 October 1990 the situation had stabilised to an extent 
that allowed Cabinet to note that it believed that it could cope in the 
advent of a limited oil shortfall15• 
Building a Coalition 
In the first hours after the invasion President Bush met with his advisors 
to discuss a proposed American response. Having decided that some 
form of action was needed Bush then set about calling various world 
leaders that he had built personal relationships with over the years. It 
was a hallmark of Bush's leadership style that was to playa great part in 
the building of the coalition. Some of the leaders he called included 
Presidents Turgut Ozal (Turkey), Hosni Mubarak (Egypt), King Hussein 
(Jordan), and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. Thatcher's 
immediate and solid support for both Bush and "the cause" helped 
consolidate Bush's own determination in the matter16. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 36/31, 15 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 VoL 15. 
16 US News & World Report, 1992, pp. 57-62. 
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Dealing with the Saudis 
Bush and his advisors met again on 3 August to discuss a reaction to the 
invasion. They decided that no matter how hard it was for the U.S. to 
respond due to the distances involved. they had to get the flag in the 
ground in the region. In this respect they looked towards Saudi Arabia as 
they believed that Saddam was obviously prepared to fight over Kuwait, 
but would he be willing to fight the U.S? A series of meetings were held at 
Camp David the following day, 4 August. At these meetings Bush and his 
advisors, who by this time included Generals Powell and Schwarzkopf, 
discussed the deployment of troops. Two options were considered: 
retaliatory strikes utilising aircraft carriers and cruise missiles; and 
Operational Plan 1002-90, that had been created some months earlier 
during the pre-invasion posturing. The plan called for 200,000 troops 
but was reliant on Saudi permission to use their territory as a staging 
area l7. 
On 6 August Secretary of Defence Dick Cheney and General Schwarzkopf 
travelled to Riyadh and sought approval from Saudi ruler, King Fahd. At 
the completion of this meeting Cheney telephoned Bush from the state 
guesthouse and let him know that Fahd had officially requested U.S. aid. 
Bush then gave the go ahead for the deployment of the first US troopSlB. 
Bush Continues to Build His Coalition 
Mter ensuring permission for US troops to be allowed to base themselves 
in Saudi Arabia, Bush continued to build a coalition against the Iraqis. 
On 7 August, he appeared in public with British Prime Minister Margaret 
17 Ibid., pp. 49-51,65-77. 
18 Yitev. 1997, p. 14. And US News & World Report, 1992, pp. 62-64, 82-86. 
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Thatcher and Manfred Woerner. the Secretary General of Nato. Together 
they announced their mutual approval and acceptance of the UN 
embargo on Iraq and Kuwait. The next day Bush announced the 
deployment of US troops to the Persian Gulf. He claimed that the troops 
were there for defensive purposes only. that they were not there to 
remove Saddam. he said that that was the job of the UN embargo and 
sanctions19. Turkey gave approval for combat missions to be flown out of 
the large airforce base at Incirlik, and Britain pledged naval vessels for 
immediate deployment2o. 
Bush did not want the coalition to be a purely western force. It needed to 
be multi-national and especially to include Arab forces. On 10 August 
the Arab League voted 12 to 9 to send Arab troops to Saudi Arabia, and 
the first Egyptian troops arrived in Saudi on 11 August. Saddam 
responded by declaring Jihad (Holy War) on Israel and the United 
States21 . 
During this phase of activity Australia received a direct request from the 
United States to join the coalition while New Zealand did not, which 
some analysts saw as a deliberate snub22. Australia responded promptly 
to its public invitation, announcing on 11 August that it would 
contribute two guided missile frigates and a support vessel to the multi-
national force23• 
IY us News & World Report. 1992, pp. 91-94. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Summers, J 995, p. 19. 
22 I.M. Malik, The Gulf War: Australia's Role and Asian-Pacific Responses. Canberra, 1992. p. 91. 
23 J. Grey, A Military History afAustralia. Cambridge. 1999. p. 260. And B. Hawke, The Hawke Memoirs, 
Melbourne, 1994, pp. 512-513. 
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Building a multi-national coalition was not a cheap exercise for the 
Americans. Bush had to offer billions of dollars in aid and foreign loans 
to encourage some of the more hesitant countries whose commitment he 
needed. He did a deal with Malaysia, who were on the Security CounciL 
over textile import quotas: he let Turkey onsell some of their F16 fighter 
aircraft to Egypt to raise hard currency, and qUietly allowed Colombia to 
renounce a treaty on the extradition of drug traffickers. The Syrians, who 
were extremely reluctant to join the US sponsored international force, 
received billions in aid by way of inducement from Saudi Arabia. 24 
OPERATION DESERT SHIELD 
Operation Desert Shield, which was set in motion just one day after 
Bush's warning to Saddam on 3 August, became one of the largest 
military deployments in history. Altogether Bush assembled a coalition 
that grew to include thirty seven countries by the end of the Gulf War. 
The coalition force included more than half a million soldiers with a 
10,000 soldier brigade from the Arab Gulf states, 7,000 Kuwaiti soldiers, 
and 15,000 Syrian troops who fought only on Kuwaiti soil. due to their 
reluctance at fighting the Iraqis.25 
The major European countries were dependent on Gulf oil, had 
significant business interests in the region, and wanted to protect their 
regional political influence. Accordingly they played a major role in the 
US led coalition. The British sent 43,000 troops and large amounts of 
military eqUipment. while the French sent 16,000 soldiers. Wealthy 
24 US News & World Report. 1992, pp. 94-95. 
25 yitev, 1997, p. 17. 
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countries such as Japan, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Gennany provided 
large amounts of money to help finance the campaign. In the case of 
Gennany and Japan, this was in lieu of troops, which because of 
protocols related to WW2, they were prohibited from deploying 
overseas26 . 
However not all of the countries involved were major powers or wealthy, 
nor did they necessarily contribute large military forces. The small 
Australian naval taskforce assisted with an economic blockade of Iraq 
and Kuwait during this period and as we will see in later chapters, New 
Zealand provided transport aircraft and medical personnel. Other smaller 
countries such as the Netherlands, Sierra Leone, Honduras, and 
Romania also made modest contributions27 • 
THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND ITS KEY 
RESOLUTIONS 
The response of the United Nations was, at the time. unprecedented. 
During the Cold War the Security Council had been polarised by the 
stand off between the United States and the Soviet Union, with the veto 
frequently used by the pennanent members to protect their strategiC 
interests. The Gulf Crisis of 1990-91 saw for the first time the two 
superpowers working together within the framework of the UN on the 
basis of collective security to force Saddam to back down. 
26 Ibid., 
27 Watson, 1993, pp. 22]-222. 
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Between August and November 1990 the UN Security Council (UNSC) 
passed a total of twelve resolutions beginning with UNSC 660, which 
condemned the Iraqi occupation, and finishing with UNSC 678, which 
sanctioned the use of force. Three were of particular Significance for both 
this crisis and the UN as a whole. UNSC 661 was only the third UN 
resolution to impose economic sanctions against a state. UNSC 665 was 
the first time force had been authorised to enforce economic sanctions. 
And UNSC 678 was the first time states had been authorised to use 
discretion to achieve a UN objective28 
On 6 August, the Security Council passed Resolution 661. which 
imposed a trade embargo upon Iraq29. On 8 August Saddam responded 
to pressure from the international community by announcing that Iraq 
was annexing Kuwait. The following day the Security Council passed 
Resolution 662, declaring the Iraqi annexation of Kuwait to be void. On 
25 August, with no end to the crisis in sight the Security Council passed 
Resolution 665 autl!orising the use of force to enforce the embargo30 . As 
will be shown in later chapters the allied countries with whom New 
Zealand consulted regarded this resolution as being sufficient to cover 
New Zealand's wish for a specific UN request for military assistance. 
On 29 November the Security Council, following strong urging from the 
United States, passed Resolution 678. This was the most important 
Resolution passed during the conflict, and by its nature was ground 
breaking. It set 15 January 1991 as a deadline for Saddam Hussein to 
2X D.S. Papp, "The Gult'War Coalition: The Politics and Economics of a Most Unusual Alliance" in W. 
Head, & E.H. Tilford Jr., Ed:;., The Eagle in the Desert: Looking Back on US Involvement in the Persian 
Gulf War, Westport, 1996, p. 42. 
29 Summers, 1995, pp. 18-19. And US News & World Report, 1992, pp. 39,81-82. 
30 Summers, 1995, pp. 19-20. 
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withdraw from Kuwait or face military action from UN authorised forces 
to remove the Iraqi troops. By manoeuvring the Security Council into 
setting a deadline for an Iraqi withdrawal. the Bush administration 
sought to weaken CongreSSional opposition to committing US troops in a 
war zone. Second. the deadline helped Bush strengthen the will of those 
members of the coalition who preferred to wait for sanctions or 
negotiations to work31 . For New Zealand UNSC 678 came at an 
opportune time and confirmed the intention of the New Zealand 
government to contribute troops to the coalition force. 
While the coalition force operated under the banner of the UN it was not 
in actuality a UN force. In fact the ,UN Charter does not even envisage a 
UN force per se. Instead the Charter calls on members to hold their 
forces ready for use by the Security Council. A Military Staff Committee, 
drawing its members from the permanent five, has existed since 1945 
with the role of advising the Security Council on military issues and Co-
ordinating military operations32. Article 46 of the UN Charter states that 
'plans for the application of armed forces shall be made by the Security 
Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee'33. However. it 
has never been used as it was intended and this continued during the 
Gulf Crisis34 . The Security Council therefore had no means of actually 
controlling coalition military operations. Instead. it effectively gave the 
coalition a mandate to carryout its objectives within the terms of the UN 
31 Bickerton & Pearson, 1991, p. 53. 
32 K. Suter, "The United Nations and the Gulf Conflict" in S. Kettle, & S. Dowrick, Eds., After the Gulf 
War: For Peace in the Middle East, Leichardl, 1991, pp. 59-60. 
33 Ibid., p. 63. 
34 Ibid., 
17 
Security Council resolutions. Military judgement was left to the 
coalition35 . 
When the US and UK came to the aid of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia at the 
beginning of the crisis they did so under Article 51 of the UN Charter, 
which authorises legitimate self defence until the Security Council acts to 
restore peace and security. At this point in the crisis they were acting as 
allies but not as agents of the UN. Before the US could take action to 
force an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait it required a Security Council 
resolution authorising 'all necessary means' and a specific ultimatum 
date. UNSC 678 accomplished this for the US and transformed the 
coalition military build-up from a self defence operation under Article 51 
to a 'peace enforcement' operation under Article 4736. The willingness of 
the US to work through the UN Security Council also helped strengthen 
and enhance the legitimacy of the coalition and its military endeavours37• 
LAST MINUTE DIPLOMACY 
The day after UNSC 678 was passed President Bush announced that he 
was prepared to go 'an extra mile for peace' and proposed diplomatic 
talks between US and Iraqi offiCials in order to avert further military 
conflict. However, Saddam Hussein asserted that he could not possibly 
meet US Secretary of State until 12 January and rebuffed Bush's 
overtures. On 3 January 1991 Bush once again raised the possibility of a 
diplomatic solution and proposed that Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tariq Aziz meet in Geneva on 9 January. This meeting proved fruitless 
35 K. Matthews, The Gulf COlljliet and International Relations, London, 1993, pp. '50-151. 
36 Ibid., pp. 139-143. 
37 Papp, 1996, p. 41. 
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with Baker accusing the Iraqis of stalling and attempting to test US 
resolve. Aziz also 'refused' to deliver a letter addressed to President 
Hussein from President Bush38 . 
On 11 February 1991 when the aerial bombardment of Iraq and Kuwait 
was well underway and a ground war looked imminent another attempt 
at a diplomatic solution was made. On this occasion Yevgeny Primakov, a 
Soviet envoy travelled to Baghdad to meet with President Hussein in an 
attempt to mediate a settlement and avoid a potentially bloody ground 
conflict. However, Saddam Hussein made so many changes to the initial 
Soviet proposal that when it was delivered to the President Bush for 
consideration it had been severely watered down and he immediately 
rejected it on these grounds39 
OPERATION DESERT STORM 
UNSC 678 had set a deadline of 15 January for Iraq to withdraw its 
military forces from Kuwait. If they did not, then UNSC 678 also 
authorised the use of force in order to remove the Iraqi forces4o, On 7 
January 1991, the US Department of Defense announced that they 
believed Iraqi forces in the Kuwaiti Theatre of Operations (KTO) to 
number in excess of 500 000 soldiers, and to include approximately 
4000 tanks, 2700 armoured vehicles, and 3000 artillery pieces41 , 
On 12 January 1991, President Bush sought and obtained Congressional 
approval to commit US military forces to combat under the auspices of 
38 Yetiv, 1997, pp. 25.27. 
39 Watson, 1993, p. 52. 
40 Summers, 1995, p. 23. 
41 L. Freedman, & E. Karsh, The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991: Diplomacv and War in the New World Order, 
Princeton_ 1993, pp. 388-391. And Summers, 1995, p. 24. 
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UNSC 67842. On 17 January 1991, two days after the deadline for an 
Iraqi withdrawal had passed, the first coalition air strikes began at 3am 
Baghdad time43. This began an incredibly intense aerial bombardment of 
Iraqi military and infrastructure target in both Iraq and Kuwait. The 
bombardment utilised a variety of ordnance delivery means, ranging from 
Tomahawk cruise missiles, to 1950s era heavy bombers such as the B-
52, to ultra modem and previously classified stealth fighters. By 3 
February 1991 the bomb tonnage dropped on Iraq had reached 
2,150,000 total tons. This was more than the total tonnage dropped by 
US forces during WWII44. 
On 22 February 1991, President Bush issued a 24 hour ultimatum to 
Iraq setting a deadline of 8pm Baghdad time on 23 February for Iraq to 
withdraw from Kuwait in order to avoid a ground war, The Iraqis ignored 
this deadline and at 4am Baghdad time on 24 February the ground war 
began45. The ground war proved to be a stunning success for the 
coalition as they swept through the Iraqi forces who were completely 
unprepared for the modem military juggernaught that opposed them. 
Many of them were conscripts with little training. Also as a result of the 
ferocious aerial bombardment that they had endured for more than a 
month much of their supply and communications network had been 
destroyed, leaving them isolated and starving. The ground war lasted just 
100 hours before it was suspended when the Iraqis accepted that it must 
comply with all UN resolutions regarding their invasion of Kuwait. In this 
42 Summers, 1995, p. 25. 
43 R. Atkinson, Crusade: The Untold Story of the Gulf War, London, 1993, p. 81. And Bickerton & 
Pearson, 1991, p. 63. And Summers, 1995, p. 25. 
44 Summers, 1995, p. 27. 
45 Bickerton & Pearson, 1991, pr. 141-144. And Summers, 1995, pp. 29-30. 
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100 hours of war the coalition forces had not only expelled Iraq from 
Kuwait. but they had penetrated deep into Iraq itself, and captured more 
than 80,000 prisoners of war6 , 
The ground war was halted when Kuwait had been freed as per UNSC 
660, Because the US had legitimated its use of force under UNSC 
resolutions 660 and 678 it was careful not to overstep its mandate and 
endanger this legitimacy. It was also concerned that if its forces 
continued deeper into Iraq that the Iraqi military may either strengthen 
its resistance or resort to chemical warfare47• 
Of prime concern was the danger of the coalition collapsing if the ground 
conflict was prolonged. Arab support was essential for maintaining its 
stability and many of the Arab coalition members were already suffering 
Significant domestic unrest over their participation. It was felt by many 
that this support would disappear should the US continue to prosecute 
the war8 , General Schwarzkopf was in doubt, claiming later that he 
believed that the Arab states would definitely have left the coalition and 
possibly France too49• Adding to this was the possibility that the US 
Congress who had approved President Bush's commitment of US forces 
to combat may remove its approval5o • 
46 C. Andrew, For the President's Eyes Only: Secret Intelligence and the American Presidency from 
Washington to Bush, London. 1996, p. 523. And Freedman & Karsh, 1993, pp. 406-407. And Summers. 
1995, p. 30. 
47 L. Cline, "Defending the End: Decision Making in Terminating the Persian Gulf War" in Comparative 
Strategy, Vol. 17, No.4, OClober-December 1998, London, 1998, pp. 367-368. 
48 Ibid., pp. 370-372. 
41) Ibid., p. 372. 
:'i0 Ibid., p. 374. 
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Post war the US and its allies have continued to use limited military force 
when dealing with Iraq. The UN has maintained its rigorous economic 
sanctions as Iraq has failed to comply with intrusive UN inspections 
aimed at preventing Iraq from building a weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) program. The US has continued to maintain a large and 
expensive military presence in the region. This military presence along 
with US foreign policy in the region has angered many Islamists and 
anti-US radicals51 . 
THE NEW ZEALAND MILITARY CONTRIBUTION 
New Zealand's involvement in the Persian Gulf conflict began not with a 
military commitment but rather a humanitarian one. On 20 August New 
Zealand offered Saudi Arabia a civilian medical team, and two Andover 
aircraft for UN duties. Seven days later New Zealand agreed to send a C-
130 Hercules to Egypt with 35,000 pounds of milk powder. On 7 
September the Hercules began airlifting refugees out of Jordan. for this 
task it was joined by an RNZAF 727. By the time the two New Zealand 
aircraft had finished their airlift duties and returned home, they had 
carried 1500 refugees to countries such as Bangladesh. India, Pakistan. 
and the Philippines52 . 
On 3 December 1990, a few days after the passing of UNSC 678, the new 
National government. which had replaced Labour follOwing a General 
SI D. Byman, " After the Storm: US Policy Toward Iraq Since 1991" in Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 
115, No.4, Winter 2000-2001, New York, 2000, p. 493. 
52 Press Statements by Mike Moore, Prime Minister, 7 & 19 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2!l6/4 Vol. I 
And 26712116/3 Vol. 2. And Ministry Of Defence. New Zealand Defence Force Contingents 1n The Gulf 
Region And Background Documents, Wellington, 1991, pp. 3-4. And 1. Armstrong, "NZ Signals Cautious 
Support For Gulf Effort", in New Zealand Herald, 21 August 1990, Auckland, 1990. And B. Burns, "Govt 
Rejects Sending Gulf Forces", ill The Press, 21 August 1990, Christchurch, 1990. And B. Burns, "Cabinet 
Offers Milk Powder Airlift 10 Gulf'. in The Press. 28 August 1990. Christchurch, 1990. 
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Election in October, announced its decision to send a small force of non-
combatant troops, as a contribution to the multi national coalition forces 
in the Gulf53. Cabinet chose to send transport aircraft and medical 
teams. The C-130H Hercules transport plane has been the backbone of 
the RNZAF since April 1965 and are in service with sixty-four different 
air forces worldwide54 . On December 23rd , 1990, two Hercules and forty-
six personnel from 40 Squadron, RNZAF, arrived at Riyadh, the Saudi 
capital. During the conflict they served with a British Hercules unit. The 
contingent's size was increased during the deployment with the addition 
of a fourth aircrew55 . 
Altogether New Zealand provided, two medical teams, which comprised 
both regular and territorial (reserve) personnel and included doctors, 
nurses, and medics. The first medical team arrived in Bahrain, a small 
central Gulf Island State on 19 January 1991, serving at a 500 bed USN 
hospital located at Manama, the capital city. This hospital was just a 
forty-minute helicopter flight from the front lines. On 21 January 1991, 
the New Zealand government announced the deployment of a second 
medical team, drawn from all three services, which arrived in Bahrain on 
5 February 1991, and served at a Royal Air Force (RAF) hospital in 
Muharraq, near the international airport56 . Following the liberation of 
53 Ministry Of Defence. 1991, p. 9. 
54 D. Wilson, " Frying, Freezing In "Fat Albert"" in New Zealand Defelice Quarter!v, Autumn 1995, 
Wellington, 1995, p.2. 
55 Ministry Of Defence. 1991, p.3. 
56 T. McRae, "Florence Helps Kiwis" in The Sunday Star Times, Auckland. 26 January 1991. And Ministry 
Of Defence. 1991, p.3. And M. Brown, "Medics Fly Right Into Danger Zone" in New Zealand Herald. 
Auckland, 22 January 1991. And R. Oram, "Services Close Ranks To Help Folk Left Behind" in New 
Zealand Herald, Auckland, 21 February 1991. 
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Kuwait the New Zealand contingents were withdrawn and returned to 
New Zealand in mid-April 1991 57. 
The Gulf War of 1990/1991 involved combat on the biggest scale seen 
since the end of World War II. The coalition forces completely dominated 
the Iraqi military during a short but intense period of air. naval. and land 
combat. The majority of the fighting was done by troops from the three 
main coalition members, the US, UK, and France. Like their counterparts 
from other smaller countries such as Bangladesh and the Philippines, 
the military forces that New Zealand contributed played only a very 
minor part in the coalition effort, and were not involved in any combat 
operations during their stay in the region. However, the participation of 
smaller countries such as these was considered important by the larger 
countries as it signalled a wider political and military solidarity. 
57 J. Crawford, In the Field of Peace. Wellington. 1996, p. 40. 
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Chapter Three 
Foreign Policy Decision Making 
The Levels of Analysis 
As discussed in Chapter One. the Levels of Analysis approach has been 
chosen as the theoretical framework for this thesis. It comprises three 
levels of analysis: individuaL domestic. and international. Some studies 
such as Rosenau's Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy, which had 
six. have defined more levels58. However, this study will utilise just the 
three primary levels in order to keep it both concise and firmly rooted in 
the theoretical literature. 
This approach was chosen because it allows for a greater and more 
rounded examination of the case study. Foreign policy decision making 
studies often focus on only one particular level, or an aspect thereof. As 
was also discussed in Chapter One, these studies are, if they are framed 
correctly, both valid and important in their own right. However, many 
important aspects and factors of a case study may be overlooked simply 
because they do not fit the specified criteria. Also, in this case study. as 
in many others, there are events that do not fit neatly into just one level. 
It is for this reasons that the Levels of Analysis approach has been 
chosen. 
5R I.N Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories in Foreign Policy" in I.A. Vasquez, Ed., Classics of 
International Relations, Englewood Cliffs, NI. 1990. 
25 
DECISION MAKING UNIT 
As will be shown. there are a multitude of factors than can influence 
foreign policy decision making. However. these factors must be 
channelled through the various levels and filters of the political structure 
of the government. Within this governmental structure is a set of 
authorities with the ability to commit resources and make a decision not 
easily reversed. This is known as the decision unit. The identity of the 
decision unit will vary depending on the circumstances of the decision 
required. More straightforward and routine decision situation will be 
dealt with at the varying bureaucratic levels in line with established 
standard operating procedures. However. in the case of matters of vital 
importance the decision unit will be situated at the very highest levels of 
government. within the executive leadership. In these situations it is not 
unusual for the decision unit to be confined to a dominant political 
leader and a few key advisers59• 
Individual Level 
INTRODUCTION 
The Individual Level of Analysis is concerned with how individual 
characteristic differences among decision makers affects foreign policy 
behaviour. While the case study for this thesis is limited to the three 
Prime Ministers (Palmer. Moore. Bolger), this level of analysis does not 
5<) M.O. Hermann & c.F. Hermann. "Who Makes Foreign Policy Decisions and How: An Empirical 
Inquiry" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 33, No.4. Stoneham. MA. 1989, pr. 362·363. And J.E. 
Dougherty, & R.L. Pfaltzdraff Jr .. Contending Theories of Internatiul1a{ Relations. 1971, Philadelphia, p. 
323. And M.G. Hermann. c.F. Hermann, & J.D. Hagan, "How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy" in 
C.F. Hermann, C.W. Kegley Jr., & LN. Rosenau, Eds., New Directions in the Stud)' uf Foreign Polin, 
Boston, 1987, p. 311. 
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have to be limited to purely Heads of Government. For the purposes of 
analysis a decision maker can be defined as a high level official in a 
position whereby he/ she as an individual can have an impact on the 
decision. The focus therefore is primarily on political leaders such as 
heads of government or heads of ministries. Depending on the 
circumstances, a decision maker's personal characteristics, such as his 
or her beliefs, motives, or interpersonal style. might influence 
government foreign policy in terms of (a) strategies in its foreign policy, 
(b) the style with which its foreign policy is made and executed. and (c) 
the actual content of the policy. Strategies relate to its basic plans for 
action, such as taking a generally co-operative or competitive stance with 
other nations, whether it prefers to act alone or with other nations, 
whether it prefers to engage in bilateral or multilateral agreements, or 
the emphasis it puts on its various self interests 60. 
POLITICAL LEADERS AS DECISION MAKERS 
The higher the level at which the decision maker operates the more likely 
his/her personal characteristics are to have an impact on the decision 
making process. However this will vary depending on the nature of the 
political system in which the decision maker operates. This will be 
explained further later in this chapter under the heading Political Culture. 
Lower level officials on the other hand. generally occupy more defined 
roles and may operate within a hierarchical infrastructure61 . 
60 C.F. Hermann & M.A. East. "Introduction" in M.A. East, S.A. Sal more. & C.F. Hermann. Whv Nations 
Act, Beverly Hills, 1978, p. 22. And J. Frankel, International Relations in a Changing World, 4'h Ed., 
Oxford, 1988, pp. 97-99. And M.G. Hermann, "Effects of Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders on 
Foreign Policy" in East, Salmore & Hermann. 1978, pp. 60-61. 
61 M.O. Hermann in East. Salmore & Hermann, 1978. pp. 49-52. And Frankel. 1988. pp. 97-99. And H. 
Kissinger. "Domestic Structure and Foreign Policy" in IN. Rosenau. Ed .. International Politics and 
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Because the decision makers targeted by this study were all Prime 
Ministers it is appropriate to single out characteristics that Margaret 
Hermann suggests impact on foreign policy behaviour. For example: 
1. Interest in foreign affairs, 
2. Training in foreign affairs, 
3. General sensitivity to the international environment62. 
In effect a political leader's interest. training. and sensitivity to the 
international environment act as filters on the relationship between their 
personal characteristics and the government's foreign policy. These three 
variables indicate how much attention the leader is likely to pay to 
foreign policy. the type of foreign policy behaviours the leader is likely to 
display. and how consistent the relationship is likely to be63 . 
Hermann also says that a political leader's personal characteristics will 
have an impact on foreign policy behaviour under three sets of 
conditions. These are: 
1. Situations that force the political leader to define or interpret 
them. For example ambiguous situations where varying 
partiCipants present different analyses. 
Foreign Policy. New York, 1969. p. 267. And Z. Maoz, National Choices and International Processes, 
Cambridge, 1990, pp. 70-71. 
62 M.G. Hermann in East, Salmore & Hermann, 1978, pp. 56-59. And M.G. Hermann, "Explaining Foreign 
Policy Behaviour Using the Personal Characteristics of Political Leaders" in International Studies 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No.1. Sloneham, MA, 1980, pp. 13-14. 
63 Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 267. And M.G. Hermann in East, S,dmore & Hermann. J978, pp. 59-68. 
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2. Situations in which the political leader is more likely to take 
part in the decision making process himself/herself. For 
example in times of crisis. 
3. Situations in which the political leader has a wide decision 
latitude. Examples of this include the "honeymoon" period 
following a landslide election64. 
This is relevant in our case study because as the crisis in the Gulf 
unfolded Jim Bolger's popularity enabled him to push through legislation 
leading to the commitment 'of New Zealand military personnel. See 
Chapters Four, Five, and Six for further discussion of this. 
COGNITION 
An individual's environment contains so many stimuli, so much potential 
information, that he or she will require some mechanism to discriminate 
between what is or is not important. and to give some form of order and 
meaning to what would otherwise be an overwhelming mess of sensory 
data. Psychologists have labelled this process as cognition. Cognition 
therefore involves those mental activities associated with acquiring. 
organising and using knowledge65. 
Cognitive decision making is making a choice within the limits of what 
you consciously know. Because there are often many things beyond the 
boundaries of what a decision maker knows or can possibly know, 
cognitive decision making has also been called "bounded rationality"66. 
64 M.O. Hermann in East, Salmore & Hermann, 1978, pp. 51-52. And Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 267. 
65 J. Vogler, "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches" in M. Clark, & B. 
White, Understanding Foreign Policy, Aldershot, 1989, pp. 135-136. 
66 G. Allison, & P. Zelikov, Essence (~tDecision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Ed., New York, 
1999, p. 20. 
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There are both internal and external factors that place cognitive limits on 
a decision maker. Internal factors include intellectual and physical 
limitations. No human decision maker has the intellectual or physical 
capacity to analyse completely and accurately the mass and complexity 
of information that is available. Another internal cognitive factor is 
human emotion. Humans will often ignore or suppress information or 
will not consider a policy option because they are emotionally unable to 
do so. This does not however mean that they are emotionally disabled, 
rather it is more a case of human beings sometimes not "knowing" 
something because they "don't want to know" it67. 
Given that these cognitive boundaries exist, it is important to understand 
how decision makers cope with the limitations they operate under. Four 
possible mental strategies have been identified68. They are: 
1. Seeking Cognitive Consistency - Seeking cognitive 
consistency is a process whereby decision makers can often 
attempt to suppress ideas and information that do not follow 
the accepted interpretations of events and actors69. 
2. Wishful Thinking - When human beings make a deCision they 
generally acquire some form of emotional stake in its wisdom 
and success. Often the deCision maker will then be very 
(,7 J .T. Rourke. International Politics all the World Stage. 51h Ed., Guildford. CT, 1995, pp. 122-123, 139. 
And Frankel, 1988, pp. 97-99. And C.A. Powell, J.W. Dyson & H.E. Purkitt, "Opening the 'Black Box': 
Cognitive Processing and Optimal Choice in Foreign Policy Decision Making" in Hermann, Kegley Jr. & 
Rosenau, 1987, pp. 206-209. 
68 W. Nester, International Relations: Geo-Political and Geo-Economic Conflict alld Co-operation, New 
York, 1995, pp. 128-129. And Rourke, 1995, p. 124. And Powell. Dyson & Purkitt in Hermann, Kegley Jr. 
& Rosenau, 1987, pp. 209-210. 
69 R.N. Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis, Baltimore, 1981, pp. 102-103. 
And Rourke, 1995,p.124.AndVoglerinClark&White, 1989.pp. 145-l46. 
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reticent with regard to reversing a decision once made, and 
will increasingly believe that their choice will succeed7o. 
3. Limiting the Scope of Decisions Because it is easier to make 
small decisions rather than big ones decision makers will 
sometimes take an incremental approach to decision 
making71. 
4. Using Heuristic Devices - A heuristic device is a mental 
shortcut that allows an individual to skip the long and 
detailed gathering and analysis of information and come to a 
decision qUickly. It works by screening out most of the flood 
of incoming information. while clinging to key elements. 
Examples of heuristic devices include belief systems. 
stereotypes, and historical analogies72• 
Belief Systems 
A decision maker's beliefs represent his or her fundamental mental 
assumptions about the world. These beliefs can be very general, and 
include for example notions about his or her ability to control events in 
their own life, or they can be more specific such as notions about his or 
her ability to shape political events for their nation. In fact an 
individual's prior beliefs and expectations will play an important role in 
their perceptions during the entire foreign policy decision making process 
from the initial definition of the situation through problem 
understanding. analysis, evaluation of alternatives. and choice. An 
70 Rourke, 1995, p. 124. 
71 Ibid. 
72 L. Jensen, Explaining Foreign Policy, Englewood Cliffs. NJ, 1982. p. 16. And NeSler. 1995, pp. 128-129. 
And Rourke, 1995, p. 124. And Powell. Dyson & Purkitt in Hermann. Kegley Jr. & Rosenau, 1987, pp. 
209-210. 
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individual's beliefs will often cause them to react positively to events or 
individuals who share their beliefs, this also means a negative reaction is 
likely to occur with regard to events and individuals who contravene the 
belief seF3, 
Stereotypes 
Decision makers often operate in an environment that is not only highly 
complex and uncertain but which is also laden with threat and 
insecurity. This problem can be compounded by the difficulties of 
communicating across cultural and linguistic boundaries, and a pattern 
whereby national self-images are often sustained by the portrayal of 
foreigners in a stereotyped and rather less' than flattering lighF4. 
Historical Analogies 
History. and the use of historical analogies have an impact on both the 
decision making process and the individual decision maker. This impact 
generally occurs in areas such as defining the situation, and the 
determination and justification of strategy75. 
Two analogies that are often used in contemporary international 
relations are the "Munich Syndrome" and the "Vietnam Syndrome". 
73 M.O. Hennann. "Foreign Policy Role Orientations and the Quality of Foreign Policy Decisions" in S.O. 
Wa.lker, Ed .• Role Theory and Foreign Policy Analysis, Durham, NC. 1987, pp. 123-127. And Hennann, 
1980, pp. 8-9. And M.O. Hermann in East. Salmore, & Hermann, 1978. p. 59. And Rourke, 1995. p. 139. 
And Powell, Dyson & Purkitt in Hermann, Kegley Jr. & Rosenau, I ';Ill!, p. 206. 
74 Vogler in Clark & White, 1989. p. 137. And Rourke, 2001, p. Ill. 
75 Lebow. 1981. p. 104. And Y. Vertzberger, "Foreign Policy DecislOnmakers as Practical-Intuitive 
Historians: Applied History and Its Shortcomings" in International Sludies Quarterll', Vol. 30, No.2. 
Stoneham. MA. 1986. pp. 225-230. 
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The Munich Syndrome relates to the lesson drawn by post World War II 
leaders that you should not compromise with aggression, The Vietnam 
Syndrome relates to the concept of the danger of becoming tied down in a 
drawn out contlict with little or no realistic opportunity for a successful 
outcome, This syndrome in particular has played an important role in US 
foreign policy over the last twenty years. When the possibility of a 
military intervention has been discussed, particularly an intervention in 
a civil war, the term "no more Vietnams" has been used by those 
opposed. This was particularly so during the 1980s when the Reagan 
administration attempted several times to build up public support for an 
intervention in Central America. 
When President Bush decided to go to war with Iraq over Kuwait. both 
"syndromes" were used in the debate in Congress, with supporters of 
Bush drawing on the Munich Syndrome while his opponents used the 
Vietnam Syndrome76 , Since that time, these two syndromes have also 
been used to either advocate or oppose military action in areas such as 
Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo. and East Timor. 
PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Why does a leader choose a certain path? What are the individual 
internal factors that helped motivate the decision? For the purposes of 
this thesis seven individual personal characteristics have been identified. 
These are: 
1. Personality. 
2. Motives - Ego and Ambition. 
3. Decision Style, 
76 Rourke, 1995, pp. 136-138. 
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4. Interpersonal Style, 
5. Biological Factors, 
6. Role Factors, and 
7. Group-Behaviour Factors77. 
Personality 
Because each decision maker has a different personality. it will affect the 
deCision making process in varying ways. The greater the interest in 
foreign policy of the decision maker the greater the impact of their 
personality. The wider the decision making latitude of the decision 
maker. the greater the impact of their personality. Also the behaviour of 
the decision maker in a crisis and the heuristic devices they use for 
filtering information will help determine the impact of their personality 
on the decision making process78. 
Motives - Ego and Ambition 
Another important personal characteristic that can have an impact of a 
decision maker is motivation. primarily its source. Motivation here is not 
what the decision maker perceives in terms of national interest but 
rather the individual's ego and ambitions. The primary motivation is the 
77 R.C.Snyder, H.W. Bruck, & B. Sapin, "Motivational Analysis of Foreign Policy Decision-Making" in 
Rosenau, 1961, p. 247. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 133-134. 
n J.D. Barber, The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance inlhe White House, 3'" Ed., 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1985, p. 4. And Jensen, 1982, pp. 14-16. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 124 & 134. And 
Vogler in Clark & White, 1989, pp. 151-152. And Nester, 1995, pp. I ZR-129. And Powell, Dyson & Purkitt 
in Hermann, Kegley Jr. & Rosenau, 1987, pp. 209-210. And Maoz, 1990, pp. 51-5Y. 
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desire for power through either of two means (a) achievement. or (b) 
approvaF9. 
Decision Style 
A decision maker's decision style is his or her preferred method of 
making decisions. The various possible components of decision making 
style include factors such as an openness to new information, a 
preference for certain levels of risk. complexity in structuring and 
processing information. confidence, and an ability to tolerate ambigUity. 
Other positive/negative factors that may playa role in a decision makers 
decision style include preconceived preferences for compromise as 
opposed to conflict, planning as opposed to activity, and optimising as 
opposed to satisfyingBO. 
Interpersonal Style 
Interpersonal style is the characteristic way one decision maker deals 
with other decision makers. Margaret Hermann points to two traits, 
paranoia, and Machiavellianism, that are often attributed to decision 
makersB1 . Identifiable interpersonal characteristics include the deCision 
maker's method of persuading others - threats or praise, his or her 
7Y Hermann, 1980, p. 9. And Jensen, 1982, p. 22. And Nester, 1995, p. 130. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 135-
136. And Snyder, Bruck & Sapin in Rosenau, 1961, pp. 247-253. And M.O. Hermann in East, Salmore & 
Hermann, 1978, pp. 59-60. 
HO Barber, 1985, p. 4. And M.O. Hermann in Easl, Salmore & Hermann. 1978, pp. 60-62. And Hermann. 
1980, pp. 9-11. 
HI Paranoia can be defined as a mental disorder characterised by delusions of perseclition and self-
importance or an abnormal tendency to suspect and mistrust others, while Machiavellianism is 
unscrupulous scheming. 
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sensitivity to others, sense of political timing, and he or she is a task 
orientated, or person orientated, decision maker82 • 
Biological Factors 
An alternative explanation of political behaviour in general can be seen in 
the debate over "nature versus nurture". This debate is centred around 
whether human behaviour is based on animal instinct and other innate 
emotional and physical drives (nature) or instead based upon a process 
of socialisation and intellect (nurture). With regard to political behaviour 
in particular, the field of biopolitics focuses on the relationship between 
it and the physical nature of humans83• 
Gender as a biopolitical factor is studied in an attempt to answer the 
question of whether or not gender can make a difference in the attitudes 
and actions of politicians. The principal focus of these studies is to find 
out whether an equal representation of women among policy makers or, 
even putting women almost exclusively in charge of foreign and defence 
policy would make a significant difference in international affairs84• 
Role Factors 
The role of the decision maker within the overall foreign policy decision 
making process is extremely relevant because it will often give an 
indicator of the motive behind a decision maker's actions. The key to this 
is understanding expectations, primarily the self expectations of the 
decision maker and the expectations of others, related to a role. An 
K2 M.G. Hermann in East, SalmQre & Hermann, 1978, p. 60. And Hermann, 1980, pp. 10. 
N3 J.T. Rourke, International Politics on the World Stage, 8111 Ed .. New York, 2001, pp. 114-118. 
N4 Rourke, 1995, pp. 126-128. 
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example of a role is that of the office of Prime Minister or President. while 
individuals who hold that office come and go. the role continues. though 
filled by another individual85. This case study is a prime example of this 
as there were three people who filled the same key role of Prime Minister 
through the decision making period. The self expectations of an 
individual in regard to their role will determine the approaches that 
individual takes toward decison making. Also they will be aware of the 
expectations others hold towards them and the conduct of their role. 
Together these expectations will often influence the behaviour of the 
decision maker and can sometimes be used as an indicator of motive86. 
Group-Behaviour Factors 
It is a well established fact that people will act differently in organisations 
than if they are alone. This is due to the fact that they do not have the 
freedom to directly choose the course of action. instead they must take 
part in what is effectively a bargaining process with the other members of 
the enlarged decision making units that occur in the organisational 
setting87. 
Group decision making often becomes an essentially consensus building 
process. This is because consensus is seen by many as enhancing the 
efficient performance of the decision body88. However consensus is not 
8S There are of course some exceptions to this. In some Middle East countries Leaders hold onto their office 
for life. Examples of this include Libya's Qadhafi, and Iraq's Saddam Hussein. 
86 Rourke, 1995, p. 130. 
87 Maoz. 1990, p. 23. 
88 Ibid., p. 341. 
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always a positive thing and in a process Irving Janis calls "groupthink" 
can produce negative results. Examples of this include: 
1. Ignoring or suppressing dissidents and discordant 
information and policy options 
2. Reluctance by subordinates to offer discordant opinions, and 
3. Limiting policy choices89. 
Janis in fact goes much further than this when he says that in 
circumstances of extreme crisis, group contagion sometimes leads to 
collective panic, violent acts of scapegoating, and other forms of group 
madness9o• While he stresses that groupthink is not universal, in that 
not all groups suffer from it, he does point to a number of these 
potentially major problems than can occur as a result of group decision 
making. However, he also pOints out that these problems can also arise 
from other causes of human stupidity as well. These include factors such 
as erroneous intelligence, information overload, fatigue. blinding 
prejudice, and ignorance91 . 
An increasing trend over the last forty years, since the time of the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, has been the preference for conducting foreign policy 
decision making in a group setting. This is partly due to the widespread 
belief that the interaction of several minds will broaden the range of 
"experience," and that "experience" is believed to be the best source of 
knowledge92• Theoretically there are two main areas of concern with this 
K9 I.L. Janis, Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign Policy Decisions and Fiasco.I', 1972, 
Boston, pp. 10-13. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 131-132. 
90 Janis, 1972,pp.3, 10-13. 
91 Janis, 1972. pp. 10-11. And Rourke. 2001, pp. 119-121. 
92 H. Kissinger, "The Policymakcr and the Intellectual" in IN. Rosenau. Ed., Internarional Politics and 
Foreign Policy, 1961. p, 274. 
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approach. The first is that the decision maker usually appoints people 
with similar beliefs and motives to his or her own as advisers, thus 
helping to ensure that their viewpoint will permeate the wider 
bureaucracy93. The second area of concern is the use of committees 
when a decision maker comes under pressure from his or her 
subordinates with either conflicting or dubious advice and they decide to 
seek outside/unbiased advice94. However committees themselves have 
several drawbacks. First, committee members require extensive briefing. 
thus placing further strain on the bureaucracy; second, by the time that 
the members are at their best, the committee is usually being wound up; 
and finally. the members usually come from the same social strata as the 
officials and therefore rarely provide significantly different viewpoints95. 
In fact, as Henry Kissinger pOints out committees almost seem designed 
to produce the status quo. He claims that the ideal "committee person" is 
one who does not make their associates uncomfortable, and does not 
operate with ideas that are too distant from those generally accepted. 
Thus. he claims the general thrust of committees is toward a standard of 
average performance. Kissinger bases this analysis on the rationalisation 
that because a complicated idea cannot be absorbed by ear, particularly 
when it is new, committees lean toward what fits in with the most 
familiar experience of their members. Hence they produce great pressure 
in favour of the status qu096 • 
'13 Janis, 1972, p. 3. And M.G. Hermann in East, Salmore, & Hermann, 1978. p. 61. 
94 Kissinger in Rosenau, 1961, p. 275. 
'15 Ibid. 
% Ibid., p. 276. 
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CONCLUSION 
What this level of analysis shows is that there is a great deal of scope for 
variance of behaviour between different individuals. How a decision 
maker views the various stimuli of the situation will playa role in the 
determination of the eventual outcome. Thus. it is essential when 
analysing decision makers to judge their cognitive ability. Do they seek 
consistency? Do they try and limit the scope of the decision? Or do they 
use heuristic devices as shortcuts? Is their decision making ability 
impaired by the basic assumptions of their belief systems? 
Added to this are the factors of a decision maker'S personal 
characteristics. personality. motives. and style which will all influence 
the decision making process. How a decision maker views his or her role 
in the process, and how he or she interacts in a group situation impacts 
on the process itself. 
Some of these factors will impact on the process, others will not. For 
different decision makers. different factors will play different roles. Thus 
the identification of the key decision makers and the factors that 
influenced them is an important indicator in the analysis of foreign policy 
decision making. This will be highlighted in Chapter Four which looks at 




The Domestic Level of Analysis for foreign policy decision making is a 
large and complex structure. It encompasses two main sets of factors, 
each of which provides for an important element of domestic level 
analysis. These two factors are political culture, and sub-national actors. 
There are two main elements to political culture. These are the national 
historical experience, and the national belief system. They are important 
because lessons from the past sometimes offer appropriate pOinters to 
contemporary situations, while levels of accountability and 
institutionalisation offer an insight into the domestic level decision 
making processes. 
Sub-national actors are an important set of factors in domestic level 
analysis because the state is not a unitary actor. There are in fact many 
groups and organisations who are involved in the policy process, not just 
the small decision making unit at the top. For the purposes of this 
analysis seven key sub-national actors have been identified, which 
should be used as a baseline for this kind of analYSiS, and not used with 
rigidity. Not all of the identified actors will be relevant in every case, while 
in some case studies there may be other actors that can be identified and 
included. 
Together these two sets of factors provide an analyst with the relevant 
details of a state's geography, economy, demography. political structure. 
culture and tradition. and its military-strategic situation. Together these 
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details show the structure from which the decision making process is 
formed. They also have the spin-off effect of showing the constraints that 
are then placed upon this process at the domestic level. 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
As described previously political culture has two main sources, the first 
is the national historical experience, and the second is the national belief 
system. or its ideas and ideologies97. 
The first of these two source dimensions is the national historical 
experience. History often prOvides "lessons" from past situations which 
can be applied to contemporary ones. Also by studying patterns that 
appear in a state's claims and actions. we can begin to understand its 
past, current, and possibly, future policy98. 
The second element, the national belief systems, or ideas and ideologies, 
is reflected in the form of political system under which the state operates. 
There are two main elements worth considering when studying political 
system structure. The first is accountability, which refers to the extent of 
democratisation within the system, with particular respect to the public's 
ability to participate in the political process itself. Institutionalisation 
refers to the wide acceptance of the political system processes, and their 
establishment as a feature of the political order99. 
97 Rourke, 1995. pp. 103-104. And Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 263. 
9X Rourke, 1995, p. 103. And Nester, \995, pp. 134-135. 
99 J.D. Hagan. Political Opposition and Foreign Policy in Comparative Perspective, Boulder, 1993. p. 90. 
And E.G. Salmore & S.A. Salmore, "Political Regimes and Foreign Policy" in Easl. Salmore. & Hermann. 
J978, pp. 104-105. And Rourke, 2001, pp. 82-83. 
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Another distinction in political structure theory is that of open and 
closed systems. Openness refers to the level of the government's 
accountability, or the extent to which a government is subject to 
influences from society, States that are considered closed, are those of an 
authoritarian style where public opinion and political interests are less 
likely to have an impactIOO. There are also some democracies. which are 
theoretically open, where one party or coalition dominates political life, 
while there are some authoritarian regimes which have a highly 
competitive internal political life with major exchanges of power between 
party factions and/or competition between party, state, and military 
institutionsIOl. As well as the distinction between open and closed 
systems, states also differ in many other ways. 111e governments of 
different states vary in the types and number of organisations and 
institutions within them. the distribution of influence among these 
organisations and institutions. the numbers and types of personnel in 
those institutions, and the societal interests they represent102. 
Political culture is also a changeable variable. However shifts in political 
culture are normally evolutionary, this is particularly so in stable 
political systems like New Zealand. Newer political systems, such as 
post-colonial or post-revolutionary systems. are however much more 
susceptible to dramatic changes in political culture, as has been seen 
throughout Africa and Southeast ASia103 . 
100 Rosenau in Vasquez, 1990, pp. 168-170. And B. Russett, & H. Starr, World Politics.' The Menu/or 
Choice, 2nt! Ed., New York, 1985. pp. 208-209. 
WI Hagan. 1993, pp. 91-92. 
102 Nester, 1995, p. J 35. And Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 266. 
103 Rourke, 1995, p. 104. 
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SUB-NATIONAL ACTORS 
Below the international level the state is not a unitary structure, instead 
it should be considered a shell with many actors who all have an impact 
on the decision making process to varying degrees. These sub-national 
actors include both governmental and non-governmental organisations 
as well as the media and the people104 . For the purposes of this analysis 
framework the following seven sub-national actors have been identified: 
1. Political Leadership 
2. Bureaucracies 
3. Legislatures 
4. Political Opposition 
5. Interest Groups 
6. The Media 
7. The People 
As each case differs in outcome, so too will it in the levels of input from 
each of the seven sub-national actors. Factors in this include the size of 
the state making the decision, and which specific part of the foreign 
policy spectrum is the decision affecting. Sub-national inputs on a 
question of defence and national security will naturally differ from those 
surrounding a question of immigration or trade. As each of the seven are 
explained in more detail their relevance to the case study will also be 
explored. 
104 J.D. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" in Rosenau, 1969a, pp. 23-24. 
And Rourke, 1995, p. 108. And G.T. Allison. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
Boston, 1971, p. 144. 
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Political Leadership 
The political leadership of a country is the strongest and most important 
sub-national actor in the foreign policy process. By political leadership 
we mean the country's executive leadership, a President or Prime 
Minister, and their Cabinet. While these terms are generally generic to 
democratic regimes, for the purposes of this study we should also 
include the corresponding fixtures in authoritarian or monarchical 
regimes, such as, for example, the General Secretary and Politburo in a 
communist regime. 
The executive leadership, however, does not get everything it wants. It 
too faces constraints. These constraints though, often differ depending 
on the institutional style of executive leadership. For example, the 
institu tional arrangements in a parliamentary system will result in 
different constraints than those found within a presidential system105. 
In New Zealand for example it is Cabinet rather than the Prime Minister 
that is ultimately responsible for decision making. This is somewhat 
misleading in that the Prime Minister effectively operates as Chairman 
and will normally gUide Cabinet's policy directions. However, because 
Cabinet essentially relies on consensus it is possible for a Prime Minister 
to have poliCies he or she favours effectively vetoed by his or her Cabinet 
colleagues, Cabinet also has a policy of collective responsibility, whereby 
once a decision has been made or approved by Cabinet all Ministers are 
bound to support it, even those who may have dissented during Cabinet 
discussions 106. 
105 Hagan. 1993, p. 25. 
106 G. Palmer, New Zealand's Constiflltion in Crisis; Reforming our Political System. Dunedin, 1992. pp. 
152-156. And R. Mulgan, Politics in New Zealand. 2nd Ed .. Auckland, 1997, pp. 87-91. 
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This is of vital importance to this thesis as Cabinet provided significant 
constraint on the ability to act of two of the three Prime Ministers in this 
case study. This will be examined in much greater detail however in 
Chapter Four. 
Bureaucracies 
Every state, whatever its size. strength. or type of government, is 
influenced by its bureaucracy. Bureaucrats are career governmental 
personnel, as opposed to those who are political appointees or elected 
officials. Technically. the bureaucracy is legally subordinate to the state's 
political leaders. however in many cases the bureaucracies are so large 
and powerful that they prove extremely difficult to control because the 
vast bureaucratic mechanisms develop a momentum and vested interest 
of their own 107. 
The role of the bureaucrat should not be downplayed. While it is 
generally assumed that ministers create policy and bureaucrats execute 
it. it is the bureaucrats who preserve the continuity of policy. while the 
foreign ministers of different parties and views come and go. It is also 
important to note that these ministers (and Prime Ministers) usually rise 
to power based on their achievements in domestic politics; accordingly 
when they become responsible for foreign affairs they naturally become 
dependent on expert advice 108, 
In? Y. Vertzberger, "Bureaucratic-Organisational Politics and Infromation Processing in a Developing 
State" in International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. I, March 1984, Stoneham. MA, 1984, pp. 70-71. 
And Kissinger in Rosenau, J969, p. 263. And Rourke. 1995. p. 110. 
lOR Frankel, 1988, p. 86. 
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An important purpose of the bureaucracy is to establish standard 
operating procedures, which will cope effectively with most problems109 . 
In this way bureaucracies take on a distinctive organisational form. And 
it is as an organisation, or system of organisations that they should best 
be analysed. 
While a leader handpicks his or her decision makers, they inherit a 
veritable army of career bureaucrats whose primary loyalties are to 
themselves and their respective organisations. It is not uncommon for 
each organisation within the bureaucracy to operate like an interest 
group, with its own values and priorities. This often results in a "behind 
the scenes" struggle between the different organisations over their 
separate interests on various issues 1 10. This will be highlighted in 
Chapter Five by the strain in the relationship between the Ministry of 
Defence and New Zealand Defence Force that occurred during the 
decision making process. 
Decision makers are dependent on their bureaucratic organisations for 
supplying them with facts, but what facts they are told often depends on 
what subordinates believe and what they pass on. It is relatively common 
for bureaucracies to filter information unintentionally. This can happen 
in several ways such as the passing on of information that they 
inaccurately believe to be true, tailOring its recommendations to suit its 
own preferred option. and altering the implementation of policylll, 
lO'! Kissinger in Rosenau, 1969, p. 263. 
ilO Nester, 1995, p. 131. And Rourke. 2001, pp. 95-97. 
I j I D.W. Drezner, "Ideas, Bureaucratic Politics. and the Crafting of Foreign Policy" ill American Journal of 
Political Science, Vol. 44, No.4, October 2000, Madison, Wisconsin. 2000, p. 735. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 
110-111. And Russett & Starr, 1985,291. And Nester, 1995, p. 131. 
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The bureaucracy in New Zealand in 1990 was in the process of adapting 
to radical changes as a result of government reforms in the late 1980s. 
This impacted on the advisory component of the decision making process 
and will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Five. 
Legislatures 
The legislature often has much less of a foreign policy role than the 
executive branch leadership and the bureaucrats, but this does not 
mean that it is powerless, or has no role at all. However, its exact 
influence varies from country to country. In non-democratic countries 
legislatures have little impact as they do little more than rubber stamp 
decisions made at the executive level, and are otherwise used. generally, 
as a tool for mobilising the masses112 . This of course does not mean that 
legislatures never play an important role in foreign policy. However, 
legislative activity is most likely, and important, when there is an 
intersection between domestic and international spheres1l3. 
In a parliamentary system. the majority party can often be divided on an 
issue and debate it vigorously. but once a decision is made it tends to 
vote as a bloc within the legislature. Due to its size and factional nature 
a parliament cannot effectively initiate foreign policy in its own right. and 
instead is essentially limited, outside of debate, to the power of veto over 
poliCies proposed by governments. should sufficient support exist. 
including the ratification of treaties 114. In this case study, as will be 
examined in Chapter Five, the legislature had a minimal impact on the 
112 Nester, 1995, p. 132. 
113 Rourke. 1995, p. 112. 
114 Frankel, 1988, p. 85. And Nester, 1995, p. 133. 
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decision making process with agreements made to debate identified 
issues on the proviso that decision making be left to Cabinet. 
One country in which the legislature does have an impact is the United 
States. There is little party discipline within the United States Congress, 
where every representative and Senator is able to vote for his or her own 
interests regardless of the position encouraged by the party leadership. 
Factions of similarly minded legislators, often representing powerful 
interests. have the ability to have an enormous impact on policy. Due to 
its constitutional powers over trade and the declaration of war, Congress 
leads as often as it follows in American foreign policy. If the President 
represents one party and the Congress is controlled by the other, as 
often happens. the result can be either bi-partisan consensus or 
legislative deadlock depending on the issue and the ability of the 
President1l5. 
Political Opposition 
Every political system has a competitive nature between those in power 
and those who seek to replace them. In democratic political systems, this 
opposition is usually legitimate and takes the form of organised political 
parties, though often rival politicians may also exist within the leader's 
own party. In non-democratic systems, the very nature of the system 
often means that the opposition is normally less overt and often less 
'peaceful' than in most democratic countries. however it does exist 116. 
115 Nester, 1995, p. 133. 
llf> Rourke, 1995, pp. 112-113. 
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Political opposition can generally be classified into one of four main 
groups. These are: 
1. Opposition from within the ruling party or group, 
2. Opposition from other political parties. 
3. Opposition from the military and para-military actors, and 
4. Opposition from locally and regionally based groups 117. 
The strength of political opposition can be assessed by two key attributes 
of opposition actors. These are: 
1. Their organisational strength, and 
2. The intensity of their challenge118 . 
The intensity of an opposition group's challenge to the regime can be 
categorised into three basic levels. These are: 
1. Opposition to the regime's overall policy program. 
2. Opposition to the continuation of the regime in power. and 
3. Opposition to the basic norms and structures of the 
established political system119• 
In this case study political opposition came from two sources: (a) from 
within the ruling party (in the case of Labour), and (b) from other political 
parties. Labour suffered from factionalisation over several issues. much 
of which dated from the time of David Lange's leadership. This 
117 Hagan, 1993, pp. 78-88. 
IIX Ibid., p. 79. 
IIY Ibid., pp. 79-80. 
50 
factionalisation undoubtedly had an impact on the decision making 
process and will be examined in Chapter Four. There was also of course 
a General Election in the middle of the time period of the case study 
there was obviously active opposition from other political parties given 
New Zealand's free and democratic electoral process. 
Interest Groups 
Bureaucracies and political parties often operate as interest groups. 
However. interest groups are more generally considered to be 
associations of private citizens {rather than public officials) with similar 
policy views, who attempt to place pressure on the government in order 
to convince them to adopt these views as policy. 
Historically, interest groups have been less active on foreign policy than 
domestic policy due to the limited effect of foreign policy on their 
concerns. However the increasing inter-connection of domestic and 
foreign policy has led to a rise in interest group activity in the foreign 
policy sphere120. 
Interest Groups come in many different forms and sizes. Some have a 
broad area of interest. such as combined trade union movements, while 
others such as anti-abortion groups have a much more specific interest. 
Some are so large and organised that they have a bureaucracy of their 
own. or operate on a trans-national basis. while others are so small that 
they constitute just a handful of people, who come together in an 
informal and intermittent manner. Interest groups are often wide spread 
and include fields such as churches, labour, economists. ethnic identity 
and culture, research and development, and the media. The amount of 
120 K. Deutsch, The Analysis of IlIfemational Relations, Englewood Cliffs, 1968, p. 52. And Rourke. [995. 
p. 113. And Nester, 1995, p. 133. And L.W. Milbrath. "Interest Groups and Foreign Policy" in J.N. 
Rosenau, Ed .• Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy, New York. 1967, p. 245. 
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influence that interest groups can have on foreign policy behaviour is 
determined by a combination of factors such as resources, exposure, and 
audience 121 . 
The most active interest groups in the case study were the various peace 
groups, both established and ad hoc, who campaigned vigorously during 
the crisis period. While not directly influential in the governmental 
decision making process of this case study they did however have a role 
in influencing public opinion by raising their concerns pUblicly. 
The Media 
The media, both electronic and print, is an interesting category of sub-
national actor as it actually crosses boundaries and sits in between 
interest groups and the people. The media does at times function as an 
interest group placing pressure on governments, as its content is 
generally a reflection of the views of management. readers, and viewers. 
However, it also has a major role as a prime information source for the 
people. With this dual function it is in fact worthy of discussion on its 
own merit. 
The focus of this section is not on the media as a whole but rather on the 
news media in particular. This is because it is the most important faction 
of the media with regard to foreign policy. In fact. the quality of 
international news coverage has a major bearing on determining the role 
that the public is able to, and should, play in the conduct of foreign 
121 P.A. Reynolds, An Introduction to International Relations, 3'd Ed., London, 1994, p. 89. And Deutsch. 
1968, pp. 53-65. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 113-115. And Milbrath in Rosenau, 1967, p. 248. 
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affairs. This is because, for good or bad, this is the major way that the 
public is infonned on international issues122 . 
In New Zealand at the time much of the initial news was a mixture of 
international reporting by major news networks and local discussion 
pieces by politicians, academics, and other specialists. However as the 
crisis became prolonged it essentially reverted to reproduction of 
international reporting. 
The People 
To an extent, public opinion plays a part in the foreign policy decision 
making process of every state. This is particularly so in democratic 
countries where elected officials must always keep an eye on public 
opinion because after all it is the general public who will decide his or 
her fate at the next election. Authoritarian leaders while not beholden to 
voters, must still be mindful of the general public mood as they still need 
public support to maintain the regime or else face being overthrown. 
Public opinion can also be contradictory and fickle as it often changes 
day by day, issue by issue123 , 
Public opinion on foreign policy issues varies because in many countries 
the general public is far more concerned with domestic issues and does 
not pay detailed attention to international issues. A crisis situation will 
draw the attention of much of the public, as will an issue that bisects the 
domestic and international spheres, however this tends to be an issue by 
122 W.P. Davison, D.R. Shanor, & F.T.C. Yu, News From Abroad and the Foreign Polin Public, New 
York, 1980, p. 4. 
123 Frankel, 1988, pp. 91-92. And Nester, 1995, pp. 133-134. And Rourke, 1995, pp. 116-118. 
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issue phenomenon 124. As has already been discussed, the main sources 
of information for the public come from the media, whether they are 
reporting government statements or international events, therefore public 
opinion can at time be an extension that promoted by the media. 
Public opinion has the ability, if it is intense enough to be considered by 
deCision makers, to place broad constraints on the foreign policy 
behaviour of a state. However, governments generally pay far more 
attention to political opinion, informed opinion from academics and 
political commentators, and to interest groups125. 
Public opinion played a role in this case study by virtue of the fact that 
the National victory at the October General Election essentially dictated 
that New Zealand troops would be committed to the coalition force. It 
also played a role in the nature of the military commitment as National 
sought to maintain public support for its pOSition. This will be examined 
in more detail in Chapter Five. 
CONCLUSION 
Political culture will set the tone or context for the domestic setting. The 
national historical experience and belief system, along with levels of 
accountability and institutionalisation provides the framework in which 
the sub-national actors operate. Differences in these factors provide 
different political cultures such as democracies and dictatorships and 
will therefore also impact upon the process in a varied manner. 
124 Rourke, 1995, pp. 116-117. 
125 Reynolds, 1994, p. 88. 
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For the purposes of this analytical framework seven key sub-national 
actors have been identified. As will be highlighted by the case study they 
will not all be of equal importance in any given circumstance. Instead, 
depending on the nature of the foreign policy decision required. one or 
more will probably rise in importance. However. because the identity of 
these primary actors varies all must be considered in the analysis. It is 
far better to discuss and dismiss a factor than to overlook it and 
invalidate any conclUSions. 
INTERNATIONAL 
INTRODUCTION 
The international level of analysis is focused on contextual changes that 
occur within the international system. The international system itself can 
be defined as the patterns of interactions and relationships between 
major political actors, seen together as a single unitI26. 
In the modern international system states are interdependent. no state 
can effectively isolate itself from the rest of the world. hence the 
behaviour of a given state will affect other states in the system. This can 
be either deliberate or accidental. In some cases. such as the Persian 
Gulf War of 1990/1991. the behaviour of one state can affect the entire 
system 127. 
i2(o M.A. East, "The International System Perspective and Foreign Policy" in East. Sal more. & Hermann, 
1978. pp. 143-147. And Singer in Rosenau. 1969, p. 22. 
127 B. Russett. H. Starr. & R.I. Stoll, Eds .• Choices in World Politics: Suvereignty (Inti Interdependence, 
New York, 1989, pp. 30-31. And W.R. Phillips, "Prior Behavior as an Explanation of Foreign Policy" in 
East, Salmore. & Hermann, 1978, pp162-163. 
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There are two important elements to understanding the international 
system. The first is identifYing the actors in the system. Who or what 
impacts on foreign policy decision making at the international level? The 
second is establishing the balance of power within the system. Which 
actors are dominant? Which actors have an impact on the case study? 
How and why? 
ACTORS IN THE SYSTEM 
The actions and attitudes of international actors will have a bearing on 
the foreign policy decision making of all states. This is because no state 
is able to function independently in the system. All modern states, 
including the United States can only function properly with at least some 
level of international co-operation or inter-dependence. 
So, how do you define an international actor? For the purposes of this 
thesis three main criteria have been selected. They are: 
1. The entity must perform significant and continuing functions 
- significant in the sense that it has a continuing impact on 
interstate relations, 
2. The entity is considered significant by the foreign policy 
makers of states and is given significance in the formation of 
states' foreign poliCies, 
3. The entity has some degree of autonomy or freedom in its 
own decision making128• 
IH Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 52. 
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Given this criteria, four main types of actors have been identified as 
existing in the international system. These are: 
1. States. 
2. Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs), 
3. International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs), and 
4. Multi-National Corporations (MNCs)129. 
The first of these four. the nation-state. is the traditional unit of analYSis 
for international relations and the international system in particular. 
However, the twentieth century. the last half in particular, gave rise to a 
number of other institutions who need to be considered as actors in their 
own right. The first type of these to be considered is Inter-Governmental 
Organisations (IGOs) such as the United Nations; the second is 
International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) like Amnesty or 
Greenpeace; and the third is Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) like 
Shell. Coca-Cola. General Motors. or Mitsubishi13o. 
Why do organisations like Greenpeace or General Motors qualifY? They 
qualifY because any organised unit that is able to command the 
identification. interests, and loyalty of individuals, and that is able to 
affect interstate relations, becomes by default a competitor of states 131 . 
129 East in Salmore & Hermann, 1978. pp. 145-147. 
J30 M. Nicholson. International Relations: A Concise Introduction, New York. 1998. pp. 30-31. And 
Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 52. 
J3J Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 52. And Nicholson, 1998, p. 31. 
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States 
It is a widely accepted fact that the state is the primary actor in the 
international system. There are a plethora of definitions of a state within 
the literature, none of which are necessary for the purposes of this 
analysis. What is relevant is that while the state has many competitors in 
the international system, it has several key advantages. The first is its 
legal status of formal sovereignty, but the state also it also possesses 
demographic, economic, military, and geographic capabilities that most if 
not all other actors are unable to match132. 
Most of New Zealand's international interaction during the crisis period 
was with other states, primarily Australia, Britain, Canada, and the 
United States. This will be examined in greater detail in Chapter Six. 
Intemational GovemmentaL Organisations ([GOs) 
Inter-Governmental Organisations (IGOs) are associations of states 
established by mutual agreement. IGOs have at least two member states 
as well as a permanent structure and staff, whose primary loyalty is, 
theoretically at least. to the IGO. Most IGOs have a specific function. 
whether it be economic as in the case of IGOs such as the World Trade 
Organisation (WIO) or military like the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO). The most important IGO is the United Nations, 
which in turn also has a number of specialised subsidiary IGOs such as 
the World Health Organisation (WHO). 
While the activities of trans-national IGOs extend beyond national 
boundaries, they are still based on the principle of sovereignty, and each 
J32 Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. S()·60. 
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state within the organisation is the legal equal of all the others133. IGOs 
also provide a forum for co-operation, and an administration to assist in 
providing the means of implementation. They also provide channels of 
communication for states which are often either unable, or unwilling, to 
partake in bi-Iateral, or even conventional multi-lateral 
communications 134. In 1909, there were just 37 traditional IGOs. By 
1997 this number had risen to 1850. an increase of 5000%135. There are 
four main focus areas for IGOs: (1) Peace and Security, (2) Social and 
Economic Development, (3) Human Rights, and (4) Humanitarian 
Assistance136. 
By far the most important IGO, and the only one explicitly relevant to 
this case study is the United Nations. The power of the UN effectively 
rests with the Security Council, which has five permanent members-
Russia, China, France, Britain, and the USA - and ten non-permanent 
members, who are voted onto the Council and serve on a rotational 
basis. The five permanent members also have the power of veto, which 
means that any and all matters voted on by the Security Council will be 
dismissed unless there is unanimity amongst them. During the Cold War 
the Security Council was effectively paralysed by constant use of the veto 
along strategic voting lines. In 1990 there was a subtle change of 
emphasis which had an important impact upon the outcome of the Gulf 
War. No longer constrained by their Cold War ideologies and strategies 
133 U.c. Tafe, "Intergovernmental Organisations" in M.K. Cusimano. Ed., Beyond Sovereignty: lssuesfor a 
Global Agenda, Boston. 2000, pp. 221.230-231. And Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 57. 
U4 A.L. Bennett, International Organisations: Principles and Issues. 4'h Ed .• Englewood Cliffs, NJ, 1988. 
p. 3. And Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 56-57. 
135 Tafe in Cusimano, 2000, p. 217. 
136 Ibid., p. 225. 
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the permanent members voted together on the many resolutions that 
related to this crisis. 
New Zealand, as a small state, would generally be expected to expend 
most ofits foreign policy resources through 100s such as the UN. This is 
highlighted in the case study by New Zealand's initial emphasis on the 
role of the UN in the crisis. However, as it became apparent that it was 
the United States that was taking the lead role, albeit under UN 
sanction, this focus changed to bi-lateral interactions as will be 
discussed in Chapter six. 
Intemational Non-Governmental Organisations 
The main distinction between IOOs and Non-Oovernmental 
Organisations (NOOs) is membership. NOOs differ from 100s in that 
their members are individuals or private associations, rather than states, 
as is the case with IOOs. Like 100s they have a permanent structure and 
staff, but they are not always purely political organisations. Like 100s, 
NOOs deal with a wide variety of matters. There are religious bodies. 
such as the Catholic Church; professional organisations: sports 
organisations, like football's goveTIling body FIFA: trade union groups; 
and political parties, all of whom can be classified as NOOS137. 
INOOs are NOOs that operate across state boundaries. While these 
INOOs generally perform relatively low-level tasks, mainly promoting 
contact across state boundaries on issues of common interest and 
aSSisting in non-goveTIlmental communication between individuals of 
many nations. In many ways INGOs help to bring the global SOCiety 
together in a similar way that private groups do in building a civil society 
m Russett & Starr, 1985, p. 57. And Russett, Starr & Stoll. 1989, p. 33. 
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within a state. While their total membership is only a fraction of the 
world's population they can sometimes function as pressure groups, 
affecting national governments or international organisations 138 . 
INGOs played only a very minor role in New Zealand's decision making 
during this crisis period, with New Zealand consulting with the Red 
Cross and contributing humanitarian assistance to the Egyptian Red 
Crescent. This will be further explained in Chapter Six. 
Multi-National Corporations 
Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) are private business firms whose 
activities straddle at least one state boundary, though many of them 
have business operations spread around the globe. Unlike a state whose 
sprawling bureaucracy is multi-layered, they are often organised 
hierarchically, and run centrally. MNCs are not new to the international 
system. in fact many of them predate the states that have been created 
since the end of World War II. Since the end of World War II, MNCs have 
become major actors on the international scene. Like states, MNCs have 
their own spheres of influence through the division of world markets. In 
many cases they often engage in diplomacy and espionage. the 
traditional tools of states. However, more importantly, MNCs have very 
large economic resources, which gives them a huge advantage over not 
just many of the newer and smaller states in the system, but some of the 
older ones as well139• 
I3X Russett & Starr. 1985, pp. 57-58. 
13Y Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 58-59. And Nicholson. 1998, pp. 30-31. 39. And Russelt. Starr & Stoll. j 989. 
pp.34-35. 
61 
Despite the undoubted interest of MNCs, such as the major oil 
companies, in the crisis, a survey of the MERT archives and secondary 
sources such as newspaper and journal articles has found no evidence 
that MNCs played a significant role in the decision making process of 
this case study. 
STRUCTURE OF THE INTERANTIONAL SYSTEM 
Foreign Policy is not made in a vacuum. In most cases foreign policy is a 
reaction to the behaviour of other actors in the system. Because of this, 
the policy options available to a decision maker are often shaped by the 
relative power of all actors involved 140. All states are theoretically equal, 
but in reality some states are more equal than others. This is due to the 
unequal distribution of resources that exists in the international system. 
This unequal distribution of resources. such as land, population, and 
wealth, has led to the forming of a status hierarchy of size and power 
that exists in the international system. As a result states can be divided 
and classified by such variables as large and small, strong or weak141 . 
There are many attempts at categorising states in a hierarchical manner 
available within the literature. However. many of these make the 
fundamental error of over simplifYing their categorisation by relying on 
just one variable such as area, population. or GDP. As studies have 
shown, a single factor such as territorial size can be misleading. and in 
itself is an insufficient definition142. The yardstick should in fact be 
140 Nester, 1995, pp. 135-136. And Reynolds. 1994, p. J 03. 
141 Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 61-62. 
142 Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 4-5. And Handel, 1990, p. 10. 
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power, which comes not only in many forms. but also from many 
sources. 
A good measure for analysing the power of a state is to look at its 
national capabilities and attributes. This refers to the resources of a state 
and the ability of the state to utilise them. Together these two factors 
produce a capability, sometimes known as a "capacity to act". Decision 
makers consider their national capabilities and attributes when they 
decide on the type of roles their state can play on the international stage. 
National capabilities and attributes also provide a gUideline or framework 
for the state's potential foreign policy behaviour l43. All countries have 
different national capability and attribute levels, which lead to differences 
in the substantive content of their foreign policy behaviour, differences in 
their approaches to. and style of. statecraft, and differences in the 
processes by which foreign policy is made in each country144. 
There are four main national capabilities and attributes, military. 
economic, demography, and geography. Military power is, of course, an 
important tool for influence or coercion, while economic power too, can 
be just as influential. A country's geography and demography also playa 
large role as they constitute much of the country's resource base. 
143 N.B. Wish, "National Attributes as Sources of National Role Conceptions: A Capability-Motivation 
Model" in Walker, 1987. pp. 95-96. And K. Knorr. "Notes on the Analysis ofa National Capabilities" in 
J.N. Rosenau, V. Davis. & M.A. East, Eds .• The Analysis of International Politics, New York, 1972. And 
East in East, Sal more. & Hermann, 1978, pp. 123-124. 
144 East in East. Salmore. & Hermann. 1978. pp. 136-141. 
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POWER CLASSIFICATION 
As a result of the analysis of their uneven capabilities, states can be 
classified according to five levels of power. These are: 
1. Superpowers, 
2. Great Powers, 
3. Middle Powers, 
4. Small Powers, and 
5. Mini-states 145. 
New Zealand is a small power, commonly referred to in the literature as a 
small state. Small powers are exactly that, small, with limited territorial 
areas, populations, and economic and military resources. This lack of 
resources generally allows them only a limited role in international 
affairs which often leads them to having a selective approach to foreign 
policy146. This is highlighted by the fact that the foreign policy of small 
powers often has an economic or moral basis. In general. small powers 
support international norms and seek to avoid the use of force as a 
foreign policy tooL They like to emphasise their sovereign equality when 
dealing with larger actors, while preferring to act in a multi-lateral 
setting as opposed to a bi-lateral setting in order to best utilise their 
limited resources147. 
J4S Handel, 1990, p. 10. 
146 Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 6-7. 
147 M. Papadakis & H. Starr, "Opportunity, Willingness, and Small States: The Relationship Between 
Environment and Foreign Policy" in Hermann, Kegley lr. & Rosenau, 1987, pp. 420. 428-429. And 
Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, p. 6. 
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ALLIANCES 
The balance of power can also be affected by co-operation between 
states. This co-operation between states can be either informal or formal. 
Two or more states can be said to be acting in coalition if they act in a 
similar way towards a third state, even without a formal agreement. An 
alliance on the other hand is a formal structure, based on written or tacit 
agreements, with a range of reciprocal commitments148• 
There are two main reasons why states enter into alliances. The first is 
the aggregation of power. An alliance allows a state to add the military 
capabilities of others to its owrl. The second reason is deterrence, in 
order to constrain the options open to a potential opponent. In this way 
many alliances are in fact pre-emptive rather than reactive. Also should 
the deterrence fail to prevent conflict, the addition of extra military 
resources will prove usefu1l 49• Alliances can also allow large states to 
dominate and control smaller states, smaller states to manipulate larger 
ones, and for an alliance leader to create and maintain order 150. All of 
which can be clearly seen in the behaviour of states during the Cold War. 
New Zealand's traditional approach of relying on alliances to guarantee 
its security, and the changes to this in the 1980s are relevant to the 
decision making process in 1990. This will be examined in greater detail 
in Chapter Six. 
14~ l. David Singer, "The Global System and its Sub-Systems: A Developmental View" in l.N. Rosenau, 
Ed., Linkage Politics: Essays on the COil vergence of National and 1l1lernationa[ Systems, New York, 
1969b, pp. 27-28. And Russell & Starr, 1985, p. 95. 
149 Russett & Starr, 1985, pp. 95-96. 
150 Ibid, p. 99. 
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CONCLUSION 
The international system is a complex environment with a multitude of 
actors. The primary actor is still the state, however the rise of IGOs, 
INGOs, and MNCs has further complicated an already myriad world. 
Within the international system exists a balance of power, effectively a 
vertical hierarchy. Where an actor sits in the balance of power is defined 
by their national capabilities, military, economic, geographic, and 
demographic. An analysis of these capabilities allows an actor to be 
classified according to a scale as either a superpower, great power, 
middle power, small power, or mini-state. 
This balance of power is an ever evolving concept as actors move up and 
down the vertical hierarchy as their status changes. The status of an 
actor is also fluid, because it can change quickly with the loss or 
acquisition of capabilities such as natural resources or nuclear 
weaponry. The status of individual actors, and consequently the balance 
of power, is also affected by the forming or dissolving of alliances. 
Alliances allow for the sharing or enhancing of capabilities, thus the 
status of the actors involved is often also enhanced. The dissolution of 
such a relationship will of course remove any such enhancement, 
possibly with negative effects for the actors concerned. 
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Chapter Four 
Three Prime Ministers in Two 
Short Months 
INTRODUCTION 
For the purposes of this case study the individual level analysis will be 
confined to Geoffrey Palmer, Mike Moore, and Jim Bolger, who held the 
office of Prime Minister during the crisis period. It is possible for this 
level of analysis to be broadened to include others who played a role in 
the decision making process such as Cabinet Ministers, and 
Bureaucratic officials. However, given the time and length constraints of 
this study a much narrower focus is the most pragmatic approach. This 
does not detract from the case study as the roles and inputs of these 
other decision makers on the process are examined in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
This chapter will firstly examine the political backgrounds of the three 
individuals and point to some of the key experiences and factors that 
impacted upon their decision making during the Gulf Crisis period. The 
second section will examine their approaches and decision styles during 
this period highlighting the differences and Similarities. and 
consequences for the decision making process. 
At the beginning of August 1990 when the case study begins polls 
indicated that the Fourth Labour Government was heading for a severe 
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defeat at the upcoming October general election. Geoffrey Palmer, had 
succeeded David Lange as Prime Minister the previous year. However his 
leadership was being questioned by elements within an increasingly 
fragmented Labour Caucus, and on 4 September he was eventually 
supplanted by his Foreign Minister, Mike Moore. Seven weeks later 
Moore and Labour were defeated at the polls and replaced by the Bolger-
led National Party. 
As will be explained in this chapter, all three Prime Ministers had 
different backgrounds, training. and experiences; they all held power 
under quite differing circumstances, carne into the office with different 
goals and ambitions, and exercised their leadership in different manners. 
However, one thing they did have in common was their use of small 
decision making units, comprising just two or three key Ministers. They 
also received consistent advice from the two main advisory groups, MERT 
and NZDF, as the main advisers remained the same throughout the 
crisis period. This consistency therefore should be taken into 
conSideration when comparing the their decision making. 
F 
GEOFFREY PALMER 
Geoffrey Winston Russell Palmer was born 21 April 1942 in Nelson to 
urban middle class parents, both of whom were university graduates. A 
key factor in the personality and decision making style of Palmer was 
and is his love of the law. He was educated at Nelson College and then 
the Victoria University of Wellington (VUW), where he graduated with 
degrees in Politics and Law in 1965. He spent most of the next ten years 
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either. studying, teaching or practising law in both New Zealand and the 
United States 1S1 . 
Politics was something that Palmer was adept at, despite his failure to 
secure Labour's Nelson candidacy when he joined the party in 1974. 
After becoming MP for Christchurch Central in 1979, he eventually 
enjoyed a remarkable rise in the Labour Party. Within one year of being 
elected to parliament he became Labour leader. Bill Rowling's 
Parliamentary Assistant. In 1983. he was elected Deputy Leader to new 
leader. David Lange, beating Mike Moore and Anne Hercus, for the job. 
When Labour won the election of 1984 he became Deputy Prime 
Minister, as well as Attorney General. and Minister of Justice 1S2. 
Palmer's rise to power came largely as a result of the fallout from the 
Lange-Douglas feud that beset the Fourth Labour Government. After 
winning re-election in 1987 Lange came to verbal blows with some of his 
senior ministers, led by the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas. over the 
shape of future economic policies. On 5 November 1988 Lange sacked 
Richard Prebble. a staunch Douglas ally, from Cabinet. On 14 December 
1988. Douglas resigned from Cabinet after refusing to serve under 
Lange's leadership. At Caucus the following week Lange called for a 
leadership vote, which he comfortably won by 35-15 with 2 
abstentions IS3. 
lSI S. Gomibuchi, An Amateur Labour Leader?: Geojji'ey Palmer alld his Contribution to the Electoral 
Reform Policy, M.A. Thesis. University of Canterbury, 1995, p. 26. 
152 K. Eunson, Mirrors on the Hill; Reflections on New Zealand's Polilical Leaders. Palmerston North. 
200), pp. 225-226. And Gomibuclli, 1995, pp. 27-28. 
153 H. McQueen, The Ninth Floor: Inside the Prime Minister's Office A Political Experience, Auckland. 
1991, pp. 124,133-134. 
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On 3 August 1989, Caucus returned Douglas to Cabinet and Prebble 
almost won the second available spot, losing to Annette King on the third 
ballot. David Lange saw this as a vote of no-confidence and on Monday 7 
August 1989 he resigned as Prime Minister154 . Succeeding Lange came 
down to a two horse race between Palmer and Mike Moore, as Douglas 
did not have enough support to seriously challenge for the top job, Moore 
who had stayed out of the Lange-Douglas feud was given no chance by 
many pundits, but Lange himself voted for him. The real battle was 
between Douglas and Helen Clark for the job of Deputy, a battle won by 
Clark, who became New Zealand's first woman Deputy Prime Minister155 • 
This series of incidents is also important in that its repercussions, in 
terms of factionalisation, were still being felt a year afterwards when the 
Gulf Crisis occurred. 
Palmer claims that he did not especially aspire to be Prime Minister, and 
that his prime motivation in accepting the post in 1989 was out of a 
sense of duty: "1 didn't seek the post, and 1 didn't want it: the reason 
being that I had a close opportunity for five years to observe what the 
position involved - having been Deputy Prime Minister for that time and 
Acting Prime Minister on many occasions" 156. 
Palmer served as Prime Minister for just thirteen months before being 
replaced by Moore in the lead up to the 1990 General Election. Mter 
resigning as Prime Minister he remained Minister for the Environment 
outside Cabinet until the election when he retired. He then returned to 
154 Ibid., pp. 11,38. 
155 Ibid .• p. 192. And Eunson, 2001, p. 218. 
150 Geoffrey Palmer, cited in N, McMillan, Top oj the Greasy Pole: New Zealand Prime Ministers or 
Recent Times. Dunedin. 1993, p. 31. 
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academia before launching his own law firm in 1995, where he continues 
to practice 157. 
Palmer, as the only recent Prime Minister who neither won nor lost an 
election, was not bothered by the fact, and has been quoted on the 
subject as: ''I'm perfectly content with that because I regard elections as 
pretty much a waste of time anyway. I went into politics to do certain 
things of a legal character which I largely did, and which I am very fond 
of, and pleased and concerned about still" 158. 
This surprises few, as it is law and not politics that is his true calling. 
Politics was more or less a temporary deviation from a career which had 
been devoted almost wholly, one way or another, to the law. An 
opportunity to experience making law rather than merely teaching or 
practising it 159. 
Keith Eunson, who served as a media consultant to Palmer when he was 
Prime Minister compares Palmer to former National Party Prime Minister, 
Sir John Marshall. Both came from reasonably prosperous middle class 
families and were well educated in the law. Both men were more attuned 
to the intellectual aspects of their parties than their political 
machinations. The strength of both men, he claims, was their excellent 
administrative skills, robust intelligence. and ability to shoulder a heavy 
administrative departmental load. And finally. the extensive legal 
knowledge they were able to provide to the upper echelons of their 
respective governments 160. 
157 Palmer, 1992, p. 150. And Eunson, 2001,221. And Gomibuchi, 1l)95, pp. 29-30. 
15M Geoffrey Palmer, cited in McMillan, 1993, p. 84, 
19 Eunson, 2001,pp. 215-216. 
160 Ibid., pp. 217, 226. 
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This is also reflected. as we shall see, in Palmer's decision making style. 
Not possessed with a politicians cunning and instinct. he was cautious, 
studied, and determined to make the 'right' decision. 
MIKE MOORE 
Born in Whakatane in 1946, Mike Moore began an active life in politics 
at an early age. In 1964, at the age of just 18 Moore was elected to the 
Auckland Trades Council. A member of the Printer's Union, he also 
marched against the Vietnam War161 . In 1972. when Nonnan Kirk and 
the Labour Party swept to power, Moore, at the relatively young age of 23 
was elected as MP for the Auckland electorate of Eden. Moore's interest 
and experience in foreign policy began emerging during this first term as 
an MP when he also served on the Foreign Affairs Committee162• By the 
time of the next election in 1975. Kirk was dead, replaced by Bill 
Rowling. The widespread support that Kirk had in 1972 was also gone 
and the National Party. led by Robert Muldoon won a comprehensive 
victory. Moore was one of many Labour casualties, losing his Eden 
seat163 . 
The years 1977 and 1978 were pivotal for Moore. In 1977 he stood for 
the Labour candidacy in the Mangere by-election. but lost out at 
selection time to David Lange164. That same year he fought and beat 
161 M. Moore. A Labour of Love, Wellington. 1993a, pp. 18-20. 
162 Ibid., pp. 30-37. And EUllson, 2001. p. 243. 
163 Moore, 1993a, p. 50. And Eunson, 2001, p. 243. 
164 McMillan. 1993, p. 28. Anu Moore. I 993a. p. 60. And Eunson. 200 I, p. 243. 
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cancer165. In 1978 he left Auckland and moved to Christchurch in order 
to further his political career. After some initial suspicion as to his 
motives for moving, Moore was quickly accepted by his electorate, the 
historically safe Labour seat of Papanui. This was reinforced later that 
same year when he was elected as their MP at a general election166. 
Moore was never defeated as MP for his new electorate and retired in 
1999. 
In his second tenn in Parliament as a Labour MP Moore's star rose along 
with that of David Lange. When the charismatic Lange replaced Rowling 
as Leader of the Labour Party in 1983 Moore went up against Palmer for 
the role of Deputy. Moore was ahead after the first ballot, but eventually 
lost by a single vote on the second. When Labour, with Lange at the 
helm. won the 1984 election Moore became Minister of External 
Relations and Trade167 . 
PALMER - MOORE LEADERSHIP CHANGE 
The change of leadership between Palmer and Moore is an important 
factor to this study because of the dishannony it caused in the Labour 
Caucus. Labour was still feeling the effects of the Lange-Douglas feud 
which had to a degree factionalised the Caucus and led to the resignation 
of Lange. When Moore replaced Palmer in the lead up to the 1990 
General Election a number of Labour MPs were not happy about the 
manner in which it was done and this led to further disharmony in an 
already unhappy camp. 
165 Eunson, 2001, p. 243. 
inC, Ibid., and Moore, 1993a, pp. 60-68. 
167 Moore, 1993a, pp. 88-89. 117 
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By the middle of 1990 the writing was on the wall for the Labour 
government as a series of recent polls forecast disaster at the upcoming 
election168. Unfortunately for Palmer the decline in his own support and 
the rise of that for Moore was also reflected in leadership polls conducted 
by a variety of reputable organisations. 169. 
Ultimately it was the polls that ended Geoffrey Palmer's term as Prime 
Minister. Rumours of a 'coup' had begun to circulate as early as May and 
by June the newspapers were speculating that Labour'S poll pOSition was 
beginning to look disastrous, and that Palmer'S position as leader was 
possibly at risk 170. 
With Palmer seemingly hamstrung, bailing an increasingly sinking ship, 
Moore was beginning to attract much more attention from a meeting with 
United States Secretary of State James Baker, and leading an important 
trade delegation on a tour of Europe. Moore received kudos for both. If 
nothing else he was showing energy and enthusiasm, both of which were 
lacking in the existing Labour leadershipl7l. At the time Winston Peters 
16M These polls included an NRB poll for The New Zealand Herald at the end of April which showed 
National at 55 percent and Labour 30 percent; a Heylen poll for TVNZ in early May which had National on 
64 percent and Labour 28 percent; a Dominion-TV3 Gallup poll in mid May showing National on 67 
percent and Labour 24; and an MRL Research poJ! for The National Business Review in early June which 
had National on 46 percent llnJ Labour on 18 percent. All cited in Sheppard, S., Broken Circle: The 
Decline and Fall of the Fourth Labour Government, Wellington, 1999, p. 227. 
16Y NRB, in its May poll for The New Zealand Herald had rated Moore at just 4 percent. well behind Palmer 
and Peters, at 16 and 13 percent respectively. By July he had gained ten points and was tied for first with 
Peters at 14 percent, meanwhile Palmer dropped to 12 percent. Heylen. in its April poll for TVNZ, had 
rated Moore at a lowly 6 percent. By July that had ballooned to 12 percent, narrowly trailing Palmer who 
was on 15 percent. Cited in Sheppard, 1999, p. 227. 
170 Eunson, 2001, pp. 233-234. And Sheppard, 1999, p. 227. 
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was quoted as saying 'He's the only Labour Party politician who's never 
in the country, hence his appeal'l72. 
By August 1990 it was apparent that some senior Cabinet members, 
aware of the electoral difficulties they were facing. were considering 
replacing Palmer with Moore. At its meeting on 27 August, with Palmer 
absent overseas. Cabinet, led by Helen Clark, agreed to consider "all 
options" in the fight to win the election. "All options" was code for 
"Palmer must go"173. Losing the support of Clark, his deputy was the 
fatal blow for Palmer's leadership. 
But the fact that I was the Deputy and that I supported it was pretty important. 
It was a very ditlicult position. But I became convinced that he was in no shape 
to go to the election at all. And 1 suppose it was around that time that Mike 
Moore started talking to me about whether anything could be done. Mike 
genuinely believed that he had the ability to pluck victory from the jaws of 
defeat. And in the end I backed him and the caucus backed him on the basis 
that it couldn't be worse 174 . 
Initially Palmer attempted to fight to retain his position, even taking 
charge of the Gulf criSiS personally. thus driving Moore, the Minister of 
External Relations out of the limelight. He even announced that he would 
take the speaking slot that was scheduled for Moore in New Zealand's 
address to the United Nations General Assembly debate on 1 October175. 
172 Ibid. 
173 A. McRobbie, "Leadership ano the Public Opinion Polls: The 1990 Election" in McLeay, Wellington, 
199\, p. 56. And Sheppard, 1999, pp. 228-229. And EUllson, 2001, pp. 221-222. 237. 
174 Helen Clark, cited in B. Edwards, Helen: Portrait of a Prime Mil1l,l'Ier. Auckland. 2001, p. 217. 
175 Sheppard, 1999, p. 229. And Eunsoll, 2001, p. 222. 
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Palmer also continued publicly to deny that there was any threat to his 
position as leader, even up until the day before he reSigned. On Monday 
3 September, when asked whether he would use that day's Cabinet 
meeting to confront Moore, he replied: 
Confront him with what? There has been no indication to me by any MP that 
there is going to be a leadership challenge: none at all. To change the leader at 
this stage would show signs of panic and desperation. I don't think that the 
public would react at all well to that. I think it would focus attention on what 
people would think to be splits and divisions in the Labour Party. I want to make 
it absolutely clear to every New Zealander that I am not quitting. I am staying 
where I am. I am going to fight this election176 • 
However any confidence that Palmer had in his own leadership must 
surely have been destroyed by the polling data, requested the previous 
week by the Party's Campaign Committee, and presented at that fateful 
Cabinet meeting. The data, from Insight Market Research, was based 
upon a telephone poll of 800 people conducted the previous day. It was 
not good news for Labour who it showed were 21 points behind NationaL 
For Palmer it was far worse: it concluded that the best possible outcome 
for Labour, if he remained in charge was a defeat by 19 pOints. If this 
result stood on election night then it would mean a swing against the 
Government of 14 percent, and would leave Labour in opposition with 
just somewhere between 13 and 18 seats in Parliament. More 
importantly for Palmer it showed that if Moore were to assume the 
leadership there was the possibility of Labour still having a fighting 
chance 177. 
176 Sheppard, 1999, p. 230. 
177 Sheppard, 1999, p. 230. And Eunson. 2001, Pl'. 221-223. 
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The next day, Tuesday 4 September, caucus was scheduled to meet at 
llam. Instead of the expected vote of no confidence and leadership vote, 
Palmer surprised many by announcing his resignation. It was a surprise 
to many commentators as some believed that had Palmer forced a 
leadership vote himself he would have had enough support from outside 
cabinet to retain his position, Instead however he resigned and Moore 
was elected to replace him 178. 
The two questions to arise out of this new circumstance were: to what 
extent had Moore acted to undennine Palmer? And why? To many it 
would have made more sense to wait till after the election before 
assuming the leadership so as to have a clear run to the 1993 election. 
In public Moore had always denied that he had any leadership ambitions 
but others would disagree with those statements. David Lange, for one, 
was certain that Moore 'engineered' Palmer's downfall, despite his own 
advice to him that he should wait until after the election 179. Helen Clark. 
who played a large part in Moore's rise to power has been quoted on the 
leadership issue as saying 'I would say Mike was eager. when was Mike 
ever not eager?'180. 
Moore claims that he had told colleagues to 'go away' when they 
approached him to take the leadership in August. He said he knew that 
Labour would lose the 1990 election and that he had a chOice between 
'taking up a poison chalice. or inheriting a toxic waste afterwards', He 
claims that in the end he gave in to his colleagues' wishes because he 
wanted a fundamental redirection of Labour. and by assuming the 
17& Sheppard. 1999, pp. 230-231. And Eunson, 200 I, p. 224. 
17~ Eunson, 2001, p. 233. 
IX!) Sheppard, 1999, p. 229. 
77 
leadership he could position the party to become the government in 
1993 181 . 
Regardless of the motive, many Labour MPs were unhappy about Moore's 
side-lining of Palmer, as Ruth Dyson, the then Labour Party President 
has commented: 
I had to do a lot of pacifYing of people in our Caucus, because they were very 
unhappy ... really unhappy ... that Geoffrey stood down ... [Allot of people in our 
Caucus saw it as very unfair to Geoffrey ... They thought the Mike Moore had 
deliberately undermined him in the media and within the Cabinet. .. Geoffrey had 
really strong loyalty to the party, and that he was being abused 182• 
Division already existed within Caucus as a hangover from the Lange-
Douglas feud, and between Caucus and the party's grassroots 
organisational and industrial wings over government policy directions 183. 
This new unrest, which lasted until well after the election, further 
fractured an already fragile unity as the criSiS was deepening in the Gulf. 
1990 GENERAL ELECTION 
The replacement of Palmer with Moore was highly unusual in that it 
came just 53 days before the date already set down for a General 
Election. However it did add a spark to what had previously promised to 
be one of the dullest campaigns for many years, as the Palmer-Bolger 
lXl McMillan, 1993, p. 35. 
IK2 Interview with Ruth Dyson cited in S. Gomibuchi, Followers and Leadership Durability: An Afwlvsis of 
Leadership Support ill the New Zealand Labour Party. PhD Thesis. University of Canterbury, 2000. p. 57. 
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battle had done nothing to capture the imagination and spirit of the 
population184• 
Despite the change in leadership, and Moore's aggressive and concerted 
campaigning Labour were heavily defeated at the Polls on 27 October 
1990. Labour dropped from 56 seats to just 29. National rose from 41 to 
67. and New Labour gained their first elected seat in Parliament when 
Jim Anderton retained his Sydenham seat. National went from a deficit of 
15 to a majority of 37, a massive 52 seat swing in a parliament of 97. 
Forty percent of incumbent MPs were ousted. including 12 Labour 
ministers, both Labour whips, and the Speaker of the House. Despite the 
devastation many Labour supporters were privately satisfied as party 
polling had indicated that results might have been far worse 185 . 
How much effect Moore's aggreSSively promoted individual leadership 
had on minimising Labour's losses remains open to debate. However it 
was probably minimal because upon being installed as Labour Leader 
Moore quickly jumped into the lead in the polls for preferred Prime 
Minister. and even maintained that position immediately after the 
election 186. 
JIM BOLGER 
James Brendan Bolger. the son ofIrish immigrant farm workers, was 
born in Opunake in 1935. A sheep and cattle farmer himself, Bolger 
became MP for King Country in 1972. After the Muldoon led National 
IX4 K. Jackson, "Leadership and Change" in McLeay, 1991, p. 47. And McRobbie in McLeay. 1991. p. 56. 
IX5 J. Vowles, & P. Aimer, Voters' Vengeance: The 1990 Election in New Zealand and the Fate of'the 
Fourth Labour Government, Auckland, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
iX6 Jackson in McLeay, 1991, p. 54. 
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Party victory in 1975, Bolger became a Parliamentary Under Secretary for 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Maori Affairs. In 1977 he was appointed 
Minister of Fisheries, and Associate Minister of Agriculture. In 1978 he 
took the reins of both the Immigration and Labour portfolios. He kept 
Immigration for just one term until 1981 though he stayed on until 
electoral defeat in 1984 as Minister of Labour, a position that he is 
largely held to have excelled in 187. It was during this term as Minister of 
Labour that Bolger served one year as President of the International 
Labour Organisation in 1983188. In Top of the Greasy Pole (1993) Neale 
McMillan points out that 'a senior official from this period rated him the 
best Minister of Labour that he had dealt with at a time when ministers 
in this portfolio regularly found themselves arbitrating in disputes' 189. 
After Labour defeated National at the 1984 election, Muldoon was 
replaced as Leader by Jim McLay and Bolger was elected Deputy 
unopposed. However McLay proved to be relatively ineffective as Leader 
of the Opposition and was in turn replaced by Bolger in 1986. This 
change of leadership bears many similarities to the replacement of 
Palmer by Moore four years later. Like Palmer, McLay was undone by 
opinion polls and a fickle caucus who did not believe he could win an 
upcoming election 190. 
When Bolger assumed the leadership of National the party was divided 
as the structure that Muldoon had ruled over for so long and so firmly 
IX? 1. Bolger, Bolger: A Viel!' frO/ll the Top, Auckland, 1998, p. 34. And McMillan. 1993, p. 116. And 
Eunson, 2001, p. 251. And New Zealand National Party, Campaign '93: 1993 Par!iwnentary Candidates, 
Wellington, 1993, p. 73. 
188 Bolger. 1998, p. 50. And New Zealand National Party, 1993, p. 73. 
I 8'l McMillan, 1993, p. 52. 
iY(J Ibid., pp. 34,95, 116. 
80 
was dismantled. They lost the election in 1987, but they were never in a 
position to seriously challenge Lange and Labour at this point in time. 
Despite the defeat Bolger continued as leader and National's fortunes 
slowly began to change as the Fourth Labour Government began to self-
destruct. Between the elections of 1987 and 1990 Labour were beset by 
internal disputes, leadership changes, and a growing disharmony in both 
the private and public sectors regarding the government's reform 
policies. 
APPROACHES TO THE CRISIS 
Geoffrey Palmer 
Geoffrey Palmer's approach to the crisis reflected very much his general 
style of governance, studied, firm, judgmental. but unexciting and 
without risk191 . Palmer had limited foreign affairs experience. What 
experience he did have came largely as a result of being, ilrstly, Deputy 
Prime Minister, and later, Prime Minister, and not from any specific 
interest or training. He also lacked the political instinct and opportunism 
that is found in most senior politiCians. As a result he often fell back 
upon his legal training and experience and used a studied and controlled 
approach to decision n1aking and politics in general. 
One consequence of this approach was that Palmer maintained an open 
mind towards decision making. He had no set belief system or ideological 
background that acted as a heuristic device to colour his judgement. For 
example he had very positive feelings towards the United States. where 
he had studied and taught law on several occasions. He believed that it 
was possible to negotiate a rational solution to the ANZUS dispute that 
1\11 Eunson, 2001, p. 216. 
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had affected bi-Iateral relations in the mid 1980s. He was also one of very 
few world leaders to endorse the US invasion of Panama in December 
1989 192 • 
This then raises the question of why he did not push for an early 
decision to join the US led coalition during the Gulf Crisis? Firstly he 
knew any such decision would require Cabinet's approval and this was 
highly unlikely. Instead of rushing to make a decision Palmer hesistated. 
This was clearly articulated by his actions in early August 1990 where he 
relied on diplomatic convention. He condemned the invasion, on the 
basis of international law, and offered to support any UN imposed 
sanctions. In addition he sent his Ambassador in Baghdad, John Clarke, 
to visit the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to convey New Zealand's concerns 193 . 
Once the UN did imposed sanctions on 6 August. Palmer quickly moved 
to endorse them. However, he shied away from getting New Zealand 
involved in any potential military activity outside of a full and 
unambiguous UN mandate 194. He did not rule out the possibility of New 
Zealand military action, but he insisted initially on a legal and 
constitutional framework being applied irrespective of the situation. 
As the crisis escalated Palmer formed a small governmental decision 
making unit comprising Moore (as Foreign Minister), Minister of Defence 
Peter Tapsell, and himself. which was supplemented by a small group of 
In J. Henderson, "Foreign Policy Decision Making in New Zealand: An Insider's Vicw" in Kennaway & 
Henderson, 1991b, p. 214. 
193 Media Statements by Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer. Prime Minister. 3 & 5 August 1990. MFAT File 
26712/16/4 Vol. I. 
194 Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Post-Cabinet Press Conference. 6 Augusl 1990, MFAT File 26712/16/4 Vol. 
1. 
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key advisors. This was made up of Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
Graeme Ansell, his Middle East and Africa Division Director Richard 
Woods, Chief of Defence Staff Lieutenant General Sir John Mace, and the 
Director of the Prime Minster's Advisory Group Simon Murdoch195. 
During August and early September while Palmer was still Prime 
Minister the United States pushed ahead with its military build-up in the 
Middle East. Both MERf and NZDF kept Palmer updated and advised on 
New Zealand's diplomatic and military options and capabilities but 
Palmer maintained his stance: no New Zealand action without UN 
consent. This increaSingly frustrated NZDF, who by early September 
were beginning to suggest quite firmly that New Zealand should make a 
military commitment to the US led multi-national force 196. When Moore 
replaced Palmer as Prime Minister on 4 September there were many that 
hoped Moore would also change this stance. 
Mike Moore 
In many respects Mike Moore found himself in a most unenviable 
position during this crisis period. He had just seven weeks in which to 
run an election campaign, try to alleviate rising discontent within his 
Caucus and gUide Cabinet towards a decision over the issue of sending 
troops to the Gulf. During this period there was also the issue of the New 
Zealand hostages in the region. This issue disturbed Moore greatly and is 
one on which he often dwelt 197. 
195 Transcript of informal meeting held at Premier House on 12 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 3. 
196 As early as 7 September Mace was making submissions suggesting lhat the Prime Minister be advised 
that NZDF had military options immediately available. On 27 September he submitted a document that 
opened by proposing that it was 111 the best interest of New Zealand \0 make a military contribution to the 
coalition forces. 
J97 Further explanation of this issue will be given in Chapter Five when the Ministry of External Relations 
and Trade is examined. 
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In contrast to Palmer's inexperience. Moore was possibly the most 
experienced Labour MP in terms of Foreign Affairs. He had served on 
Labour's Foreign Affairs Committee as far back as 1972, and been in the 
role of Minister of External Relations and Trade (Foreign Minister) since 
1984. Also unlike Palmer, who had no real political instinct and was 
more studied and guided by convention. Moore was a much more 
pragmatic and "gut" politician. He also came from very low socio-
economic background and unlike many of his colleagues had no tertiary 
education background. pOints that he often dwelt upon198. 
However one thing they did have in common was an open mind on the 
issue of making a military contribution to the US led coalition. Moore has 
been an 'internationalist' who believed that New Zealand, despite its 
relatively low power status, had a role to play in international affairs, 
with and without the UN. He believed that the Labour Party should reject 
its traditional policy of isolationism and become much more proactive 
internationally 199. However even by his own admission he did not always 
find common ground on this issue within his party: 
When I became Minister of Foreign Affairs I invited the Labour Party's Foreign 
Affairs and Defence committee to lunch. All had been appOinted to this 
committee: most had never been to party conferences. most had never been 
elected to anything inside the party. and none had been elected to any public 
office. All were vegetarians. They said I was out of touch and unrepresentative. I 
knew I had problems2oo. 
IYX Moore. 1993a. pp.9-17. 
IYY Ibid., pp. 207-209. 
200 M. Moore, A Brief Historv of the Future: Citizenship (~f' the Millennium, Christchurch, 1998, p. 122. 
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While he believed that it was possible for New Zealand to contribute to 
the multi-national force being assembled in the Gulf, he also believed 
that it should be done in a wider collective securtty context. While Moore 
believed in an internationalist approach to foreign policy he also believed 
that New Zealand should and could maintain its independence: 
A nation's foreign policy should be an expression of the ideals and values of its 
people. As a PacifIc nation. New Zealand must have its own unique set of values. 
Our foreign policy should be determined in Wellington. not in Washington, 
London. Canberra, or MOSCOW201 . 
Moore. like Palmer, also believed that the relationship with the United 
States could. and should be repaired. Moore, who had a long standing 
interest in international trade believed that a better relationship with the 
United States would lead to increased trade opportunities202 However 
unlike Palmer. Moore expressed no specific strategy for the repairing of 
this relationship. He did however rule out contrtbuting troops to the 
coalition solely for the purposes of accomplishing this goal. 
When Moore assumed the leadership in early September he came under 
at times qUite intense pressure from his bureaucracy to make a military 
commitment. a position that as discussed he was open minded enough 
to consider. However, he did not have the freedom to make such a 
decision on his own, as Cabinet would have to sign off on any such 
commitment. His Cabinet and Caucus were heavily split and a majority 
of his colleagues. led by Deputy Prime Minister Helen Clark and Minister 
of Disarmament and Associate Foreign Minister Fran Wilde, opposed 
such an action. 
201 M. Moore, Fightingfor New Zealand: New Zealand ill the 21'" Century. Wellington. I 993b, p. 179. 
202 Henderson in Kennaway & Hl.!l1dersol1. 1991 b, p. 214. 
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Moore was aware of the many divisions within both Cabinet and Caucus. 
Being in the middle of an election campaign he was also aware that he 
needed their support for his leadership in order to present a united front 
to the electoral public. Likewise. he was also aware that the polls pointed 
to electoral devastation for Labour and he was wary of alienating 
Labour's traditional leftist voter base who were already upset with 
Labour's economic reform package. In the end he made a pragmatic 
political decision and on 8 October 1990, along with his Cabinet 
colleagues. decided to put off any decision on the issue until after the 
upcoming election203 . 
While putting off any decision was possibly not the outcome that Moore 
wanted, he was extremely frustrated by the approach chosen by many of 
his Parliamentary colleagues: 
After advancing for a generation the proposition that the UN should be more 
proactive, the old left in New Zealand wrung their hands in dismay when the UN 
rallied against Saddam Hussein. One MP even claimed the war was fought for 
TV ratings. It was immature, anti-American, 1960s hippie doublespeak ... There 
are a substantial number of New Zealand MPs, in more than one party, who 
believe the Gulf War was a mistake. Yet 1 believe protecting 80 percent of the 
world's oil was of importance, as were the inhabitants of Kuwait204• 
Jim Bolger 
Jim Bolger'S approach to the crisis was quite different to both Palmer 
and Moore on three distinct pOints. Firstly. whereas the two Labour 
leaders had been open minded on the issue of contributing troops to the 
203 Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 35/2], M October 19')0. MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. IS 
204 Moore, 1998, p. 121. 
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coalition forces, Bolger was not. He firmly believed that New Zealand 
should make some form of military contribution. Secondly. he did not see 
the lack of clear UN oversight as a hurdle as Palmer and Moore had. And 
thirdly. he had the clear backing of his Cabinet and Caucus. 
Whilst Bolger was an experienced politician and MP. he did not have a 
great deal of experience in foreign affairs. While this is also true of 
Palmer. he at least had an experienced Foreign Minister to help him 
(ironically Moore). Bolger's Foreign Minister, Don McKinnon, was himself 
quite inexperienced in this field when he assumed that mantle. having 
previously been Opposition Spokesman on Defence. and latterly Health. 
Throughout the entire crisis period National's position was clear cut and 
this was conveyed to both the Labour leadership and the wider public. 
Indeed whilst still in opposition prior to the October election National 
looked on with some satisfaction as successive Labour leaders struggled 
with the issue205• 
During this period Bolger was kept informed of the MERT and NZDF 
positions regarding a possible military commitment, and he had frequent 
discussions with his own shadow Cabinet appOintees Doug Graham. 
Foreign Mfairs, and Doug Kidd. Defence. Bolger made approaches to 
Palmer in late August offering to consult on a bi-partisan approach to the 
crisis but Palmer rejected these advances206• 
Once the election was completed and National returned to government 
Bolger made several personnel changes in his decision making unit. He 
205 Don McKinnon, Interview. 21; November 200 I. 
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brought in McKinnon as Foreign Minister. McKinnon, the new Deputy 
Prime Minister and Leader of the House had been shadow Defence 
spokesman up until earlier in the year when he stood down in opposition 
to National's about turn on the anti-nuclear legislation. However, when 
National changed its policy to supporting Labour's anti-nuclear stance 
prior to the election he resigned from that post in protest207 . As a result 
McKinnon was in the shadow Health. portfolio when the crisis erupted 
and was therefore not a part of the initial Bolger discussion groups208. 
McKinnon, who went on to become an extremely well regarded Foreign 
Minister had little in the way of a foreign affairs background, having been 
a farm management consultant and real estate agent before entering 
Parliament in 19782o~. Despite this lack of experience he and Bolger 
maintained a very close relationship that allowed them to work very 
effectively together21O 
The new Minister of Defence, Warren Cooper, bought with him 
experience gained as Foreign Minister in the previous National 
government led by Muldoon. Between the election date in late October 
and the decision to commit military forces in late November there were a 
number of informal discussions in the new decision making unit. which 
included Bolger, McKinnon, Cooper. and Ruth Richardson. the new 
Minister of Finance, who would, of course, have to sign off on any 
expenditure211 . 
207 M. McKinnon, independence and Foreign Polic\': New Zealand in /he World Since /935, Auckland. 
1993, p. 278. And M. McKinnon, "Realignment: Ncw Zealand and iLS ANZUS Allies" in B. Brown. New 
Zealand in World Affairs. WellingLon, 1999, p. i 69. 
20X Don McKinnon. Interview. 28 November 200 I. 
2()~ New Zealand National Party. 1993. p. 3. 
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The view of Bolger and his group was that the commitment of New 
Zealand troops to the gathering multi-national force in the Gulf was a 
chance to reassert New Zealand's flagging international role. The 
opportunity to improve the relationship with the United States was seen 
as extremely important. It was also believed that it would help strengthen 
ties with other allies such as Australia, the United Kingdom, and Canada 
which had been adversely affected by the ANZUS dispute. McKinnon has 
described the crisis as 'a perfect opportunity - a ready made vehicle if 
you like' in accomplishing this long signalled goal of National's212. 
In making the decision to commit forces there was minimal discussion 
within the Bolger Cabinet and instead the decision was driven very much 
from the top. Two considerations were taken into account. Firstly. the 
contingent had to be significant enough to signal to New Zealand's allies 
that their commitment was true and solid. Secondly, they were conscious 
of public opinion - as all democratically elected governments are - and 
did not want to compromise their huge election victory by over 
committing militarily. McKinnon was very pleased with the make up of 
the contingent selected. He felt that by including transport aircraft it 
gave the commitment a certain amount of military credibility and would 






This individual level analysis makes a significant contribution to the 
overall conclusions of this case study. Whereas the domestic and 
individual levels, which will be examined in Chapters Five and Six. 
essentially set the scene for, and provide the information, on which the 
decision process was based. it was individuals who made the actual 
decisions. Without an examination of why one action or course of 
behaviour is chosen over another this study would be fundamentally 
invalid. 
In comparing the three New Zealand Prime Ministers of the relevant time 
period, this study has essentially been one of contrasts between the 
different styles, approaches, and personalities of the three individuals 
concerned. It has also shown that while there were many differences 
between them, there were some commonalities, such as the size of their 
decision making units and the roles of the individuals concerned. 
For ease of comparison the table below highlights some of these 
similarities and differences: 
Table 1. Comparative DeciSion Factor Analysis 
Open I Foreign i Political I Cabinet/ 
Minded Mfairs I Pragmatism/ I Caucus 
Approach I Experience Instinct . Consensus 
Geoffrey I I Palmer : High Low I Low Medium 
I Mike i ! 




I I Low I i Low 
I 




Palmer, ever the constitutional lawyer and with little political instinct. 
sought to make a legally and constitutionally correct decision by waiting 
for UN approval and requests, as opposed to what could possibly be 
defined as a morally right decision, by contributing to a collective 
security operation, even though at the time was without UN mandate for 
force. He was. however, open minded on the issue. and did authorise 
several humanitarian missions in the form of milk powder deliveries and 
the transport of refugees out of the theatre of operations. Given the 
respect in which Palmer's judgement was held by his Cabinet/Caucus 
colleagues it would be interesting to see what approach he would have 
taken had he still been leader in late September/October when Moore 
came under both internal and international pressure to join the coalition. 
The far more politically instinctive and pragmatic Moore was also 
relatively open minded on the issue of a military commitment. By the 
time he took the reins of government in early September it was obvious 
that the military operation being assembled in the Gulf was going to be 
significant both in terms of size and importance. Accordingly Moore. an 
avowed internationalist with much foreign affairs experience, believed 
that New Zealand could playa role, albeit a small one. However he had 
assumed leadership of a heavily divided Cabinet and Caucus. which had 
been split by several issues including his rise to power. Without any sign 
of consensus, Cabinet, under his leadership, decided to delay any 
decision until after the election. 
Bolger was, like Palmer, inexperienced in foreign affairs terms, but more 
like Moore in that he was an experienced and somewhat pragmatic 
politician. However. unlike either of the two Labour leaders he had a 
much more closed minded approach. and really only saw one course of 
action. Moreover, he also had the necessary Cabinet and Caucus support 
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to make a substantive decision, a factor that had constrained both 
Palmer and Moore. 
The fact that all three leaders adopted similar styles of decision making, 
in that they used small consultative decision units, and maintained the 
same key advisers is probably best explained by the lack of available 
resources and alternatives faced by a small power such as New Zealand. 
Few Cabinet members had the requisite skills, knowledge. and need to be 
involved. Likewise within the advisory organs such as MERT and NZDF 
there were only very small teams of offiCials available to work on the 
projects. Also unlike many other political systems which give leaders 
more freedom to act. in New Zealand Cabinet approval is needed for all 




New Zealand - The Domestic 
Setting 
INTRODUCTION 
An examination in Chapter Three of the theory governing the analysis of 
the Domestic Level produced a number of factors that wield influence 
upon the decision making process. This chapter will address these 
factors and highlight the key areas of importance. The chapter has two 
distinct sections. The first is Political Culture. as a state's political culture 
will define the scope of behaviour available to the individual sub-national 
actors that have also been defined. The second section is an assessment 
of the roles played in the decision making process by the specific Sub-
National Actors. concentrating on those that are the most relevant to this 
case study. The most important domestic factor in this case study is the 
input of the bureaucracy. primarily the Ministry of External Relations 
and Trade. the Ministry of Defence. and the New Zealand Defence Force. 
It was these three organisations that provided a majority of the advice to 
the decision makers during the crisis period. 
POLITICAL CULTURE 
New Zealand is a former British colony and Dominion. In 1990, the year 
of the Iraqi invasion, it celebrated 150 years since the signing of the 
Treaty ofWaitangi between the British Crown and the indigenous Maori 
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Chiefs in 1840. This treaty is commonly seen by New Zealanders as the 
founding document of its nationhood, however it was only granted 'self-
governing colony' status in 1856, before becoming a 'Dominion' in 
1907214 • 
New Zealand therefore has had, by its standards, a long and close 
relationship with Great Britain. This is reflected domestically by the fact 
that most of New Zealand's immigrants traditionally came from Britain 
and New Zealand's political and judicial systems have followed the 
British paradigms. 
The New Zealand political system has high levels of both accountability 
and institutionalisation. Accountability is best seen in the form of 
electoral voting. General elections are held every three years in New 
Zealand, giving politiCians little respite before facing the electorate once 
again. This means that any instances of non-performance are fresh in 
the minds of the voters, and have led to the New Zealand electorate 
gaining somewhat of an unforgiving label. It is also not uncommon in 
New Zealand for Cabinet Ministers, or even Prime Ministers to be 
replaced if they are believed by their peers to be either under performing 
or if their actions are considered to be undermining their colleagues. 
Geoffrey Palmer was replaced as Labour Leader and Prime Minister by 
his colleagues in the lead up to the 1990 General Election. While they 
believed that they would almost certainly lose the election regardless of 
who the leader was, they felt that the losses would be more severe if 
Palmer stayed as leader. In more recent times, current Prime Minister 
Helen Clark has removed several of her ministers from Cabinet for failing 
to meet her standards in various areas, mostly for their behaviour 
outside the office they held. These actions have included convictions for 
drunk driving, claiming expenses to which entitlement is disputed, and 
214 McKinnon, 1993, p. 1. 
94 
the non-disclosure of previous convictions for a variety of offences. This, 
some would claim, is accountability at the highest levels. 
New Zealand also has a high level of political institutionalisation. 
Democracy, the three year electoral cycle, and the electoral process as a 
whole are all widely accepted. There have been no attempts to overthrow 
the government outside of the electoral process, and apart from the 
change from First Past the Post (FPP) to Mixed Member Proportional 
(MMP) in the mid 1990s, no significant changes to the process itself. 
New Zealand is a stable western democratic state, it has always held fair 
and free elections, and was even the first state to grant female suffrage. It 
has a free and independent media, and the military has always remained 
outside the political sphere. While its politiCS have traditionally been 
dominated by just the two main political parties this has lessened with 
the electoral reforms of the 1990s. New Zealand could not be considered 
anything but an open system state. 
BUREAUCRACIES 
The academic literature on bureaucratic and organisational behaviour is 
full of examples of bureaucratic failures. In this case study there were 
three main bureaucratic organs involved in the crisis: the Ministry of 
External Relations and Trade (MERT), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), 
and the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). MERr, it appears functioned 
qUite smoothly with a small leadership team led by a key individual 
providing a consistent policy advice stream. However recent reforms in 
the defence sector led to a number of problems regarding defence advice, 
as will be examined and discussed. 
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MERT 
Within MERT the workload in relation to the Gulf Crisis of 1990/1991 
was largely the responsibility of one man, the Director of the Middle East 
Africa (MEA) Division, Richard Woods. The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, 
Graham Ansell, and his Deputy, Chris Beeby were responsible for the 
policy advice process, however the day to day burden mainly fell on 
Woods. To aid him he had just two or three individuals that made up the 
MEA Division. Woods was also involved in conducting some of the liaison 
work at the officials level with New Zealand's main allies. In addition he 
also spent a lot of his time liaising with officials from other government 
department such as the MOD, NZDF, and the Prime Minister's 
Departmentz15• 
In the first few days of the crisis in early August 1990, New Zealand 
condemned the Iraqi aggression and supported the imposition of 
economic sanctions as specified by UNSC Resolution 661 of 6 August 
1990. After Australia announced its decision to commit naval forces to 
help enforce the embargo on 10 August, New Zealand made its first 
tentative steps at assessing its options for a similar contribution216 , A 
meeting of key advisers and decision makers at Premier House on 12 
August prepared a Memorandum titled The Iraqi Situation: Defence 
Options which was submitted to Minister of Defence, Peter Tapsell, for 
215 Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001. The MFAT Files also bear this out as they show him as the 
point of contact at the officials level for not only NZ government departments but for foreign diplomatic 
missions as welL He also appears as the drafter of most submissions made for the Minister of External 
Relations and Trade, and Cabinet. 
216 Malik, 1992, p.3. 
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Cabinet. This was the first of many, from both Defence and MERf to be 
presented to Cabinet on the subject of military action217 • 
The two main tasks for MERT during August and early September were 
the monitoring of the well being of the nineteen New Zealanders being 
held hostage by the Iraqis, and the arranging of humanitarian assistance 
for the many thousands of refugees in the region218 • At the Cabinet 
meeting on 13 August, Geoffrey Palmer, defined New Zealand's objectives 
vis-a-vis the Gulf Crisis as: 
1. To protect the welfare of New Zealand citizens in the area, 
2. To playa full and responsible role in the international 
response to this outrage, and 
3. To minimise the damage to New Zealand's trade interests in 
the area219• 
MERT was therefore very busy during the entire month of August 
communicating with its staff in Baghdad, as well as with its allies such 
as Britain and Australia, in order to ensure that New Zealand citizens 
were accounted for and their safety ensured. At the end of August the 
Saddam Hussein allowed all of the New Zealand women and children to 
leave Iraq. MERf arranged for Germany to transport them out of the 
region along with its own hostages22o• The remaining male hostages were 
217 MFAT File 267/2116 Vols. 3 & 5. 
m While Woods and MERT were kept informed of developments as they occurred, the options and 
possibilities for a New Zealand military contribution to the multi-national force were primarily being 
driven by NZDF in this period. 
219 A Memorandum for Cabinet jointly prepared by Palmer and MERT, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 
267121l6/3 Vol. 1 and 267/2/16 Vol. 4. And MERT, "New Zealand Response to Iraq's Invasion of Kuwait" 
in NZER Review, Vol. 40, No.4, July - September 1990, Wellington, 1990, p. 30. 
220 Media Statements by Palmer, 31 August, and 2 September 1990, MFAT File 26712/16/4 Vol. 1. And a 
Submission to the Minister of External Relations and Trade by MERT staff covering the details of the 
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finally released in November 1990, after former Prime Minister David 
Lange made a private and unofficial visit to Baghdad to plead for their 
release. Lange's successful mission, prompted by the pleas of the 
hostages' relatives, was ostensibly a private and unofficial one because 
the National Government refused to give it official sanction given their 
position on the Iraqi invasion. However, the road was smoothed 
somewhat for him as he was accommodated at the embassy in Baghdad, 
and MERT personnel assisted him with establishing the right contacts 
and appointments. Certainly much of the assistance, such as embassy 
accommodation, was merely the extension of the courtesy due any 
former Prime Minister221. Lange, however, claimed that the Government 
could have been more helpful. "but chose not to"222. 
The other main task of MERT in those first two months was 
humanitarian assistance for refugees in the region as discussed in 
Chapter Two. The Cabinet also approved the sending of a civilian medical 
team, funded by the government, to operate in Saudi Arabia with the Red 
Cross/ Red Crescent, however this offer while accepted in principle, was 
never realised in operational terms223 . 
While all of this was evolving. the options were being considered in 
Wellington for a potential military contribution. As has been discussed 
evacuation. Nine New Zealand women and children were evacuated from Baghdad to Amman via a 
German chartered Iraqi Airways flight. They were then flown from Amman to Frankfurt via a German 
military flight. The new New Zealand Prime Minister Mike Moore sent Chancellor Kohl a cable thanking 
him for the German assistance. 
221 Various Submissions to the Minister of External Relations and Trade were made in November 1990 
about the Lange trip and the status of the refugees in genera!, MFAT File 26712116/3 Vol. 2. And Woods 
Interview 18 April 2001. 
222 Unattributed, "MPs Snipe Over Gulf Mission" in -=-=~=, 8 November 1990. 
223 Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade by Woods, 20 September 1990, MFAT File 
267/2116/3 Vol. 1. And Cabinet Paper CAB (90) M 33119, 24 September 1990, MFAT File 26712/16 Vol. 
3. 
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earlier and will be elaborated on in Chapter Five, this option assessment 
was mainly being run by NZDF, however there were many interested 
parties. In mid to late August MERT were particularly busy dealing with 
enquiries as to New Zealand's position224. 
The week of 13 August, the day of the Cabinet meeting that first 
discussed defence options was a particularly busy one for MERf. On the 
Monday, 13 August, the British High Commissioner, on his own 
initiative, called on Ansell in an attempt to assess New Zealand's 
position225. On 14 August, Stanislav Kudriakov, the First Secretary with 
the Soviet Embassy came into MERf and met with Woods and a member 
of his MEA staff to explain the Soviet position226. On 15 August, Woods 
met with David Weller, the Political Counsellor, from the US Embassy, 
who had some enquiries regarding a possible New Zealand naval 
contribution. and how such an event would sit with New Zealand's anti-
nuclear legislation227. On 16 August. the US Ambassador, Della 
Newman, along with Weller and the Naval Attache visited Palmer and the 
Minister of External Relations and Trade. Mike Moore. at the Beehive. 
This meeting and other related matters will be discussed in further detail 
in Chapter Six. 
Throughout September of 1990 the NZDF continued to push for 
affirmative action. submitting in the process several papers to Cabinet. 
They also requested that officials be permitted to open a dialogue with 
224 The MFAT archives show that during this period a number of representatives from foreign diplomatic 
missions visited MERT in order to both inform MERT of their countries position, and to inquire regarding 
any developments in New Zealand's. 
225 Note in file by Ansell, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 4. 
226 Note in file by Woods, 14 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 4. 
227 Note in file by Woods, 15 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 4. 
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their allied counterparts so that if and when a decision was made the 
NZDF would be better able to act quickly. In this MERf was consistently 
supported by NZDF, who made their own submissions on contacts 
between officials. However to the consternation of senior officials in both 
departments they were continually denied this permission by 
Government228 • Finally, on 1 October 1990, at a meeting between Prime 
Minister Mike Moore, Ansell, and Woods, MERT was finally authorised to 
begin making some enquiries at the 'officials' level. The nature of this 
international contact and the reasoning behind it will be examined in 
Chapter Six. 
Defence 
In the late 1980s there were a number of important developments within 
Defence that had a substantial impact on the decision making process, 
as well as wider defence policy formulation. The cumulative effect of 
these changes in structure and personnel can be seen in two key ways 
during the Gulf crisis. 'The first was that the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS)' 
Lieutenant General Sir John Mace, was essentially the chief adviser for 
both the military and Defence, with the MOD having only a limited role. 
As a consequence there was a great deal of strain at times in the 
relationship between NZDF and the MOD, and their offiCials, mainly over 
subjects such as the costing of various options and actions. This was 
most visible in the submissions made to Cabinet by both parties. The 
NZDF provided a multitude of submissions, and responses to requests 
for advice as well as pOSition papers, while the MOD made just a few 
12K Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade by Ansell. 3 September 1990, MFAT File 
26712116/3 Vol. 1. And Robin Klitscher, Interview, 19 April 2001. And Sir Somerford Teagle, Interview, 
20 April 2001. And Richard Woods, Interview. 18 April 2001. 
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submissions, generally providing extra advice to an NZDF document, or 
drawing attention to cost related matters229. 
These changes in the defence environment have their origins in the mid 
1980s when the Lange government became particularly disaffected with 
the defence establishment and the advice it was being given. In 
particular they were concerned by the opposition to its anti-nuclear 
stance from senior officials, the leaking of documents, and by the lack of 
contestable advice being offered by the Secretary and the CDS. Lange 
believed that this was a sign of undue influence on the process by the 
military. Together, these three factors saw a loss of confidence in Defence 
on the part of the government230. 
This was further complicated by the poor relationship that existed 
between the then Minister of Defence, Frank O'Flynn, and both his 
senior officials, and the Prime Minister, David Lange. The relationship 
between Prime Minister and Minister of Defence is the most important 
political one in the defence policy process. However O'Flynn, was a 
reluctant Defence Minister to begin with. and a combination of this, 
several defence crises during the late 1980s, a breakdown with his own 
ministerial staff. and his often being overruled in Cabinet, led to Lange 
becoming more involved in defence than would otherwise be 
necessary231. 
229 MFAT File 267/2116 Vols. 5-17. A majority of these submissions were made in the month of September 
1990, when the government was most keenly looking at its options. Most of the few MOD submissions 
followed just a day or two after a NZDF submission and their content suggests that there was little or no 
consultation between the two departments at all. 
230 J. Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, Wellington, 
1993, pp. 35-36. And B. Ewart, & J. Boston, "The Separation of Policy Advice from Operations: The Case 
of Defence Restructuring in New Zealand" in Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol. 52, No.2, 
June 1993, Sydney, 1993, p. 180. 
231 Rolfe, 1993, pp. 24-25. 
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In early 1987 the Labour Government issued its Defence White Paper, 
followed in mid 1987 by a major review of resource management by the 
Ministry of Defence. This task was given to Strategos. a private 
consultancy firm, headed by the former National Cabinet minister Derek 
Quigley. This report. known as the Strategos Report. or more commonly 
as the Quigley Report. was submitted in December 1988, and had 
several radical recommendations that have had a long term effect on 
defence in New Zealand232• However, more importantly for this case 
study it radically altered the formation and provision to Cabinet of 
defence advice. These changes to the policy process had not been fully 
assimilated by either MOD or NZDF which led to the straining of their 
bureaucratic relationship during the crisis. 
The most important recommendation of the Quigley Report, later enacted 
in 1989 by the new Secretary of Defence, Basil Walker, and given 
statutory legitimacy by the Defence Act 1990, was the splitting of the 
previously unified Ministry of Defence into two separate organs. The first 
was the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF), headed by the Chief of 
Defence Force (CDF), which was responsible for the operations of the 
armed forces. The second was a much smaller Ministry of Defence, 
headed by the Secretary of Defence, who was responsible for defence 
policy and major capital expenditures233• 
The concerns of the Labour Government over the unanimity of defence 
advice were shared by Quigley, who felt that splitting the two functions, 
policy and operations, in line with similar state sector reforms occurring 
232 Ewart & Boston, 1993, p. 181. And Rolfe, 1993, pp. 59-60. And Strategos, New Zealand Defence 
Resource Management Review 1988, Wellington, 1989. 
233 Strategos, 1989, pp. 86-91. And Ewart & Boston, 1993, pp. 181-188. And Rolfe, 1993, pp. 35-36. 
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elsewhere would alleviate this. He believed that the two departments 
would no doubt work closely, but that ultimately they would at times 
have separate, contestable, advice on defence234 . 
Under the Defence Act 1990, the Secretary of Defence was appointed to 
be the principal civilian defence adviser to the Minister of Defence and 
other ministers, and to formulate advice in consultation with the Chief of 
Defence Force on defence policy. The CDF was appointed to command 
the armed forces, and be the principal military adviser to the Minister 
and other ministers. The Secretary is therefore the policy adviser to the 
government, but any advice he or she provides must first be run through 
the CDF, whereas the CDF is able to provide military advice without 
consultation235 . 
The reality is that little has changed: the overall defence policy direction 
is determined by the Secretary, with military consultation from the CDF. 
The two streams of advice are then integrated by the defence 
bureaucracy before being presented to the government, with the same 
two key players. However this was not the case during the period 1989 to 
1991. During this time frame the CDF provided most of the policy advice 
to government while the recently reorganised MOD, in a period of 
transition under a series of short-term secretaries, attempted to create 
its own internal procedures and policy directions236. 
The problems within MOD were no doubt influenced by the uncertainty 
and instability that existed in its leadership. There was a delay in naming 
234 Strategos, 1989, pp. 76-77. And Rolfe, 1993, pp. 35-36. And Ewart & Boston, 1993, p. 182. And Robin 
Klitscher, Interview, 19 April 2001. 
235 Rolfe. 1993, p. 30. 
236 Ibid. 
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a new Secretary after Basil Walker left at the end of 1989. The preferred 
candidate of the State Services Commission was Gerald Hensley, but he 
was rejected by the Labour government. David Swallow was appointed as 
the interim Secretary, but he suffered from a credibility problem due to 
the fact that he had no defence background at all. Eventually, Harold 
Titter, who was a businessman with no previous defence policy 
experience was appointed. However Titter not only had the confidence of 
the Labour Party but he had very good management skills, which were 
soon recognised by an initially hesitant and apprehensive defence 
establishment. Hensley, who had been appointed as a strategic adviser, 
working on the 1991 Defence Review, eventually replaced Titter at the 
end of his contract in mid 1991. This development no doubt was only 
able to occur because of the change of government in October 1990237 . 
NZDF 
As has been discussed earlier, during this transitional period the Chief of 
Defence Force (CDF) became by circumstance the main source of defence 
advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet. The CDF, Lieutenant General 
Sir John Mace, became actively involved in the decision making process 
at an early stage. As discussed earlier, on 12 August an informal meeting 
of senior Ministers and officials was held at Premier House. A key point 
of interest here is that Mace as CDF was present with the Minister of 
Defence but David Swallow, the Secretary of Defence, was not. This is 
further highlighted by the fact that Ansell and Woods were present with 
their Minister, Mike Moore. This was the first time that the key decision 
makers and their senior advisers had met to discuss military options. 
The result of more than an hour of extensive discussions was a 
m Ewart & Boston, 1993, pp. 180-181. And Rolfe, 1993, pp. 36-37. And Robin Klitscher, Interview, 19 
April 2001. 
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Memorandum for Cabinet by Peter Tapsell, the Minister of Defence, 
which was discussed the next day at Cabinet. This memorandum 
presented three initial options: 
1. A frigate for the blockade, 
2. A-4 Skyhawks for combat, and 
3. A battalion of soldiers to the Sinai to replace US troops238. 
Later that week, in response to a request from Cabinet for more 
information Mace submitted to Tapsell for Cabinet a paper entitled Iraq: 
Extended Defence Options. This paper studied two distinct scenarios: 
peacemaking and peacekeeping. It also reiterated the initial three options 
but also stressed the possible deployment of medical or engineer 
personnel as well as the fact that an army deployment would need 
suitable sea/air transport and would have an effect on overall NZDF 
capabilities239. 
On 17 August, Swallow submitted his own submission to Tapsell, also 
entitled Iraq: Extended Defence Options. It was essentially an addendum 
to Mace's paper and set out the position of the MOD with reference to 
Mace's proposed options. In his submission he argues strongly against 
any substantial deployment. especially the three principal options 
mentioned above. The main thrust of his argument was twofold, citing 
the cost of any substantial deployment in fiscal terms, and the potential 
effect on New Zealand's capabilities in its Area of Direct Strategic 
23M Transcript of meeting in file, 12 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 3. And Memorandum for 
Cabinet by Tapsell, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 VoL 5. 
239 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace. undated but week of 13-19 August 1990, MFAT File 
267/2116 VoL 3. 
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Concern (ADSC)240. The ADSC Swallow refers to was defined by the 1987 
Defence White Paper and will be further explained in the next chapter. 
Following further discussions at Premier House on 19 August 1990, 
Mace submitted a new paper to Tapsell for Cabinet the following day. 
Entitled Iraq: Further Detail on Extended Defence Options, it looked in 
more detail under two broad headings: if the situation in Kuwait stays 
the same, and if it deteriorates into conflict. If the situation did not 
change the paper recommended three primary options: 
1. Medical teams deployed with the Red Cross, 
2. The deployment of either HMNZS Endeavour or Monowai, or 
3. Air support, including Andovers already deployed with the 
UN in Tehran, or C-130 Hercules. 
If the situation deteriorated into conflict it recommended five possible 
contributions: 
1. A frigate force, 
2. A detachment of SAS, 
3. A battalion group, 
4. A detachment of A-4 Skyhawk aircraft, or 
5. Other lesser air detachments including helicopters or 
transport aircraft241 . 
240 Submission to Minister of Defence by Swallow, 17 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 5. 
241 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 20 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 5. The paper 
also gives details on such things as lead in times for deployment, and the preferred deployment location. It 
does not however specifically define which, if any, other nations New Zealand forces would work with 
directly. 
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On 23 August, Cabinet's Domestic and External SecuIity Committee 
directed Defence to submit a paper setting out the options for responding 
to a UN request for either a peacemaking or peacekeeping contribution. 
Mace tabled a paper with Cabinet on 27 August entitled Gulf Crisis: 
Defence Options. This paper once again discussed the varying 
alternatives given the different scenaIios and also stressed the need for 
chemical weapons defence equipment for any forces deployed along with 
the need for a close-in weapons system (CIWS) on any frigate deployed242 • 
It is over these two items that it appears NZDF and MOD clashed 
markedly. NZDF emphasised the ess~ntial reqUirement for them if forces 
were to be deployed, while MOD, in a recurIing theme as will be seen 
shortly in an examination of documents from the following month, 
emphasised the cost of the items and the effect on the wider procurement 
budget. However Cabinet noted these requirements on 27 August and 
possibly in a response to MOD's warnings over costs requested a paper 
on possible non-combat options be presented243 • 
This paper, entitled NZDF Non-Combat Options in the Gulf Crisis, was 
presented to the DESC on 30 August and stated that NZDF could provide 
military observers, helicopters, transport aircraft, as well as land 
transport or communications troops to any UN observer mission. It also 
stated that RNZAF transport aircraft had a limited capability to provide 
refugee airlift, and that army medics could train a civilian medical team. 
The DESC considered this paper and then directed NZDF to table a 
242 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 26712116 Vol. 10. The 
CIWS is a computer controlled multi barrelled anti-aircraft gun system that was later fitted to RNZN 
frigates in the 1990s. When I interviewed him on 20 April 2001, I asked former CDF Vice Admiral (Retd) 
Sir Somerford Teagle about this system and whether or not its purchase was as a result of the Gulf Crisis. 
He assured me that it had always been planned for that time frame but he did agree that the crisis had 
highlighted the need for its deployment. 
243 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 10. 
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report to Cabinet on the possibility of New Zealand playing a role in the 
blockade of Iraq. NZDF did so when Mace, via the Minister of Defence. 
tabled a paper entitled Gulf Crisis: Support to the Blockade with Cabinet 
on 3 September 1990. It discussed options including the RNZN tanker 
HMNZS Endeavour, C-130 Hercules aircraft, helicopters, and P-3C Orion 
surveillance aircraft. Cabinet then referred the paper to DESC, who 
considered it along with another NZDF paper on chemical warfare 
defence equipment requirements on 5 September244. 
Following the frustration of this bureaucratic nightmare of round about 
referral and submission Mace decid~d to submit a paper entitled Gulf 
Crisis: NZDF recommendations for Action on 7 September 1990. This 
submission summarised the various papers submitted to that date, 
reiterated the need for defensive equipment for personnel and the 
frigates. and made four recommendations of advice for the Prime 
Minister: 
1. that a frigate could be provided to assist with the 
enforcement of a UN directed blockade of Iraq; 
2. that a detachment of Skyhawks could be provided to operate 
alongside, say, the RAF detachment in Oman; 
3. that HMNZS Endeavour could be assigned in a non-combat 
role to support the UN directed blockade, in concert with the 
Australian task force; and 
4. to approve the preliminaries to procurement of further 
chemical warfare defence equipment, and a CIWS, as 
contingency against deployment being directed245 . 
244 Two separate submissions to the Minister of Defence by Mace. 3 & 7 September 1990, MFAT File 
267/2/16 Vol. 10. 
245 Submission to Minister of Defence by Mace, 7 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 10. 
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On 11 September, the new Secretary of Defence, Harold Titter, submitted 
a paper to Tapsell, also entitled Gulf Crisis: NZDF Recommendations for 
Action. Titter advised against a combat role but added that, if approved 
by the government, the MOD recommended the frigate as the best option 
and a battalion group as the worst option. This of course flies in the face 
of the legislation and convention that the CDF and not the Secretary 
provides operational military advice. Also coming from Titter, who was 
not only brand new in the job, but also had no defence background, it is 
easy to see why there was so little co-operation between the two 
departments. The MOD also advised that it would be a waste of time to 
acquire more chemical warfare defence eqUipment and they could easily 
procure a CIWS if the time came. Titter also made the point that he 
believed that the MOD's Capability Procurement Division had been 
wrongly left out of the loop, and should have been involved from the 
outset246• The biggest outcome of this submission was that once again 
the inter-departmental relationship between NZDF and MOD suffered. 
On 12 September Australia requested that the RNZN tanker, HMNZS 
Endeavour, be deployed on the east coast of Australia to assist with build 
up training for the first rotation of the Australian task force during the 
period 8 October to 5 November. This request was granted and the 
Endeavour did indeed carryout the task as requested247. This of course 
gave the government the benefit of appearing to do something positive 
without having to actually commit troops to the Gulf. 
Throughout September the NZDF was actively assisting with 
humanitarian refugee flights in the Middle East but the fact that they 
246 Submission to Minister of Defence by Titter, 11 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 12. 
247 Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade by Beeby, 17 September 1990, MFAT File 
267/2116/3 Vol. 1 and 267/2116 Vol. 12. 
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believed they could contribute in a more substantial way was beginning 
to show. On 27 September Mace made a very strong and somewhat 
controversial submission to the Prime Minister, Mike Moore. Entitled 
IraqI Kuwait: Recommendations on Defence Response, its tone was set in 
the very first paragraph: 'I propose that it is now in the best interest of 
New Zealand to make way for a pointed and unambiguous operational 
military contribution to the multi-national forces grouped against 
Iraq'248. 
The submission continued, covering such topics as international 
responses, blockade, diplomacy, war, command matters, and capability, 
before ending with a recommendation that Moore authorise officials to 
consult with Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States. He 
recommended they consult without commitment, but based on three 
options including (a) an accompanied frigate, (b) Skyhawks, or (c) Orions, 
so as to determine their applicability, and to report back249. 
Mace's submission met with a mixed reaction from Moore, who agreed 
with much of what Mace was saying. On 1 October Moore directed Ansell 
to begin consultations at the officials level but he also requested Ansell 
get Mace to "back off a little", a direction that Woods passed on. 
The contents of the responses of New Zealand's allies will be dealt with in 
Chapter Six, but the general response was positive. However, it became a 
moot point after Cabinet was unable to reach an agreement on the issue 
and delayed any decision until after the election. 
24~ Submission to the Prime Minister by Mace, 27 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 13. 
249 Ibid. 
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At this point both NZDF and MERr were actively supporting the idea of a 
military contribution, while MOD remained sceptical, mainly for fiscal 
reasons. However all three had to wait until the election results were 
known and the new government formed. During this time NZDF and 
MERT continued to monitor events and to consult about options and 
proposals. This was partly due to the impending election of a Bolger led 
National government, which was widely expected to guarantee a swift 
decision to commit, particularly given the tone of many of Bolger's pre-
election speeches on defence and foreign policy250. 
On 2 November 1990, Mace submitted a paper entitled The Gulf Crisis 
and New Zealand: A Defence Force View. This paper addressed NZDF 
capabilities, strategic and political considerations, and the UN 
dimension. It concluded by recommending that New Zealand's broader 
interests would be best served by committing NZDF resources to the 
multi-national forces, and listing several preferred options251 . 
This paper along with a separate MERr document, also recommending a 
military deployment, was put to Cabinet on 26 November. Cabinet 
referred them to the Cabinet Security Committee, which met the 
following day. This committee had the power to act, and did so approving 
the decision to commit, and identifying potential options. The follOwing 
day an Aide-Memoire listing these options for the force structure was 
distributed to Canberra, Ottawa, London, and Washington for feedback 
on preferences. This feedback and the consultation process will be 
discussed in more detail later in the international level analysis but it did 
?50 Transcript of Bolger's speech given to the Wellington Branch of the New Zealand Institute of 
International Affairs, 18 September 1990, MFAT File 26712/16 Vol. 12. 
251 Submission to the Minister of Defence by Mace. 2 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 17. 
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decide the eventual force structure which was then approved by the full 
Cabinet on 3 December252. 
The Intelligence Services 
The intelligence services in New Zealand are modest by world standards, 
and in many regards they have had to rely on the support of friendly 
states such as Britain, Australia, Canada and the United States. 
However, the New Zealand intelligence services all had a part to play 
during the Gulf crisis. 
There are four agencies that make up New Zealand's intelligence and 
security community. These are: 
1. the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (SIS), 
2. the Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB), 
3. the External Assessments Bureau (EAB), and 
4. the Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security 
(DDIS)253. 
The SIS is essentially a counter-intelligence agency, responsible for 
domestic security, Its main role is to protect New Zealand from 
espionage. sabotage, terrorism, and subversion254, During the period of 
the Gulf Crisis the SIS. along with the New Zealand Police and customs 
252 Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade by Ansell, 6 November 1990, MFAT File 
267/2116/3 Vol. 2. And 267/2116 Vol. 17. And Cabinet Security Committee Paper CSC (90) M 3, 27 
November 1990, MFAT File 2671211613 Vol. 2. And 267/2116 Vol. 19. And Internal MERT memorandum 
from Beeby to Ansell that contained a copy of the Aide-Memoire, 28 November 1990, MF AT File 
26712/16 Vol. 19. 
m The New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Security in New Zealand Today, Wellington, 1999, p. 
8. 
254 Ibid., pp. 8-14. 
112 
officials, maintained an increased security overwatch and reported to 
Cabinet, via the Domestic and External Security Committee (DESC)' on a 
weekly basis255. 
The GCSB is responsible for signals intelligence (Sigint). Sigint is 
essentially the interception and analysis of foreign communications and 
other signals such as radars. The GCSB has close ties to the American 
National Security Agency (NSA) and is involved in a global Sigint network 
also involving the United States, United kingdom, Canada, and 
Australian known as ECHELON256. During the Gulf Crisis the GCSB 
prOvided assistance with the communication of classified material 
between New Zealand and its allies. 
The EAB is part of the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, 
and is responsible for the researching and assessing of overseas 
developments, situations, and issues that are likely to have an effect on 
New Zealand's interests. This is generally done through the collation of 
open and classified source material and not secret intelligence gathering 
(spying) 257 . During the course of the crisis EAB prOvided Cabinet, and 
others, with weekly intelligence summaries regarding the deployment of 
both Iraqi and Coalition military forces, and other related materia1258 
DDIS is part of the NZDF and is the chief defence intelligence and 
security agency. It is staffed by a combination of military and civilian 
personnel. Until the late 1990s it operated as two separate organisations: 
255 MFAT File 267/2/16 Vols. 1-34. 
256 N. Hager, Secret Power, Nelson, 1996, pp. 12-29. 
257 NZSIS, 1999, p. 8. 
158 MFAT File 26712116 Vols. 1-34. 
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the Directorate of Defence Intelligence (DDI) and the Directorate of 
Defence Security (DDS), though the two have since been combined. 
Throughout the period of the crisis, from the time of the Iraqi invasion 
until after the conclusion it provided the intelligence support for the 
NZDF, who in turn provided Cabinet with operational military advice. 
The three services Army, Navy and Air Force also have personnel 
operating in various intelligence capacities within their own 
organisations. though only the Army has its own organiC intelligence 
career stream and units259. 
In 1985, as a result of the deepening ANZUS crisis, the United States 
ceased providing intelligence support and material to New Zealand. This 
cessation however did not include the material provided via the 
ECHELON network, as New Zealand was still seen as a vital cog in that 
process. Instead for some a period of time the routing indicators at the 
beginning of a message that show the origin of the material were left 
off260. On 20 February 1991. Minister of Foreign Mfairs, Don McKinnon, 
confirmed on a Radio New Zealand Morning Report broadcast, that the 
level of intelligence provided to New Zealand had increased after the 
commitment of troops261. Previous to that commitment though, the 
United States had of its own accord, provided copies of White House and 
State Department briefings and conferences from the outset of the crisis 
via the New Zealand Embassy in Washington262 . 
259 NZSJS, 1999, p. 8. And the Author served in the New Zealand Army's New Zealand Intelligence Corp 
(NZJC) from 1993-1996. 
260 Hager, 1996, pp. 23-25. 
261 MFAT File 267/2116/4 Vol. 2. And Hager. 1996, p. 182. 
262 MFAT File 26712/16 Vols. 1-34. 
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LEGISLATURES 
In New Zealand at the time, the legislature had very little impact on the 
decision making process. All three Prime Ministers confined the decision 
making process to a handful of senior ministers, though all three also 
used Cabinet to legitimise their decisions/indecisions. In New Zealand 
substantive parliamentary discussions of foreign policy are rare. If a 
major foreign policy issue does arise a member can move to adjourn the 
House to debate it. This did happen during the Gulf crisis, and in 
January 1991 Parliament met for a special day log session. However the 
debate was held on the understanding that decisions remained with 
Cabinet263 . 
POLITICAL OPPOSITION 
Opposition!rom Within the Ruling Party or Group 
Both Geoffrey Palmer and Mike Moore faced some level of opposition from 
within their own party over the Gulf crisis. Right from the start of the 
crisis Palmer refused to rule out making a military contribution, but 
made the point that it would be reliant on a request from the UN before 
doing S0264. During the early stages of the military build-up in the Gulf 
many Labour MPs believed the US actions to be hasty and premature, 
and this was reflected by an early Cabinet vote of 18-2 against direct 
action265 
263 Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991b, pp. 212-213. 
264 Post Cabinet Press Conference, 6 August 1990, Palmer was quoted as saying "if the UN decided that the 
use of force was appropriate, New Zealand would most certainly seriously consider making a contribution 
to that", MFAT File 267/2/16/4: Iraq/Kuwait Relations, Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, Media Statements and 
Coverage, Vol. 1. 
265 Mal ik, 1992, p. 92. 
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By the time Moore had assumed the leadership from Palmer in early 
September, several UN Security Council Resolutions had been passed 
and the multi-national forces were beginning to assemble in the Gulf. 
Moore came under increasing pressure from several quarters, both 
domestically and internationally, to make a firm decision and commit 
New Zealand forces. However it is clear that a majority of his Caucus, led 
by his deputy, Helen Clark, and Minister of Disarmament and Associate 
Minister of External Relations and Trade, Fran Wilde, opposed any direct 
involvement in the crisis. Others to vocally oppose a military role 
included Peter Dunne, Elizabeth Tennet, and Sonja Davies266 . Moore, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, was open to the possibility of joining 
the coalition. However, given that by this stage Moore was heavily 
involved in fighting an election campaign which threatened to destroy his 
party, and the residual resentment within his Caucus over his replacing 
Palmer, it is not surprising that he accepted the position of his colleagues 
and agreed in early October to put off any decision untn after the 
election. 
After the General Election of 27 October 1990, the new Prime Minister, 
Jim Bolger, faced no such internal opposition from within his own 
government and there was minimal debate on the issue in Caucus267• 
They had swept to power with an overwhelming majority and his 
leadership was assured. With the approval of the Prime Minister, Mike 
Moore, he had been kept informed via regular briefings from officials 
266 J. Armstrong, "PM Denies Playing Politics Over Crisis" in New Zealand Herald, 14 August 1990. And 
R. Macintyre, "New Zealand and the Gulf: Crisis and War" in New ZealandlAotearoa Palestine Review, 
No.4, July 1991, Christchurch, 1991, p. 2. 
267 Don McKinnon, Interview, 28 November 2001. 
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during his time as Leader of the Opposition. and the bureaucratic and 
military machinery had continued to work during the interim period268. 
Opposition from Other Political Parties 
The New Zealand Parliament at the time was still operating under the 
first past the post system, and of the ninety seven seats only one was not 
controlled by either of the two major parties, Labour and National. The 
Labour government controlled fifty five seats, six more than was 
necessary to have a parliamentary majority269. Therefore there was no 
significant party opposition within the parliament itself. However, private 
polling conducted by the Labour party prior to the election showed that 
they faced a potential disaster at the polls in October27o. National too, 
was aware of this and attempted to broach the subject of a bi-partisan 
approach to the Gulf crisis with Palmer. This would have both allowed for 
continuation of policy post-election. and given any decision to commit a 
certain level of domestic credibility, but Palmer was adamantly opposed 
to any such approach271. 
After the election of 27 October 1990, when Labour was in opposition 
they were in no pOSition to offer any resistance. Their number of 
parliamentary seats had fallen from fifty six to just twenty nine, and 
while this figure was higher than their own pre-election polling had 
26H Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001. Woods personally briefed Bolger, as Leader of the 
Opposition, on a weekly basis during August-October 1990. 
26~ Vowles & Aimer, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
270 Ibid. 
271 Bolger raised the possibility on Radio New Zealand's 'Morning Report' programme on Monday 20 
August 1990. The following day he sent a letter to Palmer raising the subject with him. Palmer replied with 
a letter dated Friday 24 August to the effect that he WijS disturbed that Bolger had raised the subject in the 
media before consulting himself, and that he saw no requirement for such an approach. MFAT File 
267/2116, Vol. 6. 
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forecast, they were still well behind National who held a massive sixty 
seven seats. With twelve Labour Ministers, both Labour Whips, and the 
Speaker of the House all removed from office by the voters Labour was 
far too pre-occupied with re-organising and re-building to mount an 
effective opposition in this immediate post-election period272. 
Moore, as Leader of the Opposition, offered the National government 
support over their handling of the Gulf crisis, but only as long as they 
did not commit combat forces273. As discussed earlier Moore had been 
open to the idea of making a military commitment when he was Prime 
Minister. This caveat of support based on non-combatants is most likely 
as a result of a combination of continuing dissatisfaction within his own 
Caucus and polling showing this to be the general mood of the public 
regarding troop deployments274. 
Opposition from the Military and Paramilitary Actors 
In New Zealand during the time period of the case study there was no 
military opposition to government. In New Zealand the military is 
constitutionally responsible to the Governor-General, not the Prime 
Minister. However the Governor-General is bound to act on the advice of 
the Prime Minister. The New Zealand military has no partisan political 
role, nor any role at all in civil governance. In fact subordination to 
272 Vowles & Aimer, 1993, pp. 1-2. 
273 Mike Moore reiterated this point in a radio interview on Radio New Zealand, 17 January 1991. And 
Rt.Hon. M. Moore, "Address in Reply - Presentation to the Governor-General", 22 January 1991, in New 
Zealand Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 512, 22 Jan - 6 Mar 1991, Wellington, 1991, p. 10. 
274 A Heylen Research Poll conducted IS/19 January 1991 showed 73% support for New Zealand's non-
combatant role, 5% support for an increase in non-combatant and combatant forces, and 16% for 
withdrawal of all New Zealand troops. The National government received a 6S% approval rating on the 
issue. Cited by R. MacIntyre, "New Zealand and the Middle East: Policy Evaluation and War in the Gulf' 
in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, p. lIS. 
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civilian masters is not only a well accepted but an actively encouraged 
state of affairs in a military that lacks the need, will power or 
organisation to act in its own interests275 . 
Oppositionjrom Regionally Based Groups 
As with opposition from the military, in the case of New Zealand there 
was/is no regional split. Government in New Zealand is run centrally, 
not federally, there are no regional governments operating under a 
national umbrella. There are no ethnic minorities of such a size, 
possessing the will power and the means to cause a split. At the time of 
the case study, the Treaty of Waitangi settlements that marked the 
1990s had not occurred, so even the more powerful Iwi, such as Ngai 
Tahu, had no means to battle the government. Even today it would be 
hard to imagine such a body wishing to challenge the authority of a 
government that has aided in building their resources and influence, yet 
remains quite capable of checking their power should the need arise. 
INTEREST GROUPS 
During the period of the Persian Gulf Crisis, there were two main interest 
groups that attempted to sway the decision making of the New Zealand 
government. The first fits under the economic label. In the first days 
following the invasion of Kuwait, both the Dairy Board, and Waitaki 
International, a dairy exporter, made direct submissions to the 
government and released media statements pressing the case for the 
275 J. Rolfe, The Armed Forces of New Zealand, Sydney, 1999, pp. 35-37. However this has began to be 
questioned as several scandals emerged during 2001 that involved such matters as an alleged conspiracy 
proposal to influence defence policy, improper accessing of personnel files, and the improper shredding of 
documents. 
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continuation of New Zealand trade with Iraq, and the wider Middle East 
region. 
On 5 August 1990, a senior representative ofWaitaki International sent a 
letter to Moore, who was then Minister of External Relations and Trade, 
streSSing that time was money, and urged that any New Zealand 
response stopped short of sanctions. He reiterated the fact that they 
currently had representatives in Jordan, accompanying meat shipments 
inbound for Iraq, though they also agreed to hold off on further 
discussions with Iraqi officials until the government's position was 
clearer276. On 7 August 1990, the Dairy Board released a media 
statement declaring that they expected to lose between NZ$50million and 
NZ$70million if sanctions were imposed upon Iraq, and if this happened 
they expected to discuss compensation with the government277 . This call 
for holding off on sanctions fell on deaf ears as following the adoption, on 
6 August 1990, ofUNSC Resolution 661, which imposed economic 
sanctions on Iraq, the Prime Minister announced on 7 August 1991 that 
New Zealand would implement the sanctions278. 
The other form of interest group that was prominent during this period, 
in New Zealand, were the peace groups, both organised and ad hoc. New 
Zealand has a long history of peace activism, which is probably best 
encapsulated in the anti-nuclear legislation in the government statutes, 
and the fight to get it there. From the outset of the crisis, there was an 
extensive letter writing campaign, from both peace groups and concerned 
individuals that was directed towards the government. While there is no 
276 Letter from Waitaki International to Mike Moore, Minister of External Relations and Trade, 5 August 
1990. MFAT File 267/2/16: IraqlKuwait Relations, Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait, General, Vol. 2 
277 New Zealand Dairy Board Press Statement, 7 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16 Vol. 2. 
m Prime Ministerial Media Release, Sanctions Against Iraq, 7 August 1990, MFAT File 26712116 Vol. 2 
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evidence that points to the government taking these concerns directly 
into their decision making processes, they were taking note of the volume 
of submissions, and the general direction of their views279• 
As well as the letter writing campaign. the organised peace groups, such 
as Just Defence, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), the New 
Labour Party, and the Public Advisory Committee on Disarmament and 
Arms Control (PACDAC) regularly released media statements, and 
published journals such as Peacelink. Both the organised groups, and 
the more ad hoc groups that sprung up during the crisis, held regular 
public meetings. 
As has been stated earlier, there is no evidence to show that the 
government took the views of the peace lobby directly into their decision 
making calculations. However, this galvanising of the left, just three 
months short of an election, came at an opportune time for Jim Anderton 
and his New Labour Party, who were individually and collectively vocal 
on the issue. The outcome of the General Election of October 1990 was 
already a foregone conclusion, but one question that must be asked is 
what would the impact of the peace groups have been like if the election 
had been seen as a close contest? Labour's 1984 electoral victory was 
influenced by the peace groups. and had the polling gap been closer they 
may have been able to use this issue, and the peace groups, to save 
themselves. However, as it was the Gulf Crisis proved not to be a central 
factor in the campaign. 
Post election the new National government paid little attention to the 
peace groups in relation to their decision making. McKinnon in 
279 Richard Woods, MERT, Submission to the Minister of External Relations and Trade. Gulf Crisis: Public 
Opinion in New Zealand, 12 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116/3: Iraq/Kuwait, Iraqi Invasion of 
Kuwait, Submission to Minister, Vol. 1. 
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particular was not concerned that the peace groups opposed the new 
government's military and political commitment to the US led coaltion28o . 
THE MEDIA 
With the advent of cable and satellite news channels like CNN, the Gulf 
War became the most widely broadcast, and scrutinised conflict in 
history. From the time of the invasion those with access to CNN had 24 
hour a day coverage of the latest in Gulf Crisis news and footage. In New 
Zealand, where CNN access was limited to those with the fledgling Sky 
Network system. both 'IV One and 'IV3 also spent many hours covering 
the crisis with formerly hour long news broadcasts becoming extended 
for several hours. especially in the early days of the crisis. In the first two 
or three weeks of the crisis while events were unfolding. and before they 
became more routine. much of the local coverage was still based on CNN 
and BBC footage. but there was also local input. Television personalities 
such as Paul Holmes and Lindsay Perigo hosted "specials" on the crisis 
and local academics and commentators were utilised for their input. 
However, once it had been established that the crisis was not going to 
end quickly, New Zealand coverage became far more routine and almost 
exclusively sourced from western news agencies such as the BBC and 
CNN, with New Zealand input based largely on politicians. It is possible 
though, that this was merely the channelling of limited resources into 
coverage of the election that was looming large on the horizon. 
The print media largely followed the same pattern as their television 
counterparts, whereby after a short time most of the articles on the Gulf 
Crisis were coming from foreign sources and New Zealand content was 
2RO Don McKinnon. Interview, 28 November 2001. 
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almost exclusively from political journalists and politicians. However the 
tone of much of the editorials was at times quite critical of what was 
termed government hesitancy and inability to make a decision, Radio 
was somewhat different, with talkback being a key factor. Any 
development in the crisis, at home or abroad, no matter how small, was 
able to provide talkback radio hosts with hours of feedback. 
THE PEOPLE 
Public opinion was an important factor in New Zealand at the time of the 
Gulf Crisis, though this was largely due to the impending election. The 
Labour government was aware that it was staring down the barrel of a 
heavy defeat at the polls. They were also aware that the left was their 
traditional voter powerbase, that they had caused much distress to this 
element of the population in the previous three years, and that if they 
were to survive beyond the next election, let alone win it, they had to be 
careful not to alienate them any further. Labour was also aware that a 
Heylen research poll taken on 18 August 1990, showed that 47% of new 
Zealanders opposed sending troops, while just 36% supported such a 
measure281 . 
When National took power after the election they did not face the same 
public opinion constraints. Not only were the left not traditionally 
disposed towards National, they had a significant parliamentary majority, 
and were assured of power for at least three more years. Also while the 
public may not have been overly supportive of sending troops before the 
election, they seemed to accept the committing of non-combatant forces 
2RJ Unattributed. "New Zealand Government and Opposition, Statements, Policies, and Opinions Relating 
Lo Palestine and the Gulf' in New ZealandiAotearoa Palestine Review, No.4, July 1991, Christchurch, 
1991,p.4. 
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afterwards as two Heylen polls in early 1991 showed. On 18 January 
1991, 68% approved the new government's handling of the crisis, while 
just 20% disapproved and 12% were undecided. Two weeks later, on 2 
February 1991, the approval figure had risen to 74%, with disapproval 
falling by just one point to 19%, but the undecided had dropped from 
12% to just 8%282. 
CONCLUSION 
A review of the domestic level of analysis has provided a number of 
factors that constrained the decision making process. The splitting of 
Defence into policy and operations had marginalised the MOD as it 
struggled to find its place in the policy process, complicated by multiple 
leadership changes. Instead, under the strong leadership of General Sir 
John Mace the NZDF dominated the provision of defence advice to 
government. MOD were further sidelined as the high levels of co-
operation between NZDF and MERT soon produced a consistent stream 
of advice to the decision makers. MERT promoted the idea that New 
Zealand's absence from the coalition was being progressively viewed in a 
negative context by its traditional friends and allies, while NZDF not only 
provided options for commitment but also actively encouraged a decision 
to commit. 
The legislature had little or no role in the process as both governments 
kept the decision making unit confined to a handful of key individuals 
within the executive leadership. Political opposition had little or no role 
to playas while Labour was in power National were aware of the inability 
of Palmer and Moore to woo their Cabinet, and were prepared to wait 
until after the election. Post-election National had such a heavy 
282 Ibid., 1991, p. 5. 
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parliamentary majority that any opposition to their actions by Labour 
would have a minimal effect. Moore, as Leader of the Opposition. openly 
supported the National deciSion as long as New Zealand troops remained 
in a non-combatant role. 
The only interest groups to have any impact on the decision making 
process were the peace groups who provided much of the grass roots 
political support for the Labour Party. Despite the wishes of both Palmer 
and Moore to commit, the opposition to such a move by these groups 
helped to prevent them from doing so. Both Palmer and Moore were 
aware that if Labour were to have any chance at the impending election 
the support from this traditional power base would be much needed. 
The media placed no constraints on the decision making process. 
However some observations can be made. Firstly the reliance by both 
television networks on British and American news reporting in relation to 
the crisis no doubt had an impact on the public perceptions of the crisis 
and its related issues. Secondly. the general tone of two of the three 
largest daily newspapers, The New Zealand Herald and The Press, was 
generally critical of perceived Labour Government hesitancy. It is entirely 
possible that a combination of these two factors is partially responsible 
for the general public support for the eventual commitment of New 
Zealand troops, though the scale of this support was possibly also 
influenced by the non-combatant nature of the contingent. 
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Chapter Six 
New Zealand in the International 
System 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will analyse New Zealand's place in the international 
system, its relationship with the United Nations, and its relationships 
with its key allies, This is important because New Zealand's initial policy 
position was guided by its preference for a collective security operation 
under the auspices of the UN. When this was not possible New Zealand's 
policy was influenced by discussions with its traditional allies. 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 August 1990, New Zealand moved 
quickly to condemn the invasion itself, and to endorse President Bush's 
call for an emergency session of the UNSC283, The following day the 
Prime Minister, Geoffrey Palmer, repeated the Government's 
condemnation of the invasion, calling the Iraqi aggression "an outrage, 
an affront to international law", adding that "should mandatory 
sanctions be called for by the Security Council, New Zealand will of 
course join in fully", Palmer followed this the next day by sending the 
2X3 Media Statement by Han. Bill Jeffries, Acting Minister of External Relations and Trade. 2 August 1990, 
MFAT File 267/2116/4 Vol. 1. 
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New Zealand Ambassador to Iraq. John Clarke. to visit the Iraqi Foreign 
Ministry, ostensibly to register New Zealand's views284 • 
The finn retrort of Palmer continued the next week. When questioned 
about the crisis at his post-Cabinet press conference on 6 August he 
reiterated the Government's position: 
The government's stance on that has been clearly articulated, it is one of total 
condemnation of that naked act of aggression. The Cabinet has decided that if 
the UN Security council agrees to call for mandatory sanctions then New 
Zealand will do its duty. We also designated the Minister of External Relations 
and Trade and myself to keep the situation under continuing review to develop 
any other policy options that might emerge as a result of what is quite a rapidly 
changing scene at the momentz85 • 
When asked where then New Zealand stood? He replied: 
Well, New Zealand's position is that we want to see the action through the 
United Nations. As a small nation the best protection is through the UN. Under 
the UN Charter there are a great many things that the UN can do. It can use 
mandatory sanctions as I've indicated, but it can also use force. and as I've 
already suggested, if the UN decided that the use of force was appropriate New 
Zealand would most certainly seriously consider making a contribution to 
that286 • 
New Zealand was finnly of the view that the UN should take the lead role 
in any possible military action against Iraq. Following the US decision to 
commit troops to the Gulf Palmer released a statement, commenting that 
284 Media Statements by Rt. Han. Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, 3 & 5 August 1990, MFAT File 
267/2116/4 Vol. 1. 




he appreciated the US position but New Zealand had not been invited to 
join any potential military operation. He also reiterated his government's 
belief that any New Zealand contribution was reliant on a UN decision 
deeming the use of force appropriate287 . 
NEW ZEALAND IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
National Interests 
It is a truism that government poliCies are guided by national self 
interests and constitute the state's most vital needs. These include self-
preservation, enhancement of the nation's economic development, 
independence from intervention by foreigners in domestic affairs, 
territorial integrity, military security, prestige, and preservation of a "way 
of life", culture, or ideology. National interests may be defined by political 
leaders, whether they be dictators or political parties and they are ever 
changing and developing because different leaders have different 
perspectives288 
New Zealand's national interests at the time of the case study were 
undergoing a process of introspection following the break-up of ANZUS 
and the end of the Cold War. New Zealand's foreign policy focus has 
always been largely economic rather than military or power based, with 
an emphasis on internationalism and moralleadership289. However, this 
is not to say that New Zealand has ignored the realities of the often 
2R7 Ibid. 
2&8 J.e. Plano, & R. Olton, The International Relations Dictionary, 2nd Ed., Kalamazoo, 1979, p. 128. And 
Nester, 1995, pp. 121-123. And Frankel, 1988, p. 94. And Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, 1971, p. 321. And 
M.A. Kaplan, System and Process in International Politics, New York, 1957, pp. 164-165. 
289 Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 9-lO. 
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volatile international system and its place in it. Indeed, New Zealand has 
always maintained a strategic outlook, even though it has often had to 
change as circumstances have evolved. 
This is clearly articulated by the changes in security policy that have 
occurred since the end of the Second World War, when New Zealand 
primarily concentrated on containing three potential military threats. 
Firstly the threat of a powerful country such as Russia, China, or Japan 
sweeping down through South East Asia into Australasia. Secondly. the 
destabilisation of a South East Asian country. or a superpower / 
greatpower conflict in the region. These threats were heightened by the 
Communist victory in mainland China in 1949, the Sino-Soviet Treaty in 
January 1950, and the Korean War six months later, It is against this 
backdrop that New Zealand signed the ANZUS Treaty with Australia and 
the United States in 1951290, 
As a result of this South East Asian focus, and participation in 
deterrence based defence agreements such as ANZAM (Australia and New 
Zealand in the Malayan Area), SEATO (South East Asia Treaty 
Organisation, and ANZUS, New Zealand became militarily involved in a 
number of conflicts in Malaya, Borneo, and Vietnam29 1 , 
With the admission of Communist China to the UN in October 1971, and 
the end of the Vietnam War in January 1973, the strategic focus changed 
under the leadership of Robert Muldoon (1975-1984), Muldoon, an 
avowed anti-Communist, took a more global perspective in focusing New 
290 R. Kennaway, "The Wider Asian-Pacific Context" in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 44-45. 
291 Kennaway in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 46-50. And Henderson in Kennaway & Henderson. 
1991, p. 83. And G. Wilson-Roberts, "The Prevention of War: Dilemmas for Policy Making in New 
Zealand" in Political Science, Vol. 52, No.2, December 2000, Auckland, 2000, pp. 135-136. 
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Zealand's threat perceptions on the Soviet Union292 . The demise of the 
Soviet threat, and the rise of violence and destabilisation in the Pacific 
region saw yet another shift in emphasis in the mid-to-Iate 1980s. 
David Lange's Labour government was swept to power in the 1984 
General Election on a platform based on proposed anti-nuclear 
legislation that had captured the groundswell of public opinion. The 
eventual passing of this legislation in 1986, and its poor reception by 
New Zealand's main nuclear ally, the United States, led to the virtual 
demise of the ANZUS arrangement and defence co-operation of any kind. 
As a result, New Zealand was forced to withdraw from playing any form 
of significant role in the western alliance. With the concurrent fading of 
any Soviet threat as that country began the process of fundamental 
political and economic change under Gorbachev, this was deemed to be 
of little consequence by many in New Zealand at the time, and Labour 
was re-elected in 1987. 
At the same time instability was on the rise in the wider South Pacific 
region. There were two coups in Fiji in 1987, along with seccessionist 
conflict in New Caledonia and Bougainville, as well as violence in Papua 
New Guinea, the Solomon Islands. and Vanuatu293• This was reflected in 
the diplomatic and military approaches of the Lange government. In the 
1987 Defence White Paper, the South West PaCific was defined as New 
Zealand's Area of Direct StrategiC Concern (ADSC) and in 1989 the New 
Zealand infantry battalion was withdrawn from Singapore and returned 
to New Zealand294• On the diplomatic front, by 1990 New Zealand had 
2Y2 Kennaway in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 46-48. 
293 R. Thakur, "Changing Forces in South Pacific International Relations" in Kennaway & Henderson, 
1991, p. 33. 
294 New Zealand Government, Defence of New Zealand: Review of Defence Policy J 987, Wellington, 1987. 
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ten diplomatic posts in the region, one fifth the total of New Zealand's 
overseas diplomatic missions295 . 
New Zealand is a small country, with a population at the time of the case 
study of just 3.3 million occupying a land mass of approximately the 
same size as Great Britain or Japan. Its status as geographically remote 
from most of the rest of the world is highlighted by the fact that it has a 
200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZJ, among the largest in 
the world296 . 
As a small power, according to the literature, New Zealand would be 
expected to have a low participation in the international system. However 
this is not the case. Despite its size and relative powerlessness, New 
Zealand has had a long history of activity in both the League of Nations 
and United Nations, promoting global co-operation, collective security, 
and the rights of small states297 . 
NEW ZEALAND AND THE UNITED NATIONS 
The theoretical literature suggests that small sates such as New Zealand 
have a preference for conducting foreign policy in multi-lateral settings 
such as the United Nations. This allows them to gain a better return for 
the expenditure of their limited foreign policy resources. This is 
particularly true in the case of New Zealand, which has a long and proud 
history of activity within, and on behalf of, the United Nations. 
295 J. Henderson, "New Zealand and the Other PacificIslands" in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991c, p. 17. 
296 S. Hoadley, The New Zealand Foreign Atlairs Handbook, 2°U Ed., Auckland, 1992, p. 1. 
297 D. McCraw, "The Labour Party's Foreign Policy Tradition" in New Zealand International Review, Vol. 
22, No.3, May-June 1997, Wellington, 1997, pp. 18-22. And Crawford, 1996, p. 8. 
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New Zealand was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945. New 
Zealand Prime Minister Peter Fraser chaired the committee that wrote 
the trusteeship chapter of the UN Charter298. Fraser was a strong 
supporter of the notion of collective security and wanted a strong UN 
organisation in order to achieve this. It was for this reason that he 
argued against the veto powers awarded to the permanent members of 
the Security Council299 , 
During its time as a member of the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA) New Zealand has served three terms on the Security Council. 
1954-55, 1966, and 1993-94. This has led to New Zealand involvement 
in UN discussion and decision making on issues such as Indochina in 
the 1950s, the Vietnam War and the Congo in the 1960s, and the 
internal conflicts afflicting Rwanda, Somalia, and the Former Yugoslavia 
in the 1990s30o , 
Geoffrey Palmer refused to rule out the possibility of New Zealand 
contributing to a peacekeeping force in the region should it be required. 
New Zealand has a long history of involvement in UN peacekeeping 
operations. The first New Zealand peacekeepers were three officers who 
served as observers with the United Nations Military Observer Group in 
India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) in 1952301 • Since that time New Zealand 
troops have served as peacekeepers and observers in locations as diverse 
298 M. McKinnon, "Introduction" in M. Templeton, New Zealand as an International Citizen: Fifty Years of 
United Nations Membership, Wellington, 1995, pp. 5-6. And R. Alley, "New Zealand and the United 
Nations" in Kennaway & Henderson, 1991, pp. 164-166. 
299 McKinnon, 1993, p. 57. 
3()() B. Brown, "New Zealand in the Security Council" in Templeton, 1995, pp. 25, 42-49, 55-61. And 
McKinnon in Templeton. 1995. pp. 5-6. 
301 R. Thakur. "Peacekeeping" in Templeton, 1995, p. 65. 
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as Lebanon, the Congo, Cambodia, Former Yugoslavia, Angola, Somalia, 
Iran, and Iraq302. 
NEW ZEALAND AND ITS ALLIES 
Historically, in times of both war and peace, New Zealand has 
maintained close links with its three main allies, Britain, Australia, and 
the United States. and to an extent Canada, inclUding military 
commitments stretching across every continent of the world. It was 
therefore not surprising that New Zealand should turn to its traditional 
allies as the Gulf Crisis developed. Interaction with these four traditional 
allies had a significant impact upon the decision making process. In this 
context New Zealand's previous relationships with them should be 
considered. 
Great Britain 
The link between New Zealand and Great Britain is a strong one. As a 
result, the foreign policy of New Zealand has also developed a history of 
being linked closely to Great Britain. New Zealand troops have joined 
their British counterparts in both World Wars, and several smaller 
Imperial! Commonwealth based conflicts in countries such as South 
Africa, Malaya, and Borneo, at a high cost in terms of human life. Even 
as recently as 1982, New Zealand assisted the British during the 
Falklands War, by supplying the frigate HMNZS Canterbury to assist the 
Royal Navy in the Indian Ocean, thereby freeing up a British warship for 
duty in the South Atlantic303 . 
302 Rolfe. 1999, pp. 80-81. 
303 Wilson-Roberts. 2000, p. 127. And Rolfe, 1999, pp. 14-18. And McKinnon, 1993, pp. 206-207. 
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Australia 
Australia and New Zealand have always been closely linked by 
geographical 'closeness' and common ties to Great Britain and the 
British Empire/Commonwealth. They have very much a big brother/ 
little brother relationship, and while several agreements such as Closer 
Economic Relations (CER) exist, periodically calls are made from a 
variety of sources for greater unity between the two countries. In 1944 
the Australian-New Zealand Agreement (known as the Canberra Pact), 
which identified that both countries had mutual security interests in the 
South Pacific was Signed. By the late 1980s there were more New 
Zealand officials based in Australia (47) than in the United States (36) or 
in Great Britain (33)304. 
United States 
The relationship between New Zealand and the United States, while 
stretching back to the beginnings of New Zealand's existence as a British 
colony, have flourished since the Second World War. Before this time 
Britain's dominance of international affairs, particularly for New Zealand. 
was absolute. However by the end of the Second World War, Great 
Britain had faded substantially as a world power, having been replaced 
by both the United States and the Soviet Union in the superpower 
category. New Zealand's political and defence ties to Britain had also 
been shaken by the inability of the British to protect New Zealand in the 
event of Japanese aggreSSion in the South Pacific. Instead. the United 
States stepped into the breach, sending many thousands of its troops to 
304 Hoadley, 1992, p. 7. And F. Holmes, The Trans-Tasman Relationship, Wellington, 1996, p. 35. And S. 
Hoadley, "Trans-Tasman Relations: CER and CDR" in Brown, 1999, p. 195. 
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New Zealand and Australia as well as leading the fight against the 
Japanese305. 
Diplomatic representation was established with the United States in 
1941, and from that time until the mid 1980s New Zealand and the 
United States maintained close political and defence ties, including the 
ANZUS agreement, with New Zealand an active participant in the broader 
'Western Alliance' during the Cold War. New Zealand also sent troops to 
assist in the garrisoning of Japan at the end of the Second World War, 
and to the conflict in Vietnam306 . 
ANWS Dispute 
The effects of the ANZUS dispute were still being felt in New Zealand in 
1990 when the Gulf Crisis began to impact upon the deCision making 
process. Firstly the same Labour Government that was at the centre of 
the dispute with the US was still in government. Thus many of the 
politicians who supported the anti-nuclear stance in the early 1980s had 
now to decide whether or not to become involved in a major conflict 
where the possible use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was a 
source of open debate. Being an election year the government was aware 
that the anti-nuclear stance was an important component of both its 
1984 election victory and its ongoing policy profile. To rush quickly to the 
side of the nuclear armed United States in a then regional conflict 
without what it perceived to be clear cut UN sanction would be perceived 
by much of its supporter base, including the peace lobbies, as an 
unacceptable about tum. Also due to the scaling down of co-operation 
305 S. Hoadley, New Zealand United States Relations: Friends No Longer Allies, Wellington, 2000, pp. 29-
31. And McKinnon, 1993, p. 10. 
3()6 I. McGibbon, "New Zealand Defence Policy from Vietnam to the Gulf' in Brown, 1999, p. 113. And 
Hoadley, 1992, p. 7. 
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and communication between the two countries there was in 1990 a high 
level of uncertainty in Wellington about the nature of its relations with 
the US. For example would a military contribution be welcomed by the 
United States and its military forces. 
The period 1985-1990 was a tense one in terms of the New Zealand -
United States relationship with little or no contact at any level. Since 
1991 the relationship has thawed somewhat and contact has for the 
most part returned to a high level. However, the anti-nuclear policy 
passed into legislation in June 1987307 and the rival National Party 
abandoned its opposition to it in 1990. 
The Crisis 
When Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke decided to commit a naval 
force just a week after the invasion he was contacted by Geoffrey Palmer 
to discuss the matter. While Palmer ruled out any similar contribution at 
that time due to (a) the lack of clear UN authority, (b) the lack of an 
invitation to contribute, and (c) the preparation time required, he did 
offer the use of New Zealand naval assets to substitute for Australian 
vessels that had been deployed if they were needed308. 
On 14 August Palmer received a letter from Jaber AI Ahmed AI Sabah, 
the Emir of Kuwait, requesting New Zealand assistance to reclaim Kuwait 
from Iraq. 
307 McKinnon in Brown, 1999, p. 164-169. 
,OR Media Statement By Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, 10 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2116/4 
Vol. 1. And Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Post Cabinet Press Conference, 13 August 1990, MFAT File 
267/2/1614 Vol. I. 
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I thereby request on behalf of my government and in the exercise of the inherent 
right of individual and collective security as recognised in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter that the government of New Zealand take such military 
or other steps as are necessary to ensure that economic measures designed to 
fully restore our rights are effectively implemented309 • 
On 1 7 August Palmer released a media statement announcing the arrival 
of the Kuwaiti letter. He added that Washington had been asked by 
Kuwait to provide co-ordination and liaison in order to help establish a 
multi-national force to implement the UN Resolutions310• 
A copy was also passed on by US Ambassador Della Newman when she 
and two of her key staff members visited Palmer and Moore on 16 
August. Details were provided of the most recent meeting of the 
permanent members of the Security Council held in New York on 14 
August. Palmer outlined the Cabinet meeting of Monday 13 August and 
said that the External Security Committee of Cabinet would meet on 
Tuesday 14 August to hear advice from officials on the various options 
available to the government. As a result of this advice he said he felt it 
unwise to send RNZN vessels into the Gulf at present given the self 
defence and chemical warfare 'limitations' of said vessels. Ambassador 
Newman counselled Palmer to avoid limiting his options prematurely, 
while her Naval Attache raised the possibility of medical, dental, or 
communications personnel as a potential contribution311 , 
309 Copy of original letter, dated 14 August 1990, MFAT File 26712116 Vol. 4. 
3JO Media Statement by Rt. Han. Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, 17 August 1990, MFAT File 26712116/4 
Vol. \. 
31 I Simon Murdoch, Prime Minister's Advisory Group, Note for File, 16 August 1990, MFAT File 
26712116 Vol. 5. And Graham Ansell, Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, 16 August 
1990, MFAT File 26712116/3 Vol. 1. 
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HUMANITARIAN AID 
While New Zealand remained non-committal for the present on any 
military action, it began to concentrate on the humanitarian front. At the 
post -Cabinet press conference on 20 August, Palmer announced that the 
government had decided to offer to provide a civilian medical team in 
Saudi Arabia, functioning under the umbrella of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) I International Federation of the Red 
Crescent (IFRC) organisation. He added though, that the government had 
yet to confirm any of this with the ICRCI IFRC, and the Saudi 
government. The team would be staffed by New Zealanders, and the New 
Zealand government would pay for it. He also announced the offer to 
provide to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, two RNZAF 
Andover transport aircraft for diplomatic flights312. 
A week later, on 27 August, Palmer announced the offer of 35,000lbs (16 
tonnes) of milk powder to be donated to the Egyptian Red Crescent 
organisation. The Red Crescent had requested 100 tonnes, however the 
transport of that much milk powder was deemed to be beyond New 
Zealand's means. The 16 tonnes donated amounted to a fully laden C-
130 Hercules aircraft, and was believed to be more appropriate313. 
Mter discussions with the International Office for Migration, in Geneva, 
the government agreed to allow the Hercules to be used to transport 
Pakistani and Filipino refugees to their home countries. An RNZAF 
Boeing 727, which had taken personnel to the Battle of Britain 
312 Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, Post-Cabinet Press Conference, 20 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 
1. 
313 Rt. Han. Geoffrey Palmer, Post-Cabinet Press Conference, 27 August 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/4 Vol. 
1. 
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commemoration was also diverted to the region where it flew refugee 
resettlement missions to India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the 
Philippines. Between them the RNZAF aircraft were responsible for 
returning between 1600 and 1700 refugees314 • 
During September 1990 New Zealand was finnly committed to 
humanitarian operations relating to the Gulf CrisiS. At this stage the 
military option was on 'hold' and New Zealand officials were embargoed 
from entering into discussions over military options with their 
counterparts in other nations315. 
CABLES 
On 1 October a crucial meeting was held between Moore, Ansell and 
Woods, at which Moore directed MERT to send a number of diplomatic 
cables to New Zealand posts in members states of the multi-national 
force. He wanted to know how these countries justified their decisions. 
He was particularly interested in the cases of Argentina. Denmark, 
Norway, and the Netherlands316. 
The second cable was to go to the Saudi capital, Riyadh. The broad 
message he wanted to send was that the New Zealand government was 
inquiring into what it could usefully send in event that the situation 
deteriorated and if the UN requested, in terms of transport or 
surveillance aircraft. Another cable was to be sent to the New Zealand 
314 Rt. Hon. Mike Moore, Prime Minister, Press Statement, 7 September 1990. MFAT File 267/2116/4 Vol. 
1. And Rt. Hon. Mike Moore, Prime Minister, Media Release, 19 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 
Vol. 1. 
315 Richard Woods, Interview, 18 April 2001. 
316 Note for File by Woods, I October 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 14 
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mission at the UN in New York, repeating the earlier offer of Andover 
aircraft, and inquiring into the ability of fitting a New Zealand 
contribution into a wider UN military structure. The last set of cables 
were to be sent to New Zealand's four main allies and prospective 
military partners, namely Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United 
States. These cables were to be more detailed and include infonnation 
such as the numbers of aircraft available317• 
There was, however, a certain naivety about these cables. They placed an 
emphasis on two things: firstly a deterioration of the military situation in 
the Gulf, which if it had occurred would have left no time for the 
necessary pre-deployment planning and logistical preparations as well as 
ruling out one of the two preferred options. Secondly, according to the 
cables a further request for contributions from the UN was required by 
New Zealand. This requirement was seen as not only unnecessary but 
somewhat bewildering by the other countries consulted, thus pointing to 
New Zealand being, to an extent, out of touch the true nature of events. 
Also the cable to the UN regarding a UN military structure is if anything 
bizarre given that at no time was there any attempt to initiate the long 
donnant Military Staff Committee. 
On 2 October Woods met with representatives from Australia, Britain, 
Canada, and the United States, who were given a draft copy of the cable 
being sent to their capital. They were also briefed on the cables being 
sent to New York and Riyadh318 . 
The replies from all four prospective partners were in their own ways 
positive though all questioned New Zealand's emphasis on a further UN 
m Note for File by Woods, 1 October 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 14 
m Note for File by Woods, 2 October 1990, MFA T File 26712116 Vol. 14 
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request for assistance. They believed that sufficient UN coverage existed 
under Article 51 as examined in Chapter Two. The point was also made 
that if hostilities were to break out then there would be insufficient time 
to formulate such a request319. 
The Australians responded by welcoming the spirit of the New Zealand 
offer, but noted that they had no use for transport aircraft, as their 
contingent was a naval one. They also expressed concerns about the 
current congestion at military airfields in the region and the abundance 
of surveillance support within the Gulf itself. They did point to the 
possibility of Orions operating outside the Gulf in a blockade assistance 
role320 • 
Canada was committed to political solidarity and the possibility of 
working with New Zealand, but did not require any further transport 
assistance and reinforced the Australian message regarding surveillance 
aircraft321 • 
The British welcomed a possible New Zealand contribution, but stressed 
that New Zealand risked "missing the boat". They emphasised that at the 
onset of hostilities Orion surveillance aircraft would become 
unnecessary, but they did see a need for extra transport aircraft as they 
were struggling to meet their own needs in this area322• 





The US position was much more 'complicated', due to the aftermath of 
the ANZUS dispute of the mid 1980s. The initial response from the 
Pentagon was cautious and non-committal but after more serious 
consideration at higher levels an official Administration response was 
conveyed via both the US Embassy in Wellington and through State 
Department channels, which contained three points: 
1. The US did not want to discourage participation by any 
nation in the multi-national force but that any offers should 
be directed to the governments of Kuwait or Saudi Arabia, 
2. That for safety and logistical reasons New Zealand must co-
ordinate its operations with those of other nations, and that 
any co-operation must in no way be interpreted as a change 
in New Zealand United States relations, 
3. That the US had no objections to New Zealand's co-operation 
with a country other than the US323. 
A US Embassy official also remarked that this pOSition had been arrived 
at without consulting any of New Zealand's other potential partners 
though they would be informed. This official also stressed that no one in 
the State Department wanted to 'slam the door' on New Zealand, and 
that everyone wanted New Zealand to demonstrate that it can be part of 
the world security community324. 
As well as sending the cable to Riyadh, the New Zealand Ambassador to 
Saudi Arabia, Win Cochrane, spoke with Saudi and KUWaiti officials on 
the matter. A mid ranking Saudi official conveyed to Cochrane his 




already been prepared to do and offer. The Kuwaiti Ambassador to Saudi 
Arabia undertook to talk to the Emir immediately, and asked if Cochrane 
wished to meet with the Emir personally, A week later the Saudis 
responded further by reiterating their genuine thanks for the offer but 
after due consideration they believed that there were sufficient transport 
and surveillance assets in theatre325, 
On 8 October Cabinet met to discuss the cables and the international 
replies to them. Unable to achieve a positive consensus on making a 
unilateral military contribution Cabinet instead proposed to offer to the 
UN transport and surveillance aircraft if the situation so detennined326. 
One week later when Leslie James, the Acting Canadian High 
Commissioner, visited Woods to follow up on the possibility of a New 
Zealand contribution as raised in the cables. he was infonned that 
Cabinet had decided to postpone any decision until after the upcoming 
election unless there was a major change in the current situation327. 
POST ELECTION 
The General Election on 27 October 1990 led to a new National 
government. headed by Jim Bolger, who was not constrained by the 
indecision of the previous government. nor distracted by an impending 
election. Also he was far more committed in principle to joining the 
multi-national force, and repairing the NZ-US relationship328, 
325 Ibid. 
326 Cabinet Paper: CAB (90) M 35121, 8 October 1990, MFAT File 26712/16 Vol. 15 
327 Note for File by Woods, 15 October 1990, MFAT File 26712116 Vol. 15 
12K Hon. J.B. Bolger, Leader of the Opposition, Address to the Wellington Branch of the New Zealand 
Institute of International Affairs, 18 September 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 12. 
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In early November the new government received a series of briefings from 
officials from both MERT and Defence regarding the crisis. The overall 
direction that these briefings took was clear: (a) New Zealand armed 
forces were both capable and ready to make a contribution to the multi-
national force, (b) given the wide membership of the coalition, New 
Zealand's friends and allies were somewhat concerned at its absence 
from the collective action and stood ready to accept any suitable 
contribution offered, and (c) MERT and NZDF believed that the MNF had 
sufficient UN authority for New Zealand to make such an offer329 . 
The decision to commit troops was made at the Cabinet Strategy 
Committee meeting on 27 November 1990. On 28 November the Heads of 
Mission of the four key allies were handed copies of an aide-memoire, 
which contained options for deployment currently being considered by 
the government, requesting feedback on appropriate options. They were 
also asked to identity which if any of the options they wished to be 
considered for deployment with their own forces. It was requested that 
replies be received by 1 December so that Cabinet could make a final 
decision at its Cabinet meeting two days later. It was made clear that the 
replies would decide the action taken33o. 
The options offered were the choice of: 
1. 2 x P-3C Orion surveillance aircraft, 
2. 1 x Leander Class frigate, 
3. 2 x C-130 Hercules transport aircraft, 
32'1 Lt. Gen. Sir John Mace, Submission to Minister of Defence, 2 November 1990, MFAT File 267/2116 
Vol. 17. And Graham Ansell, Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, 6 November 1990, 
MFAT File 26712116/3 Vol. 2. 
330 Graham Ansell, Submission to Minister of External Relations and Trade, Aide-Memoire, 28 November 
1990, MFAT File 267/2116 Vol. 19. 
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4. 1 x medical team, 
5. 1 x support tanker. 
The contribution would be either one, two or three, with one being 
preferred. The possibility of adding option four or five to the main 
contribution was left open for consideration331 
Because the military connection between New Zealand and Australia was 
considered to be of prime importance, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff 
(DCDS), Air Vice Marshall Robin Klitscher (and a small staff), was also 
dispatched to Canberra to confer with Australian defence chiefs. Initial 
discussions between the two groups were very positive and the 
Australians seemed enthusiastic at the possibility of some form of 
ANZAC co-operation within the multi-national force. At this stage the 
deployment of a frigate to work alongside the Australian taskforce was 
the primary option considered in the discussions. However the official 
reply was much more circumspect and far less inspiring. This was most 
likely due to some form of consultation in the interim between Australian 
and US officials332 • 
The preferred British option was the C-130 aircraft, the naval tanker, 
and medical personnel, all of which they would be most happy to 
accommodate within their order of battle333. 
331 Cabinet Strategy Committee Paper: CSC (90) M 3, 27 November 1990, MFAT Files 267/2116/3 Vol. 2 
and 267/2116 Vol. 19. 
332 Robin Klitscher, Interview, 19 April 2001. 
m Letter from Acting British High Commissioner S. 1. Scoutar to Chris Beeby, Deputy Secretary of 
External Relations and Trade, 29 November 1990, MFAT File, 26712116 Vol. 20. 
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The Canadians welcomed the decision of the New Zealand government 
and appreciated being consulted and offered the proposed New Zealand 
assistance. The offer of a frigate with or without the tanker was the most 
appropriate option for co-operation with Canadian forces. The Canadians 
also offered assistance with obtaining a CIWS air defence system for the 
frigate if necessary334. 
The US made it clear that it welcomed the New Zealand decision and 
would accommodate any contribution that New Zealand decided to make, 
though it expressed particular interest in medical personnel and to a 
lesser extent the C-130 aircraft. Like the Canadians they too offered to 
obtain CIWS for any frigates that should be deployed335. 
On the recommendation of officials and after discussions with its allies 
Bolger and his cabinet decided to approve the contribution of two 
Hercules aircraft to work with the RAF in Saudi Arabia, and an army 
medical team to be based at a US Navy hospital in Bahrain. Initially both 
the Australian and New Zealand defence chiefs sought to combine their 
medical resources and form an ANZAC unit to be based on a US Navy 
hospital ship. However this was not possible due to a shortage of 
available onboard space336. 
One mistake that was made by New Zealand was the way it handled 
relations with both Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. Firstly the New Zealand 
government made the mistake of publicly announcing the intended 
334 Robin Klitscher, Interview, 18 April 2001. 
335 Joint Submission to Prime Minister Bolger by Graeme Ansell, Secretary of External Relations and 
Trade, D.K. McDowell, Chief executive of the department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, and Vice 
Admiral P.R. Adamson, Acting Chief of Defence Forces, 3 December 1990, MFAT File 26712116 Vol. 20. 
336 Note for File by Woods regarding conversation with US Embassy and Submission to Minister of 
External Relations and Trade, 12 December 1990, MFAT Files 26712116/3 Vol. 3 and 26712116 Vol. 21. 
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deployments to these countries before any consultation on the matter 
had taken place. Understandably this caused both offence and 
diplomatic embarrassment, which was compounded when it became 
obvious that New Zealand had chosen to consult its 'allies' prior to the 
decision being made, but had not included potential host countries337 • 
On the other hand something they got right was the decision to dispatch 
the DCDS, Air Vice Marshall Klitscher, to London and Riyadh in order to 
assist with the necessary co-ordination for Operation FRESCO as the 
deployment was now being called338 . This was particularly important 
when dealing with the Saudis, who put great credence on protocol. 
Klitscher was a very senior officer with a long and distinguished record 
including combat service flying helicopters in Vietnam. By sending such 
a representative the New Zealand government sent the message that they 
were very serious with their undertaking. 
On 31 December 1990 the British High Commission presented a request 
to the New Zealand government for the provision of a second medical 
team to serve with British forces in the Gulf. By this time Britain and the 
United States were calling up reservists and struggling for numbers in 
key areas such as medical personneL After discussions with officials it 
was decided to send a 20-member medical team drawn from all three 
military services339 . This team would be based in Manama, Bahrain with 
an RAF hospital. 
m Robin KUtscher, Interview, 18 April 2001. 
m Robin Klitscher, Interview, 18 April 2001. 
339 Rt. Hon. Jim Bolger, Prime Minister, Media Statement, 21 January 1991, MFAT File 26712116/4 Vol. 2. 
And MERT, Submission to Prime Minister, 16 January 1991, MFAT File 267/2/16/3 Vol. 3. 
147 
CONCLUSION 
New Zealand has a long history of championing 'collective security' and 
the role of the United Nations in such actions. Thus it is no surprise that 
the initial New Zealand reaction was to condemn the invasion, follow the 
UN's lead and impose sanctions, and standby waiting for a UN request 
for military assistance. However, in this particular case the UN did not 
take the lead role in the international response to the invasion of Kuwait, 
the United States did. As a result. while the US set about building a 
significant multi-national coalition New Zealand remained on the 
sidelines. 
As time progressed the fact that New Zealand was absent from the 
coalition being assembled in the Gulf was increasingly becoming a 
political issue. New Zealand's absence surprised and concerned its close 
allies such as Australia, Britain, Canada and the United States. Likewise 
senior officials in New Zealand conveyed their concerns along with those 
of their foreign counterparts to the New Zealand government. The allied 
governments that New Zealand consulted with on the matter also 
expressed their belief that the UN need not make a further request for 
military forces as they believed that they had sufficient coverage under 
the aegis of earlier UNSC resolutions. 
When in power the Labour Government was heavily factionalised and the 
executive leadership could not muster the required Cabinet support for a 
decision to commit military forces. The key factor in the change of policy 
was the election of a new government on 27 October. The incoming 
National Government was concerned that the absence of New Zealand 
from the coalition exacerbated relations with the US and its wider allies. 
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As a result they decided to take the initiative and make a military 
contribution to the coalition. 
Because any military role that New Zealand might play in the Gulf would 
be minor it was deemed necessary that New Zealand forces would be 
required to conduct operations from within the force structure of another 
military contingent. To accomplish this New Zealand contacted its closest 
allies in order to seek the most appropriate contribution form, which 
contained several troop options, and requested feedback as to 
appropriateness and the possibility of operating with each addressee 
country's forces. The decision on the composition of New Zealand's 
military contribution was based directly on this feedback. 
This analysis shows that New Zealand's commitment to, and belief in, 
the United Nations, played a role in delaying an early decision to commit 
troops. It also shows that New Zealand's closest friends and allies were 
able to influence not only the eventual decision to commit troops, but 
also the non-combatant nature of the military contingent. However in 
both cases they were not the only mitigating factor as has been shown in 
Chapters Four and Five. 
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Chapter Seven 
Rhetoric, Indecision, and 
Decision - A Concluding Analysis 
The significance of this thesis is that it contributes to the literature in 
two key ways. Firstly, the depth and scope of this study adds to the 
literary analysis of what is an important piece of New Zealand foreign 
policy history34o. Secondly the theoretical literature of small state foreign 
policy behaviour has tended to concentrate largely on smaller European 
states and this study adds to the much smaller pool of studies on non-
European small states. 
A comparative analysis of the three prime ministers during the crisis 
period has produced a number of observations. As shown in Table 1. 
There was considerable variance between the three individuals in four 
key areas. The first of these is the level of 'open-mindedness' in the 
general approach to the issue of whether or not to commit New Zealand 
troops to the MNF. Palmer was the most open minded, being prepared to 
consider all options while waiting for the situation in the Gulf to clarify 
before any decision was made. Moore also tried to be open minded 
however his preference for an 'internationalist' foreign policy probably 
clouded his views to a degree. Also the situation had clarified somewhat 
by the time he became prime minister and the range of options available 
340 There are a number of research papers that cover several aspects of New Zealand's involvement in the 
Gulf War 1990-1991 held at The Macmillan Library, which holds the University of Canterbury's research 
collection of New Zealand and Pacific Islands materials. 
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had narrowed. Bolger was the least open minded of the three having 
signalled his belief that New Zealand should playa military role in the 
Gulf as early as September 1990. 
The second variable was 'foreign affairs experience'. Moore was the most 
experienced in foreign affairs by a considerable margin with almost 
twenty years of foreign affairs committee or portfolio experience. Palmer 
on the other hand had a very low experience level being primarily legal 
and constitutionally minded. Bolger too had a low level of foreign affairs 
experience having spent most of his parliamentary career in domestic 
portfolios. He did however gain some experience as Head of the 
International Labour Organisation in the mid -1980s. 
The third variable was political ability and pragmatism. Moore was once 
again clearly dominant in this area, as evidenced by his replacement of 
Palmer as Labour Party Leader and Prime Minister. He had a high level of 
political charisma which he utilised by portraying himself as a 'man of 
the people', capable of making hard decisions. Like Moore, Bolger first 
entered Parliament in 1972 and was therefore in 1990 an experienced 
politician. However compared to Moore, Bolger was a somewhat more 
conservative and cautious politician. In contrast Palmer had a low 
political instinct, often criticised for being too academic and legalistic. 
While a very effective political 'tradesman' he failed to inspire as a leader 
and was replaced by his colleagues. 
The fourth variable was Cabinet support. In terms of effecting a decision 
to join the MNF this was the most important variable, as within the New 
Zealand political system even a highly motivated and determined Prime 
Minister cannot achieve such an outcome without the backing of his or 
her Cabinet. Palmer was well respected and on the issue of the Gulf 
Crisis he maintained a high level of Cabinet support, however, he lost 
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Cabinet support for his leadership in the lead up to the General Election 
and was replaced by Moore. When Moore replaced Palmer he received a 
muted support from his Cabinet who were primarily concerned with the 
Party's political survival. However, in the wider caucus there was a great 
deal of unhappiness over the way Palmer had been forced out and for 
which Moore was blamed. Bolger maintained a high level of caucus and 
Cabinet support throughout the crisis period. 
Within the domestic political component of the decision making process 
the most important factor was the bureaucracy, in particular the three 
main policy advice organs of government - MERT, MOD, and NZDF. 
Throughout the crisis period MERT maintained a consistent and effective 
policy advice stream to Cabinet. MOD were effectively sidelined from the 
process as it struggled to adapt to the various reforms and restructuring 
that had taken place over the previous two years. NZDF pushed for the 
government to make a military commitment to the MNF from the outset 
of the crisis though the nature of the desired commitment became 
significantly diluted as the crisis developed and many initial suggestions 
were ruled out as inappropriate. 
Other domestic level factors were much less important. The Intelligence 
Services continued to provide a secure channel for the flow of 
information. though this was generally filtered through the US and UK. 
The Legislature was preoccupied with the General Election and an 
agreement was made to allow Cabinet to make a decision without 
significant parliamentary debate. Interest Groups such as the Dairy 
Board and the peace groups were active but had a limited impact upon 
the process, thqugh government did mOnitor public opinion. For the most 
part the media merely relayed international sourced news material while 
the people were generally supportive of government policy with a majority 
clearly preferring a non-combat role for New Zealand troops. 
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New Zealand has had a history of supporting 'collective security' under 
the auspices of the UN. Therefore the Palmer government's approach was 
not only predictable but also consistent with previous policy. When it 
became obvious that any military action in the Gulf would be led by the 
United States and not the UN the New Zealand government had to decide 
whether it would participate in this form of collective security. The 
decision was complicated by the continuing fallout from the ANZUS 
dispute of the mid-1980s which had adversely affected US-New Zealand 
military relations. Despite the leadership change from Palmer to Moore 
New Zealand was still governed by the same Labour government whose 
anti-nuclear stance had initiated the dispute. With an impending 
General Election this Labour government could not afford to jeopardise 
its traditional supporter base by joining the MNF and so no consensus to 
do so was achieved. 
A positive decision to commit military forces to the MNF was effectively 
assured when National won a large victory at the October General 
Election. This new National government free from the factionalisation 
and 'baggage' of the previous Labour government had previously 
signalled its intent to repair the New Zealand-US relationship. This factor 
along with the desire of New Zealand to playa more active international 
role initiated the deCision to commit non-combatant military resources to 
the MNF. 
The decision to join the US led multi-national force in the Persian Gulf 
War showed that New Zealand had moved on from the 'isolation' that had 
clouded its post-ANZUS relations with the US. Indeed the commitment of 
non-combatant forces to the MNF marked a new era of improved 
relations with the US and might therefore have been the catalyst for 
important change in New Zealand's foreign policy in the decade of the 
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1990s and beyond. Throughout the 1990s New Zealand maintained a 
high level of international activity as an IGO member state (including the 
UNSC and APEC) and as a peacekeeper operating on behalf of the UN. By 
the end of the decade New Zealand had played or was playing major roles 
in a number of significant peace monitoring/keeping operations 
including Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Bougainville, East Timor, and 
Afghanistan. 
This thesis has utilised three levels of analysis in assessing the decision 
making process that ultimately led to the commitment of New Zealand 
military forces to the MNF during the Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991. 
Several key conclusions have been reached as a result of this analysiS. 
Firstly the decision making ability of New Zealand Prime Ministers is 
often constrained through the requirement for Cabinet consultation and 
approval. This was clearly articulated in Chapters Four and Six, where it 
was shown that despite the open-minded approach taken by Mike Moore, 
and his authorising of initial discussions with New Zealand's allies he 
was not able to achieve a decision to commit to the MNF because he did 
not have the backing of his Cabinet on the issue. 
The second substantive conclusion is that despite some problems in 
adapting to recent reforms and re-organisations the bureaucracy 
operated smoothly and effiCiently during the crisis period. The chief 
reason for the delay in a final decision being reached was not the high 
number and frequency of bureaucratic submissions but the fact that the 
Labour government waited for two months before initiating substantive 
discussions with New Zealand's main allies. The uncertainties that 
surrounded such as issues as the appropriateness and welcome of a New 
Zealand military contribution and the role of the UN in the MNF would 
have been alleviated much sooner had either Palmer or Moore acceded to 
bureaucratic requests and initiated contact at an earlier date. 
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The third important conclusion is that despite New Zealand's desire for 
an independent foreign policy it was in fact significantly guided by the 
wishes of its closest allies. There is no doubt that the decision to make a 
military commitment was in part guided by the reactions to the cables 
Moore authorised on 1 October 1990. This reaction commented that New 
Zealand's reliance on a specific UN request was inappropriate, that a 
New Zealand military contribution would be welcomed, and that New 
Zealand's absence from the coalition was of potential concern to its allies. 
The decision to use an integrative analysis approach has been justified 
by the identification of the three most important factors that impacted on 
the decision making process. The fact that all three come from different 
'levels' highlights the fact that a more narrowly focused examination may 
not have produced an entirely accurate outcome. The three key factors 
were Jim Bolger's high level of Cabinet support, the support of the 
bureaucracy for a military contribution to the MNF, and likewise the 
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